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Abstract 
 
There is an on-going debate on the effects of participatory development interventions; 
some scholars claim that participation is the key driver of change while others show that 
these interventions are vulnerable to unintended consequences and often only empower the 
already leading elites.  
The Brazilian agrarian reform created a large migration flow into villages inside sugar cane 
plantations (engenhos) that became agrarian reform settlements (assentamentos). The main 
novelties in assentamentos are the presence of households with heterogeneous background 
and free use of land. 
The main question is whether the agrarian reform and producers’ cooperatives supported 
the emergence in assentamentos of new forms of social organization.  
This research argues that that impact of development intervention is not only related to 
participants but to the entire target social structure. Applying theory of adaptiveness, the 
main hypothesis is that the capacity of assentamentos to respond to the changes promoted by 
these external interventions depends on the level of overlap between multiple social 
networks that define the social structure of assentamentos. 
This research explores qualitatively and quantitatively the network formation of three 
assentamentos in Northeast Brazil. Furthermore it analyzes how one cooperative supporting 
family farming influences and it is influenced by the social network structure. The agrarian 
reform and the creation of a producers’ cooperative can be considered as participatory 
interventions, as they were community driven. The unit of analysis is the household. 
Households are the nodes in the network. Villages are considered as social relational systems. 
The analysis focuses on the study of multiple networks that connect households in each 
village.  
By analyzing three agrarian reform settlements that were created by three different social 
movements, the research shows that different households’ recruitment strategies and 
different villages’ histories led to different village composition and social processes behind 
network formation. Family farming plays a crucial role in allowing for the possibility to create 
new rural villages that differ from previous sugar cane plantation production units. The 
possibility of family farming to become a relevant livelihood strategy is associated with the 
features of villages’ social networks. The producers’ cooperative, supporting the introduction 
of new labor-intensive crops and guaranteeing a market for some crops, sustains family 
farming employment network. However the brokering role of the cooperative is hampered by 
the cooperative political positioning and by the path of specialization towards high value and 
labor-intensive crops. 
 
 
Keywords [participation, multiple social networks, adaptiveness, Brazilian agrarian reform, 
family farming] 
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1. Villages’ histories and social networks’ overlap: beyond participation  
1.1 Introduction 
International development projects aim at promoting change in the society where they 
are operating. By analyzing the discourse of development in the last decades it emerges that 
what donors refer as development is the adoption of changes in a direction that they consider 
the most suitable (Mosse 2005).  
Participatory development is a crucial element of development discourse since the late 
1980s. Authors promoting such approach (Chambers 1983) claim that the creation of 
institutions that are based on community are key to introduce change. Donors supported the 
creation of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to promote innovation adoption. 
Several participatory development did not create any change but rather became a new 
tyranny that only empowers the already leading elites (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001). 
Previous studies showed the vulnerability of CBOs to elites capturing and their risk to 
introduce no change in the context where they operate (Mansuri and Rao 2004; De Wit and 
Berner 2009). Organizations such as producers’ cooperatives often include people that share 
similar characteristics and identical social spaces (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012).  
The main explanation for this failure is that it is based on a poor understanding of how 
power and social agency operate. “Behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constraint 
by ongoing social relations that construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding” (M. Granovetter 1985, 141–142). Francis Cleaver, focusing on the social 
“embeddedness” of agency and decision making, argues that the main reasons for failure of 
participatory development is “overoptimistic notion of agency, combined with romantic ideas 
about groups and institutions” (Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004, 271).  
Most of the indicators of development are related to individual features. Instead it is 
possible to argue that these indicators should also be based on social relations to capture the 
complexity of the society studied. Analysis based on methodological individualism does not 
elucidate the dynamics of inequality and exclusion of some groups (Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004).  
Network theory developed several methodologies to analyze social relations and how 
they influence behavior and outcomes. The concept of social structure describes the relational 
system among actors. Furthermore it portrays the membership in social units or contexts, 
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such as schools, villages and neighborhoods (Entwisle et al. 2007). Every actor is embedded in 
social relations that can be represented as networks. Actors are the nodes of the network. The 
social relations, such as friendship or kinship, which connect nodes in a network, are defined 
as edges or ties. Nodes have socio-economic characteristics, such as gender, income, status, 
that are defined as attributes. Nodes’ attributes are important in the study of social networks. 
A network is a complex structure that can be analyzed according to several perspectives 
that describe the network overall characteristics, the position of nodes in the network and the 
presence of local configurations. This latter concept portrays how attributes and position of 
nodes influence the presence of ties. There is interdependence between actors network 
position and agency. 
It is possible to refer to development not only in terms of expansion of individual 
capabilities (Gasper 1997; Sen 1985) but also in terms of emergence of a system which is able 
to auto-reproduce. Padgett (Padgett and Powell 2012; Padgett and McLean 2006b) focuses on 
the emergence of organizational novelty and claims that it is crucial to analyze the intertwine 
between multiple social networks. “With our emphasis on multiple network, however, a 
central finding about the production of novelty in economic realm will be that other types of 
social relations – for example, politics, kinship and science – structure the ‘topology of the 
possible’ that is, the specific ways and trajectories through which old economic organizational 
forms can evolve into new ones”. (Padgett and Powell 2012, 3–4). 
The theory that drives this research refers to social structure ability to adapt to change. 
The capacity of adaptation depends on how networks overlap (Figure 1.1). A social network 
structure where different networks do not overlap completely (scenario 2) favors a better 
adaptation if compared with the total overlap between different social networks (scenario 3) 
or with the total lack of overlap between different social networks (scenario 1) (Parkinson 
2013a; Petersen 2001). 
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Figure 1.1 Scenarios of networks’ overlap 
 
 
 
Applying this theory to development projects, it is possible to argue that their ability to 
introduce change depends on contexts’ networks. Referring to the case study analyzed, it is 
possible to argue that the responsiveness of the community to the reform is correlated with 
how networks overlap. When external interventions operate in contexts where multiple social 
networks are totally overlapping, (scenario 3) or totally disjoint (scenario 1) they do not 
promote change. Instead in contexts where multiple social networks do not overlap 
completely (scenario 2) external interventions can be able to promote change.  
This theoretical perspective complements previous researches that mostly aimed at 
analyzing directly what are the drivers of participation in CBOs or of innovation adoption. 
Previous studies adopted quantitative models to analyze how social networks affect 
individual outcomes. Some scholars used dyadic regression models to test if sharing common 
attributes between actors (homophily effect) influences the probability of co-membership in 
the same risk-sharing or labor-sharing arrangement or in the same CBO (Arcand and 
Fafchamps 2012; A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a). Others used contextual effects 
models that both aim at describing and assessing how individual level outcome variables are 
shaped by a combination of individual and contextual variables. The dependent variables 
usually describe a behavior of the actors. The independent variables include both unit of 
analysis features and contextual features that are most often operationalized as neighborhood 
or groups. The analysis of these studies, along with resource limitations, oriented the 
definition of data collection methodology and the quantitative model adopted for the analysis 
presented in the dissertation. 
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This research aim at exploring what are the characteristics of social relational systems 
that allow for a positive response to external policies. These interventions are the agrarian 
reform and the creation of a Community Based Organization. They can be considered as 
participatory development, as they are community driven. These interventions aim at 
promoting a shift from agricultural production based on plantation system to households as 
unit of production. The use of the term “family farming” has been chosen to identify a different 
economic activity from previous sugar cane plantation system. Households are the main 
production unit of farming activities in the villages.  
Villages created by agrarian reform (Projetos de assentamentos da reforma agraria) 
represent an opportunity to create new rural spaces (Bergamasco 1997). They are a novelty 
in Brazilian rural areas as they create spaces where residency and property coincides 
(Wanderley 2000). The innovative element of Brazilian agrarian reform is not only access to 
land but also the mobilization of a large number of people from different parts of the country 
and with heterogeneous backgrounds.  
Family farming can favor the creation of rural spaces with an autonomous social identity. 
The presence of a complex system of ties inside villages can be interpreted as a proxy of 
villages’ autonomy. The research therefore analyzes intra-village ties to understand if social 
and economic reproduction functions take place mostly inside villages.  
In the context investigated, family-farming employment describes the working relation 
between small farmers and his fellow villagers, not a contract with a large company. The risk 
that labor intensive crops’ production contributes more to destroy than to build social 
relations and trust, does not apply to such context where the land dimension is small and 
where supply is limited to few workers per farmer. The relationship between employer and 
employee is a face-to-face relation that creates new opportunities for social interaction among 
villagers. The employer, sharing farming knowledge with his workers, can promote the spread 
of farming knowledge in the village. 
This research focuses on three villages created by agrarian reform in Northeast Brazil. 
The unit of analysis is the household. Households are the nodes in the network. The analysis 
focuses on the study of multiple networks that connect households in each village. The key 
research questions are: 
1) How did villages’ histories influence social networks? 
16 
 
2) What is the role of family farming in the system of social networks in the villages? 
3) How does the cooperative interact with villages' social networks?  
 
The main hypothesis is that the village that responded more positively to external policies 
(agrarian reform and the creation of a producers’ cooperative) is the village where social 
networks do not completely overlap (scenario 2). To operationalize such hypothesis the 
analysis is organized in four key arguments. 
First, agrarian reform settlements are characterized by the introduction of a new 
economic activity: family farming. Its different importance across villages is a crucial factor in 
the transformation of agrarian reform settlements into rural social spaces that are not 
dependent from towns. 
Second, agrarian reform settlements in the same municipality, which were created by 
different social movements, show substantial network variability. The different histories of 
villages, namely different households’ recruitment strategies and different early organizations 
of villages, led to different networks’ topologies and different tie generator mechanisms. 
Third, family farming is an economic activity to create cross-cutting ties among 
households in the villages studies. Households, having family farming as main livelihood 
strategy, are more likely to be linked in the frequent contact network. Moreover, family-
farming employment creates non-overlapping ties between households. Households that 
produce more crops need to hire more labor and often they hire households with whom they 
have no other ties or share few or no common attributes.  
Fourth, the producers’ cooperative, which is operating in the villages by supporting the 
introduction of new labor-intensive crops and guaranteeing a market for some crops, sustains 
family farming employment network. However the brokering role of the cooperative is 
hampered by the cooperative political positioning and by the continuing path of specialization 
towards specific high value and labor-intensive crops, without a continued sustaining of credit 
and technical assistance to support such specialization. These two elements can make the 
cooperative politically homogenous and tend to exclude smaller farmers. If this trajectory 
continues, it is very likely that the villages, supported by the cooperative, will move from 
scenario 2 to scenario 1.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews participatory development critiques.  
Section 1.3 presents social and economic obstacles to participation in Community Based 
Organizations. Section 1.4 focuses on some studies that analyzed participatory development 
interventions. Section 1.5 presents the dissertation theoretical framework and how it differs 
from other scholars. Section 1.6 provides a chapter-by-chapter outline of the thesis. 
1.2 Participatory Development 
Participatory development has become a central issue in development discourse since 
late 1980s. After the failure of structural adjustment programs, a large number of actors have 
been supporting the creation of rural local organizations, in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America. Actors include large scale organizations, such as International Labor Organization 
(ILO 2002) World Bank (Rondot and Collion 2001) Northern Cooperatives Alliances, national 
governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The main objectives of rural local 
organizations are to reduce poverty, to support rural development (Uphoff 1993; North and 
Cameron 2000), to be “intermediaries between government and its individual citizens” 
(Esman and Uphoff N. T. 1984, 51) and to solve collective action problems especially in rural 
areas in poor countries (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a). 
The connection in development discourse between local development and participation 
refers to territory, power structures, political dimension and innovation (Elisa Bignante, 
Dansero, and Scarpocchi 2008). Donors claim that the participation of some households in the 
organization they supported could be the way by which the innovation they want to promote 
can be adopted. The main assumption behind such interventions is these participants will 
adopt the innovation and they will make it spill over to the rest of the community. Also several 
development governments, in the framework of decentralization, left the local governments to 
design community-based program to tackle local problems (Alatas et al. 2012, 2). 
Development agencies and national governments aim at becoming drivers of innovations 
that they consider beneficial to empower the target population. In the field of rural 
development the most common innovations promoted are specialization in cash crops, 
introduction of new agricultural products and collective commercialization of products. 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1983) and Community Driven Development 
have become important keywords of the development intervention.  
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They identified, among others, in households’ participation in Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs), an instrument to spread the innovation they want to promote. The 
creation of local organizations and the use of participatory approach methodology were 
conceived as response to the failure of top-down projects and aimed at empowering local 
people.  
These local organizations’ pursue a wide range of objectives. Some aim at social inclusion 
such as “equity in access to opportunities to earn income, to productive inputs and public 
services” (Mishra S.N. Nharma N., Sharma K. 1984, 89). Others target economic performance 
improvement increasing production, response to market failures. Some seek out innovation 
adoption (Bardhan, 2002, in Amhad, Talib, 2010: 3761). Lastly they focus on increasing the 
trust in economic activities where legal enforcement of contracts is imperfect or missing 
(Mark Granovetter 1992). 
1.3 Barriers to Participation 
The major limitations of Community Driven Development approach are an utopist idea of 
community (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001), a conception of empowerment processes strongly 
related to voluntarism and the de-politicization of role of development agencies, especially 
Non-Governmental Organizations (Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004).  
The main drawback of Rural Participatory Appraisal is the lack of detection of structural 
problems in the community but rather the identification of immediate needs. Furthermore 
participatory development intervention become often an effective way to make of market a 
new way of regulating social interaction and social hierarchies (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 
2001). 
To understand the problem of development as participation it is necessary to decompose 
the discourse of development and identify what are the building blocks of the problem: 1) 
utopic idea of community, 2) obstacles to participation, 3) interdependence among behavior 
and social influence network dynamics namely innovation diffusion patterns, social 
autocorrelation and network formation, 4) problems of collective action, 5) normative 
discourse of development the organization financed by developing agencies becomes itself an 
actor in the political arena (Escobar 2011; Ferguson 2006; Nelson and Wright 1995; Mosse 
2005; Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001; Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004; Bornstein and Redfield 2011).  
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The creation of CBOs lies in the utopic conception of positive aspects of cooperation, 
which is conceived as more likely in contexts characterized by social and spatial proximity, 
underestimate three important aspects: possible exclusion patterns, the population’s needs 
and expectations, what commercialization of agricultural production means in terms of social 
structure change. 
CBOs often create new dependency patterns pushing towards specialization. Donors’ 
projects often create new needs (Holmén 2010), disruption of existing social norms 
(Bornstein 2003; Bornstein and Redfield 2011). Smaller producers tend to adopt multiple 
livelihood strategies and aim not at maximizing production but rather minimizing risks 
(Brookfield 2001). Specialization and market dependence has often increased rather than 
decreased inequality and exclusion patterns (F. Ellis 2006; Adato, Michelle, ed. Meinzen-Dick, 
Ruth Suseela, ed. 2007; DFID Policy Division 2004; Artur, Habinck, and Boon 2002).  
Another important negative effect of CBOs is “elites capturing” (Mansuri and Rao 2012; J. 
P. Platteau and Abraham 2002; Arcand 2008; Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001): “CBOs reproduce 
and reinforce relations of domination and subordination between elites and non-elites” (Lund 
and Saito-Jensen 2013, 105). The strong presence of elites capturing especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Platteau 2004; Platteau and Abraham 2002; Baland and Platteau 1997; 
Platteau and Gaspart 2003) made it consider comparable to the dependency pattern created 
by colonial indirect rule (Elisa Bignante, Dansero, and Scarpocchi 2008). 
Next sub-sections describe the main economic and social barriers to participation. 
1.3.1 Economic Barriers 
The most common objectives promoted by donors, is that by pooling resources and 
promoting farmers’ cooperation it is possible to increase the access to agricultural services 
and to sell at better prices. However, participating in producers’ cooperatives requires a 
series of assets and skills that are quite complex to achieve.  
The main changes that participation in CBOs foresees are specialization in specific cash 
crops and collective commercialization of products. It is often required to farmers a dramatic 
shift from sharecropping, dispersed plots, complementary non-farming activities and short 
migration flows. The shift towards specialization is not a reflection of the change in families’ 
pattern of production but it is either imposed or proposed by external actors and it can be 
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accepted or rejected by the target population. In contexts characterized by high price 
volatility, peasants tend to adopt multiple livelihood strategies aiming not at maximizing 
production but rather minimizing risk (Brookfield, 2001). Furthermore highly risky 
environment tend to favor organic structure rather than mechanic organizations (Aldrich & 
Pfeffer, 1976). Specialization also implies the ability to manage savings and to hire the 
necessary labor that is needed to guarantee the production required. Cash crops tend to be 
more labor intensive than food crops. Analysts of agrarian change points out how 
specialization and market dependence has increased rather than decreased inequality and 
exclusion patterns (DFID Policy Division 2004; F. Ellis 2006; Adato, Michelle, ed. Meinzen-
Dick, Ruth Suseela, ed. 2007; Prota and Beresford 2012). 
1.3.2 Social Barriers  
Agrarian societies have been studied under different perspective both by anthropology, 
sociology and development microeconomics. Both anthropologists and sociologists focused 
their analysis on the social structure, that can be defined as “an overall system or pattern of 
relations” (Nadel 1964, 12), and on social networks: “the interlocking relationships whereby 
the interactions implicit in one determine those occurring in others” (Nadel 1964, 16). 
Anthropologists focused on the exchange aspects of all ties, including the analysis of ties' 
direction and causal mechanisms, developing what has been defined as “social exchange 
theory.” There is a wide literature on the role of “gift exchange” in defining economic and 
social ties (Mauss 1925; Malinowski 1922).  
Social network analysis instead focused on the description of regular network patterns 
“to learn how network structures constrain social behavior and social change" (K. S. Cook and 
Whitmeyer 1992, 114). 
Development microeconomics, along with economic sociology, starting from the seminal 
study of Scott “peasants with a moral economy” (J. C. Scott 1976) and Hyden’s work on 
“economies of affection” (Hyden 2005) analysed how the presence of social networks 
facilitates coordination problems and economic transactions when markets are missing or 
incomplete (Ostrom 1990; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Narayan-Parker 1999) but also 
constrains business activities and entrepreneurship (Rooks et al. 2009; Kristiansen 2004; 
Tokuori 2006).  
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Many studies analyzed how the presence of social network affects mutual insurance 
mechanisms, collective goods, entrepreneurship, information and innovation diffusion as 
change agents rely on the opinion leaders or other relevant for mechanisms for the adoption 
of innovation (E. M. Rogers 1995; T. Conley and Udry 2001; Lyon 2000; Agadjanian 2001; 
Krishnan and Patnam 2014).  
The wider strand of literature in development economics focuses on risk sharing 
arrangements in agriculture economics (M. Fafchamps 1992; J. Platteau 1997; Townsend 
1994), assessing with many case studies, especially in rural areas both in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Asia and Latin America, the presence of informal networks of risk mitigation across 
households. In contexts where contracts enforcement is very low trust relationship are 
defined on the basis of reputation, sanctions and moral norms previous interaction it is 
therefore fundamental in the definition of the actor's choice. This explains why in these 
contexts focus is not on profit maximization but rather on risks minimization. As a result great 
attention is given to the development of personal relationship and pre-existing connections, 
such as churches, friendship between agents can be become crucial in the decision to create a 
new tie. Sharing norms and social and moral pressure are strong incentive for people to 
cooperate and reciprocate.  
There are several studies that explore both functioning and formation patterns 
highlighting as determinants of risk sharing ties factors such as kinship, ethnicity, physical 
proximity, age and wealth (Goldstein, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2002; M. Fafchamps and Lund 
2003; De Weerdt and University United Nations 2002; Dekker 2004). The most studied 
endogenous forms of insurance or cost sharing mechanisms present in rural areas in 
developing countries are risk-sharing arrangements (De Weerdt and University United 
Nations 2002; Goldstein, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2002), funeral groups (Dercon et al. 2006) 
and sharecropping (Stiglitz 1974).  
Some studies shows that cooperatives have a positive impact on social capital focusing 
especially on trust (Hong and Sporleder 2013; Sabatini, Modena, and Tortia 2013; Becchetti, 
Castriota, and Conzo 2013).  The concept of social capital has been applied to a large number 
of researches in social sciences. However it does not have a unique definition. There are 
different views on how to define social capital. “Kind of capital that creates for certain 
individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends” (Ronald S. Burt 2002, 
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150). “Social capital comes from the interplay of a range of factors, each of which entails social 
relations that shape how agents react and these reactions are shaped by existing social 
capital” (Lyon 2000, 664). 
 Social capital is associated with positive externalities. It is considered a way to overcome 
coordination failure, information asymmetries, collective action problem and to provide 
public goods (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). Burt, in his article on the network structure of 
social capital (R.S. Burt 2000), classifies social structure according to three different models: 
1) network models of contagion where physical proximity alone has strong influence on alters 
probability to adopt innovation, 2) network model of prominence where innovation is based 
on the imitation of the most prominent group or individual, 3) network model of range. This 
latter category can be divided in two subcategories: a) closure which competitive advantage is 
good risks management and that promotes communication and facilitate sanctions, b) 
brokerage: information access and control are the most important benefit for individual or 
networks that are positioned in structural holes.  
Burt's classification is linked with the “bridging” and “bonding” aspects of social capital, 
being the first intrinsic features of “social networks which connect an actor to the outside 
world” and second view that “focuses primarily on the internal characteristics of collective 
actors”. According to this view the focus is more on a collectivity (which can be an enterprise, 
village, community and so on), and the social structure of that collectivity which focuses 
primarily on social capital as resources” (Gerrit Rooks, Adam Szirmai, Adam Szirmai, 2009).  
Two are the main aspects of social capital: social networks (Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1994; Coleman 1998) and social norms and trust (Ostrom 1998). Trust, is considered 
to be an integral part of social capital. Social capital is considered to have a positive effect on 
information flow and in reducing transaction costs as it decreases the cost for monitoring and 
information.  
The main sources of trust are considered to be generalized norms of morality and 
personalized trust. This latter concept describes trust deriving from actors’ embeddedness in 
social networks. Gambetta (Gambetta 2000, 219) tends to interpret trust more as a rational 
choice made by the agent to responds to the other’s expectations. Granovetter instead points 
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out an additional factor to rational choice and he refers that individual’s actions are 
dependent on the level of embeddedness of the relationship (M. Granovetter 1985) 
The scholarship on social capital faced the difficulty of how to measure this very broad 
concept and adopted several proxies. One of the most popular is the presence of civic 
associations or dense associational life (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1994). Social capital is considered a way to overcome coordination failure, 
information asymmetries, collective action problem and to provide public goods (Durlauf and 
Fafchamps 2004).  
The main critiques that can be addressed to this literature refers to the possible negative 
consequences of very cohesive structures and an issue of causality between civic association 
and social capital. Negative drawbacks of this are the presence of incentives for people to 
cheat and the creation of barriers to entrance through the creation of cartels (Gambetta 
2000). Cohesive social structures are often defined as “community” with a positive 
connotation but some authors showed that this often causes the exclusion of certain groups or 
networks (Rooks et al. 2009). “Loyalties and familial attachments members are discouraged 
from advancing economically, moving geographically, and engaging in amicable dispute 
resolution with outsiders”(Woolcock 1998, 171). Furthermore it is possible to argue that the 
presence of civic associations is already a result of social capital.  
It is therefore necessary not only understand the level of connectivity of a network but 
also to understand what are the local structure inside the network and how much information 
redundancy is present. It is therefore important to study the process of formation of these 
networks and what social mechanisms influence the presence of ties in that network. 
This research explores the formation of social networks qualitatively analyzing the 
history of villages’ formation and quantitatively using a social network model to identify the 
structural difference among villages. Furthermore it shows that the village, where there more 
non-redundant social mechanisms is the village where the cooperative, played a stronger role.  
1.3.3 Review of Models to Analyze Participatory Development 
Among the several organizations promoted in the framework of participatory 
development this review focus on rural producers’ organizations. There are several different 
theories that have been adopted to analyze such organizations.  
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Neo-institutional economics, based on the literature on property rights, define 
cooperatives as the best ownership structure given some specific sets of market conditions. In 
the field of agriculture producers’ cooperatives can be a possible solution for subcontractors 
to minimize high transaction costs caused by monopsony, low contract enforcement and 
asymmetric information (Hansmann 1996). In this strand development economists 
investigated what is the effect of membership in cooperative on some households’ 
performance indicators (Bernard, Taffesse, and Gabre-Madhin 2008; Bernard et al. 2008). 
Experimental economics focus on the problem of agency and claim that cooperation emerges 
from the set of existing social norms where ability to punish plays an important role 
(Baldassarri and Grossman 2011).  
Development studies have investigated the role of social influence on outcomes. More 
specifically this review focuses on analyses of agrarian societies. The main issues in this 
stream of literature are 1) group formation (Fafchamps M., La Ferrara E. 2012), 2) drivers of 
participation and exclusion (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012) (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 
2010b), 3) effects of network structure in shaping economic and social outcomes (Marcel 
Fafchamps 2006; Jaimovich 2013; Jaimovich 2011), 4) CBOs as drivers of innovation adoption 
(Bandiera and Rasul 2006), 5) network variability in a sociological perspective (Entwisle et al. 
2007), 6) network architecture with an economic approach (Krishnan and Sciubba 2009). 
The next paragraphs describe studies that adopted quantitative models to analyze how 
social networks influence behavior.  
1.3.3.1 Dyadic regression 
In development economics, using dyadic regressions, several authors explored the 
formation of risk sharing mechanisms (Fafchamps M. and Gubert F. 2007) membership and 
co-membership's determinants of self-help groups (Fafchamps M., La Ferrara E. 2012) am 
Community Based Organizations (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a; Arcand and 
Fafchamps 2012). The main factors which are considered to facilitate the formation of groups 
are: ease of information flow, trust, shared social norms, ability to punish (M. Fafchamps 
1992), wealth and income members’ profile (La Ferrara E. 2002) land ownership and social 
status (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012). 
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Two of the most relevant studies that use dyadic regression analysis and focus on 
agrarian societies are part of a research program called “An experimental analysis of network 
and group formation for collective action” carried out by Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps in rural 
Zimbabwe. The overall objective of the project is to understand what are the factors that 
foster the creation of a group where people trust each other enough to create a collective 
good, based on voluntary contribution. One study uses behavioral experiment to draw causal 
inference between imperfect sanctioning enforcement and risk sharing arrangements (A. 
Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2012). The authors, to minimize possible drawbacks caused by 
the presence of an artificial decision-making, involved in the experiment only people living in 
the same village and who are known to be involved in real risk-sharing activities, and allowed 
face to face interaction during the experiment. Results show that matching on age and gender 
influence the probability of the creation of risk sharing links while belonging to the same 
group, such as common church affiliation, influences the presence of social sanctioning. In 
contrast the other study analyzes CBOs formation in a de facto quasi-experiment in rural 
Zimbabwe (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a). The analysis has focused on 15 villages 
created by the government to resettle people that were displaced during the war. Those 
villages are not created along the traditional norms of group formation such as lineage or 
wealth but based on a quasi-random rule; therefore it is possible to disentangle the factors 
that led to the formation and composition of CBOs. The authors to carry out their analysis 
used the following data: households survey conducted from 1983 to 2000, detailed 
retrospective data on CBOs in 2000, genealogical data of 1999 and 2001, lineage data of 2001 
and 2009, villages geographical of 1999 and 2009. The main results of this research show that 
the networks of CBOs co-membership are especially concentrated in poorer villages and there 
are weak evidence of exclusion of female leaded households and non-Zimbabweans. 
According to the authors a possible explanation for the former result is that in those locations 
there is a greater need for organizations aiming at coping with market's imperfection and 
provision of public goods.  
Another important application of dyadic regression is represented by the article on social 
networks in Ghana (Udry and Conley 2004). The researchers mapped information, financial, 
labor and land sharing networks and aimed at identifying what are the common attributes 
that favor the creation of ties among farmers. They showed that membership to the same 
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church; common family origin and difference in wealth levels and gender are key elements in 
the definition of information and credit link among people.   
1.3.3.2 Contextual effects models 
There is wide consensus that social influence plays a crucial role in shaping behavior 
especially in rural contexts. Literature on contextual, peer and neighborhood effects on 
individual behavior is present in several fields of social sciences such as psychology, 
economics and sociology. Different are the dependent variables taken into analysis but a 
crucial role has innovation adoption (Bandiera and Rasul 2006), (T. G. Conley and Udry 2010), 
(Banerjee et al. 2012). However the issue is how to operationalize influence namely how to 
represent group structure and whether considering only relevant peers’ behavior or group 
mean and how to identify relevant peers (Blalock 1984). 
Some scholars use synthetic network variables to present network’s features and then to 
insert them into linear-in-means models (Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009) calculating 
the average mean of the groups or groups in which the individual/organization is located. 
Other scholars adopt social auto-correlation models (Erbring and Young 1979). Lastly others 
analyze whole network features assessing on the one hand the presence and relevance of 
great variability across villages even in small geographical areas (Entwisle et al. 2007) and on 
the other network architecture effect on social network influence on outcomes (Krishnan and 
Sciubba 2009). 
In the field of innovation adoption, a relevant study for this research question and context 
of analysis refers to flower seed adoption in central Mozambique (Bandiera and Rasul 2006). 
Authors’ hypothesis is that farmers are more likely to adopt flower seeds when members of 
their networks have already adopted flower seeds. In order to measure these networks they 
asked how many people they knew that had already planted them. Farmers’ network includes 
adopters that are members of their extended family or members’ of the same church or 
neighbors. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) state that the adoption decision is function of a vector 
of individual characteristics and number of adopters in individual’s network. However the 
limitation of this study is that it takes into consideration only the number of adopters but 
neither their identity nor their position in the network. 
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The social autocorrelation models or endogenous feedback models foresee reciprocal 
influence or mutual adjustment of individuals interacting with each other. They consider that 
behaviors are passively responsive to contextual signals and actively influencing behavior of 
others sharing the same social space (Erbring and Young 1979). These models are part of non-
recursive models that consider behavior as a result of reciprocal causation loop (Erbring, 
1976, Leenders, 2002), (Marsden and Friedkin 1993). This literature is strongly influenced by 
spatial auto-correlation models (Doreian 1981; Anselin 1988).  
An application of this technique is the study by Erbring and Young (1976). The authors 
claim that students’ academic results are not only function of their own skills but also of 
academic results of students with whom they are in contact.  Variables describing student 
abilities are considered exogenous while the contiguity matrix that describes interaction level 
between all students in the class is considered endogenous. Differently from Bandiera study 
(Bandiera and Rasul 2006), rather than asking to individuals the numbers of adopters in their 
networks, they asked with whom in the class they interacted, in order to map the complete 
social networks among all students in the classes object of the study. This information is 
introduced in the equation as a contiguity matrix that represents the presence or absence of 
ties among the group object of analysis. The identification of relevant social network of 
individuals under analysis allows to limit but not to solve the two main observation problems 
that arise such as correlated unobservable and simultaneity; without longitudinal data is not 
possible to solve the reflection problem (Manski 1993). 
Another important approach is to analyze villages’ networks formation (Krishnan P., 
Sciubba E., 2009) to study variability of social structure across villages (Entwisle et al. 2007). 
The former study (Krishnan P., Sciubba E., 2009) is based on a sample of 1,477 households in 
15 villages of diverse parts of rural Ethiopia. Network formation theory (Bala and Goyal 2000; 
Bala and Goyal 2003; Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) is used to represent the choice of farmers 
to share work with other farmers. The main focus of analysis is homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of farmers that compose risk sharing arrangements and how these features influence 
efficiency and stability. The research shows that network overall features such as number of 
links and architecture are crucial elements to define social networks’ influence on outcomes. 
It presents a model of network formation to predict the network architectures generated by 
labor-sharing arrangements, which is an informal institution common to many village 
economies. The latter study (Entwisle et al. 2007) analyzed context and network structures 
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co-variation in rural villages showing relevant variation in terms of village social structure 
and mutual influence of network structure and features of villages’ context. 
Social autocorrelation model  
A possible model that could be appropriate for this research, is social auto-correlation 
model (Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Roger Th.A.J. Leenders 2004). Such model explores how 
social networks influence behavior. By using such model the social network is included in the 
model as endogenous variable. For the application to this research’s question, two are the 
possible outcome variables: participation in the cooperative and income from family farming. 
The model implies households’ choices are not only explained by households’ history and 
features but also by the choices of households with whom they are connected through social 
ties. 
The main limitations to use social auto-correlation model are the limited number of 
members of the cooperative; the fact that CBOs action goes behind the sole participants and 
the impossibility to discriminate between selection and influence as drivers of participation, 
without longitudinal data.  
The first limitation to define membership in cooperative, as the dependent variable, is 
related to the small proportion of members in the whole population and the necessity to 
collect whole network data. Interviewing all households living in the village means that the 
proportion between members and non-members will reflect the proportion of members and 
not members present in the village; as a consequence the analysis for such small number 
cannot produce statistically significant results. The second is that to have reliable picture of 
the social network structure of the villages studied it is crucial to map the entire network. 
Therefore to run an effective social autocorrelation model it would have been necessary to 
have a large number of villages. Given research resources limitation I focused on a limited 
number of carefully sampled villages.  
Referring to third limitation trying to infer if social influence had a role in shaping 
households’ decision to engage family farming and what has been the cooperative role, it is 
impossible to disentangle whether homophily is defined by selection (individual attribute 
reason to be friends) or by contagion (being friends reason to change individual attribute) 
which is generally referred as the reflection problem. The issue is that structure of social 
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networks, household experience in family farming and role of the cooperative are not 
independent but they mutually influenced by each other and co-evolved over time (Figure 
1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2 Experience in family farming and role of cooperative 
 
 
Only collecting more than one observation in different moments, both on ties and 
attributes, allows disentangling between selection and influence. Cross-sectional data imposes 
to focus either on node attributes or on ties, as it is not possible to identify direction of 
causality.  
Data have been collected on households’ attributes before and after the agrarian reform, 
namely working experience, access to land and agricultural production. The dataset also 
contains information on how households arrived to the village and on whether they were 
engaged in one of the three social movements. These households’ attributes from the past 
refer to propinquity, such as origin or migration waves, or similarity in socio-economic status 
as such as previous access to land and similar professional experience. Other homophily 
effects that have been introduced in the model to test whether they influence observed 
network are geographical propinquity and the co-presence of other networks at the time of 
survey realization. Villages’ histories and households past attributes are considered as 
generator mechanisms that influence the formation of social networks (Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1.3 Villages’ histories and villages’ social structure 
 
 
For what concern the role of the cooperative, if on the one hand, the necessity to 
commercialize products makes households being interested in the cooperative, on the other 
hand the guarantee of a certain market allows households’ to produce more. A larger 
production increases the necessity of households to have more labor force. There is a strong 
correlation between income from family farming and number of people hired in the three 
villages.  Furthermore different crops require different amount of labor force.  
The cooperative by promoting such crops can be promoting indirectly the creation of new 
ties in the family farming employment network. If such new ties are not redundant in respect 
to other ties or they do not overlap completely with other attributes family farming 
employment can create a bridge across homophilous groups (figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4 Family farming employment and role of cooperative 
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1.4 Innovative aspects: focus on multiple social networks 
The challenges that cooperatives, among other CBOs, face are more than being simple 
drivers of participation. Cooperatives’ challenges relate more to what can be referred as 
organizational invention (Padgett and McLean 2006a). In order to introduce a new economic 
pattern, such as family farming, it is not only necessary to make some people participate but 
rather to use the existing social structure to promote organizational transformation. The issue 
is not only what makes some participate and others not (also for the issue of impossibility to 
discriminate between selection and influence) but it is more about what creates the social 
structure of connections among the households and how the cooperative is able to interact 
with this system. The question is how the cooperative, with his actions, shapes the network 
form of households’ interaction, both by sustaining a specific activity, such as family farming, 
by introducing hierarchies, such as coop leaders, and also by operating as an actor in the 
political arena. 
This approach focuses on innovation not in a methodological individualism perspective 
(Arrow 1994) but rather in terms of emergence of new organizational form (Padgett and 
Powell 2012).  We can refer to development not only in terms of expansion of individual 
capabilities (Nussbaum 2011) but also in terms of emergence of new organizational forms 
(Padgett and McLean 2006b). The article on organizational invention defines “social context 
by multiple-network architectures and actors as clusters of relational ties” (Padgett and 
McLean 2006a, 1468). The authors argue that “patterns of social embeddedness are 
important for us not only because of “trust” but also because they regulate the dynamic 
reproduction of constitutive ties in each domain through the aligning and sequencing of 
multiple roles” (Padgett and McLean 2006a, 1470). “In other words, both organizations and 
people are shaped, through network co-evolution, by the history of each flowing through the 
other” (Padgett and McLean 2006a, 1471).  
Drawing from the concept of re-functionality and transposition across domain (Padgett 
and McLean 2006a), this research aims at understanding whether agrarian-reform 
settlements are mere repetitions of what happened in the previous engenhos or whether they 
introduce some form of organizational invention.  
The main argument is that producers’ cooperatives, that are community-based organizations, 
are de-facto mirrors of social networks’ structure that they encounter, as they build their 
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organizational foundations on local knowledge and therefore on local power. The strong risk 
of these organizations is to simply replicate existing structures and to benefit only one specific 
group that it is usually also the most central. The main two risks are on the one hand elites 
capturing, that means that the beneficiaries of the innovations are also the most central in the 
network, and on the other hand segregation patterns, that means the lack of connections 
among different groups (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  
These risks can be considered as the result of the combination of several phenomena such 
as homophily, innovation diffusion patterns and peer effects. Homophily, is a widely 
acknowledged phenomena and it is one of the main drivers of human interaction. It portrays 
the tendency by which individuals tend to interact with similar others (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Cook 2001). Several studies on innovation diffusion, show (Rogers 1995) how 
social networks are fundamental in allowing innovation to diffuse and how early innovators 
tend be the most central people in the networks (Jackson and Rogers 2007). Whereas in the 
framework of the third one, peer effect and contextual models, it is possible to refer that the 
choice to have family farming as main livelihood strategy is not only explained by their history 
and skills but also by the choice of households with whom they frequently interact (Marsden 
and Friedkin 1993). If there are no brokering links across groups and no orthogonal 
dimension, households will tend to interact only with similar households (homophily) and 
therefore be influenced in their behavior only by them.  
Therefore the main argument is that a development intervention, such as the creation of 
producers’ cooperatives, is likely to trigger change when it is able emphasize the brokering 
ties in the social networks’ structure where they operate. The lack of complete overlap 
between multiple social networks defines the capacity of to respond to change (Petersen 
2001; Parkinson 2013a). The presence of non-overlapping ties, that create bridges between 
homophilous groups, can limit the negative effects of the above-mentioned phenomena.  
This research aims at complementing extant research adopting a different network 
theory approach namely network theory of organizations. Furthermore it uses a different 
model to test for the presence of relevant differences in the overlap between multiple social 
networks. Lastly it considers the political role-played by development agencies and by 
Community Based Organizations: development intervention is first of all a political 
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intervention (Olivier de Sardan 2005). These elements imply both a different 
conceptualization of the research problem and a different model definition and specification. 
In development economics, the main references in terms of model specification are the 
dyadic regression model (Fafchamps M. and Gubert F. 2007) and network formation model 
(Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). The starting assumption in these studies is that inclusion and 
exclusion dynamics are essentially based on individual characteristics or synthetic network 
variables. Starting from this assumption authors tend to use synthetic network variable to 
present network feature and then to insert them into linear models. They therefore look for 
individual factors that increase the likelihood of households to participate and/or to adopt the 
innovation but they do not consider the local structure of interdependencies in which 
households are embedded. Arcand and Fafchamps focused the analysis of formation and 
composition of CBOs (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012) and Krishnan and Sciubba instead focuses 
network architecture of labor-sharing arrangements (Krishnan and Sciubba 2009). 
The study carried out by Barr and others (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a), despite 
sharing a series of common research setting and partially research questions, differs from this 
research for a series of factors. The main objective of Barr’s article is to identify what common 
traits are more likely to influence membership and co-membership in CBOs present in fifteen 
re-settlements created by Zimbabwean government. Furthermore the authors use a 
longitudinal dataset on households’ affiliations in CBOs and other organizations. They use in 
fact panel interview to reconstruct the organizations to which the households belonged.  
In this research instead a comparative approach is used to disentangle the difference 
social networks across villages. Furthermore bigger attention is devoted at identifying the 
social basis of frequent meeting among households, captured by the frequent contact 
network, using not only survey but also participant observation.  
The aim of the analysis developed in this thesis is to describe multiple ties that connect 
the households (nodes) in the villages, to identify groups and to understand what are the 
forms of brokerage that connect groups. For each village all the households of permanent 
residents have been interviewed collecting both attributes and social, economic and kinship 
ties among them. 
The research approach takes into consideration some critiques directed to the shallowest 
aspects of participatory development conception and rationale: 1) utopic conception of 
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community considered an ideal social setting (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001, 2) idea of 
development as based on individual motivation (Elisa Bignante, Dansero, and Scarpocchi 
2008, 3) non-political representation of development agency positioning (Olivier de Sardan 
2005).  
In response to the limitations of participatory development assumptions the networks of 
constituency (kinship) and exchange (agricultural employment and frequent contact) present 
in the context analyzed have been elicited. This research monitors the voluntarism discourse 
has been monitored, as the analysis of interdependence among actors’ is the main focus. 
Moreover the political positioning of the Community Based Organization, which is crucial to 
understand both the access to resources and role in the society, has been analyzed. 
This research explores qualitatively and quantitatively the formation of social networks 
in the three villages analyzed. This choice is driven on the one hand by nature of the data 
(cross-sectional) and on the other by the decision to adopt a strong network theory approach, 
that requires modeling the role of social structure. The dependent variable is the network of 
frequent contact among households in the three villages analyzed. This network is considered 
to be the result of immigration patterns into the villages and of social and economic activities 
that were developed since village creation. In coherence with the previous literature the 
analysis focused on homophily to understand if it played a role in the definition of frequent 
contact network. Producers’ cooperative sustains family farming employment network. 
However the cooperative political positioning hampers its brokering role in the villages. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis: chapter by chapter outline 
The thesis, after the first introductory chapter, is composed of five chapters.  
Chapter two shows that mixed methods are an appropriate methodological perspective to 
analyze the interaction between Community Based Organizations and the social structure in 
which the organization is embedded. Mixed methods is an appropriate methodology for the 
research questions as qualitative data can confirm, complement and inform quantitative 
findings (Small 2011) (Mansuri and Rao 2003). Furthermore the use qualitative data to allow 
for a better understanding of the meaning of social relations in the context analyzed and they 
provide with possible confirmatory tools for the findings deriving from quantitative analysis 
(Edwards 2010). Furthermore the chapter presents the sampling strategy and the instrument 
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(semi-structured interview) adopted to collect qualitative and quantitative data and the 
quantitative model used to test quantitative hypotheses. The unit of analysis is the household. 
I used multi-stage sampling and I have collected multiple intra-village ties. Variables used 
comprise both socio-economic features and network data. In this chapter I have described the 
reason for the choice of those variables and their meaning in the context analyzed. 
Chapter three situates the case study in the macro policy context to then focus on the 
municipality and in the villages’ object of the analysis. It describes the history of agrarian 
reform, the main features of the previous production system and the position of family 
farming in Brazilian context. It provides an overview of the history of the sugar cane sector, its 
crisis and its effects the littoral area of Northeast of Brazil (zona da mata), where it 
represented the first source of employment. It outlines the main features of Brazilian agrarian 
reform focusing on the crucial role of social movements and the role of encampment in the 
process of agrarian reform settlements’ creation. Such framework is crucial to understand the 
social structure of sugar cane plantations and the risk to reproduce pre-existing domination 
patterns in the context analyzed. It allows identifying the different aspect of households’ 
livelihoods that have been influenced by the agrarian reform: access to land and possibility 
and opportunity to engage in family farming. It highlights the importance of agrarian reform 
in the municipality object of analysis, and describes the main steps in process of formation of 
the three villages studied. It illustrates the differences among villages between use of the soil 
and crops production. The old crops are still those that occupy more soil. New crops have 
higher value of commercialization but they are more risky crops. New crops need farmers’ 
technical competence, that only very few farmers developed from their previous experience 
and they have specific harvest seasons and high level of perishability. Therefore they require 
on the one hand a sure market and on the other hand the ability to mobilize workforce during 
specific periods of cycle of production. The analysis of the two areas sampled shows that 
village A is the most productive settlement both in terms of area cultivated and value 
commercialized. Village A shows a prevalence of new crops towards old crops. Village B 
instead produces mostly old crops and it does not show relevant differences with neighbors. 
Village A produces the highest value of soursop and passion fruit. These crops are core 
products for ASTC. The introduction of soursop and passion fruit induced a new demand of 
labor in the village that single household alone are not able to provide.  
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Chapter four illustrates how important differences, in the way in which households have 
been mobilized, affected village composition and villages’ social networks. The combination of 
narrative of villages’ histories and visualization of villages’ networks allowed showing 
substantial variability across villages in households’ attributes and social networks’ features. 
The use of ERG models showed that homophily in households’ attributes and edge covariance 
are relevant elements in determining links in frequent contact network. The significant 
uniform homophily statistic differ across villages. The only parameters that are significant in 
more than one village portray households’ activities in family farming. There are two 
variables that describe such activity. Engaged in family farming is a binary variable that 
identifies whether the household declared to have family farming as main livelihood strategy 
at the time of survey. Employment in family farming describes the presence of a working 
relation between households in the village. Edge covariance in kinship is also extremely 
important in village A and C where there were no limits in terms of households that could be 
linked by kinship in the phase of village creation.  
Village A is the most complex village in terms of networks and the village with the highest 
agricultural production. Furthermore there are a wider number of factors contributing to 
network formation while in the other villages there is a smaller number of factors that are 
able to explain the contact network. In village A same geographical origin, edge covariance in 
kinship network and employment in family farming are the most important elements to 
trigger links. 
 In village B instead it is more difficult to identify what are the generator mechanisms of 
frequent contact network. Arriving to the village in the same migration wave is important in 
defining a link in the frequent contact network.  
In village C the major factor that increases the probability of tie in the frequent contact 
network is the presence of a tie in another network, while few shared attributes have an 
homophilous effect. Moreover in village C the presence of a large group of old settlers, the lack 
of previous ties among new settlers and a short period of encampment of new settlers, 
characterized by episodes of violence, did not favor the creation of ties across groups. Kinship 
represents the most important driving force of contact network and there is strong 
overlapping between different ties. This multiplicity can be considered as an anti-risk 
behavior in response to a long exposure to violence for old settlers and early tensions 
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between the groups of old and new settlers. I will test if village A is the most similar to 
scenario 2, as the frequent contact network is predicted by the combination of both family 
farming employment and kinship network that are not completely overlapping. It is important 
to point out that a similar quantity of products sold to the cooperative is an element that 
triggers the connection among households in the frequent contact network both in village B 
and C.  
Chapter five analyzes the role of the cooperative in the three villages analyzed. The 
analysis of trajectory of ASCT specialization, driven by donors, shows that crucial decisions 
taken by ASTC reflects only marginally the needs and requests of ASTC members. The debate 
on crucial role of donors in shaping ASTC decision and the future of the cooperative is central 
for some of the most productive members. They would like ASTC to gain financial autonomy 
to increase the bargaining power of ASTC members. However, not all of component of ASTC’s 
board of directors do completely agree on this position and the ambivalent discourse of the 
cooperative persists. While dependence from external funds provides some members with 
personal benefits, it strongly hampers the ability of members to take decisions in ASTC. In the 
framework of coalition theory it is possible to argue that the smaller producers, that are tag 
along, are important. They allow the cooperative leader not be inconsistent when she justifies 
her narrative to some donors saying that ASTC supports the more disadvantaged farmers. On 
the contrary the narrative that is starting to emerge among villagers, especially in village A, is 
that ASTC only supports the biggest producers.  
While ASTC’s support to the introduction of new crops has played a role in the emergence 
of village family farming employment network, its trajectory towards specialization in very 
costly crops creates on the one hand barriers to entrance in the coop and on the other hand 
increase dependence towards market.  
Despite ASTC ambition and planned strategy, its members are not able to diversify their 
production including several high value crops but instead they tend to produce high quantity 
of the same crop. The market represented by municipality schools is important for ASTC. 
However the political positioning of ASTC members, due to its history, creates barriers to its 
own access to municipal funds.  In village A ASTC members prevalently belong to the blue 
party and many of the members that withdrew from the coop, are now members of the 
opposite party. All of these factors can hamper the bridging role of ASTC and expose it to the 
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strong risk of becoming the mirror of a specific political or economic group. The analysis 
presented in this chapter is based on the burgeoning materials produced by ASTC (project 
reports, cooperative power point presentations, cooperative management systems), as well as 
on my own observations of the cooperative activities, in depth interviews, and on a focus 
group with a sample of the cooperative’s members. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
International and national donors design projects aiming at fostering change in societies 
they do not belong to. The risk of unintended consequences of participatory development 
interventions is very high as previous literature shows (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001; Lund 
and Saito-Jensen 2013; J. P. Platteau 2004). Community-Based Organizations often do not 
introduce any change but simply reproduce existing social structure.  
Recent studies highlighted the necessity of better enquiring local contexts and emergence 
of CBOs (Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010). The study of participatory development 
interventions promoted by external donors in developing countries is intertwined in three 
main literature streams such as participatory development (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001; 
Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004; Mosse 2005) development economics that focus on drivers of 
participation in Community Based Organizations (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012), social 
influence and innovation diffusion (Banerjee et al. 2012).  
This study, applying the theory of adaptiveness (Parkinson 2013b; Petersen 2001) to 
participatory development projects, claims that the ability of such interventions to introduce 
change depends on the contexts’ where they operate. Contexts analyzed are three villages 
created by agrarian reform (Projetos de assentamentos da reforma agraria) in the Northeast of 
Brazil.  
The villages can be defined as organizations. The unit of analysis is the household and 
they are the nodes in the network. A network describes the social relationships (such as 
friendship) among nodes. Multiple networks that connect households in each village define 
villages’ structure. The research focuses on the study of villages’ multiple networks overlap.  
The seminal contribution of Padgett and Powell (Padgett and Powell 2012) focus on the 
problem of emergence of organizational novelty: “our interest is how multiple-network 
topologies can shape the emergence and evolution of organizational actors over time” 
(Padgett and Powell 2012, p. 6).  
This research shows the different overlap between social networks across villages. It also 
explores how the response to CBOs is associated to social networks’ features. It does not 
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directly aim at the identification of the factors that favor or hamper the participation of 
households in the organization, operation that is possible only with longitudinal data.  
The challenges of villages’ response to CBOs intervention go beyond participation and are 
more related to what can be referred as organizational invention (Padgett and McLean 
2006a). The introduction of family farming, as new important economic activity, is not only 
the result of people participation in social movements’ activities first and then to a producers’ 
cooperative but it is the result of existing social structure transformation. 
The main questions are on the one hand how the cooperative’s action is shaped by 
villages’ social networks and on the other how the cooperative influences the network form of 
household interaction by sustaining a specific activity, such as family farming. 
Figure 2.1 Experience in family farming and role of cooperative 
 
 
The research focuses especially on family farming which is an innovation for the context 
and it can potentially allow for the creation of new ties in the villages. The main object of the 
research is the social network structure of a sample of three villages where a cooperative 
operates. The study analyzes social networks’ features and on how the cooperative influenced 
these networks.  
Section 2.2 presents mixed methods outlining both strengths and limitations. It provides 
both a literature review on some relevant studies that used such methodology and it explains 
why this research qualifies under the definition of mixed methods. Furthermore it explains 
the main features of the quantitative model adopted to analyze social network (Exponential 
Random Graph Models). Section 2.3 describes the sampling definition. Section 2.4 outlines the 
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process of data collection: fieldwork organization and interview delivery. Section 2.5 points 
out the main data collection limitations. 
2.2 Mixed methods: theory and some applications 
In development studies, and not only, there is an on-going debate on the selection of 
research methodologies. Three are the main methodological schools: the main stream 
quantitative that sustains quantitative approaches (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007), a 
more ethnographic approach (Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Mosse 2005), 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006), (Desai and Potter 2006) and a stream that proclaims the advantages 
of mixed methods and the combination of several research methods (Rao and Woolcock 2004; 
Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010; Rao and Ibáñez 2003; Cramer et al. 2013). 
Understanding the process of interaction between producers’ cooperative and the social 
structure requires a combination of tools. Qualitative tools allow eliciting the history of the 
village to understand how villages were created and with which objectives. A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative tools allows identifying what are the drivers of interaction among 
households, how groups connect and what is the political positioning of the cooperative. 
This section aims at showing that mixed methods are an appropriate methodological 
perspective to analyze on the interaction between an organization and the social structure in 
which the organization is embedded. It refers to a consolidated practice of dialogue between 
quantitative and qualitative methods and data to confirm, complement and inform 
quantitative findings (Small 2011). There is in development studies, since late Nineties strand 
of literature that uses mixed methods in monitoring and evaluations’, also referred as 
“participatory econometrics” (Mansuri and Rao 2003) that especially focuses on Community 
Driven Development initiatives. Well-established institutions such as the Word Bank have as 
also promoted this scholarship. Social network analysis has long roots in mixed and 
interdisciplinary research methods (Edwards 2010). 
The main common argument of these strands of literature is that qualitative tools allow 
for a better understanding of the meaning of social relations in the context analyzed and they 
provide with possible confirmatory tools for the findings deriving from quantitative analysis. 
However, there is an going debate in literature on opportunities and limitations of mixed 
methods (Heyvaert et al. 2013). 
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In the next pages a brief history of mixed methods, outlines what are the features that 
qualify a study under this category. It will be also described the application of mixed methods 
in development studies, which is considered to be a good methodology, both by World Bank 
researchers (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010), (Rao and Woolcock 2004) and by an on-
going study on fair trade impact financed by UK Department For International Development 
(DFID). Lastly it will be presented the application of mixed methods in social networks 
analysis and especially how authors mix the traditions and the two techniques.  
The current century is characterized by the presence of several publications that adopted 
mixed methods approach(Small 2011). In the last fifteen years we observe the birth of a new 
field with journals and conferences. 
There is a debate on what qualifies mixed methods. Is it the choice to combine survey 
methods with qualitative interviewing? Is it the choice of the sample size? (Small 2011, 58).  
Mario Small (Small 2011) argues that the classification of studies should be done on three 
levels: 1) typology of data, 2) data collection, 3) data analysis. Any study that combines at least 
two kinds of different data can be considered as based on mixed method. 
The combination of different methods has long roots in the history of research 
methodology in several disciplines of social sciences. In the field of psychology, already in late 
Fifties, it was argued that confronting measurement obtained with different methods of data 
collection can improve the validity of results (Campbell and Fiske 1959). In sociology, in the 
debate on survey methods, Sieber (Sieber 1973) supported the importance and value added 
represented by integrating fieldwork with survey as the two methods complement each other 
weaknesses and strengths. Some authors (Brewer and Hunter 1989) even claimed that multi-
methods research has produced some of the most important contributions in XX century. In 
evaluation studies the validity of mixed methods have especially been defended since late 
Seventies (T. D. Cook and Reichardt 1979).  
 
Motivations of mixed methods 
 
The two main objectives foreseen by researchers when starting multi-method studies are 
confirmation and complementarity. The first objective aims at testing findings obtained with 
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other sources. This technique is also referred as triangulation (Jick 1979). The second 
objective is instead designed to allow different types of data to compensate the weaknesses of 
the other. This approach has been most widespread since 2000s. There are two main 
strategies of combining these two methods: a) use qualitative data to interpret quantitative 
results and b) large sample to test qualitative results. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative can be achieved using a time scale by 
concurrent or sequential design or instead by using nesting design (Creswell and Clark 2006). 
In this latter case a wide spread procedure starts from a larger group to focus then on some 
specific group where more qualitative methods, such as in depth interview, will be adopted. 
Main issues in mixed methods research 
The main critical issue in mixed methods is commensurability. The two methods 
combined have diverging epistemological perspectives. On the one hand quantitative research 
moves from a positivist perspective that claims the existence of an independent social reality 
to the researcher. On the other hand qualitative research provides more emphasis on 
subjective interpretation of the researcher (Small 2011).  
Another important drawback of such type of research refers to sustained trend of social 
sciences towards specialization. The risk for mixed methods researchers is to be very 
vulnerable to critiques. It can happen that the reviewer of the manuscript will dominate the 
technique applied in the study better than the author (Small 2011, 79). It is therefore 
fundamental for mixed methods researchers to select the right audience. 
Application of mixed methods in development research 
In development research and program evaluation it can be provided an added value to 
combine qualitative and quantitative methods (Rao and Woolcock 2004) as often none of the 
two techniques alone is able to respond to the research questions of development researches, 
especially when researchers are not interested in the outcomes but in the way through which 
outcomes are achieved. 
Purely quantitative research face the difficulty to design survey that is able to fully 
provide definitions that respond to the context. Often development researches surveys do not 
achieve to successfully integrate what emerges from fieldwork observation into questionnaire 
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design. Wording of questionnaires, which does not comply with respondents’ representation 
of phenomena inquired, is most likely to foster biases in the measurement.  
In addition quantitative methods are able to elucidate correlation between observed 
outcomes and covariates but they are not able to elucidate on the processes that have driven 
the formation of such mechanisms. An example (Rao and Woolcock 2004, 167) refers to 
Community Development Project namely the creation of a village committee. The authors 
(Rao and Woolcock 2004) claim that a purely quantitative study would not be able to elicits 
the process of creation, how it interacts with local politics, what are inclusions and exclusions 
mechanisms and the emergence of leadership. 
The main drawbacks of qualitative studies instead are the small number of observations, 
possibly biased criteria to select key informants to be interviewed, subjectivity in the 
interpretation of results and impossibility to control for other factors.  
In development studies and evaluation researches the first to argue for the necessity of 
multi-methods was a study on the impact of the creation of an irrigation system in South of 
India (Epstein 1962). Other scholars instead carried out a very detailed household survey in 
one single village in India (Epstein 1962; Bliss and Stern 1982) combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods to investigate the village economy first and second the evolution of 
poverty and inequality over the last five decades. 
The methods of integration of qualitative and quantitative methods can be defined as 
parallel, sequential and iterative. Parallel is when the two analysis are done separately and 
then integrated to compare results, sequential and iterative aim at combining the two 
strategies in all of the phases of the research. 
Rao and Woolcock (2004) define as “participatory econometrics”, a research design that 
combines qualitative and quantitative methods in development research. The main qualitative 
methods adopted are Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1983) (Chambers 
1994), focus group and textual analysis.  
Participation econometrics face critical issues referred to data collection. Data collection 
outcome is largely dependent on moderator’s ability to animate group discussion. 
Furthermore it is crucial to achieve a good representativeness of all groups present in the 
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target population. Finally PRA has been largely criticized because it is not able to elicit 
structural problems but just problems that are on the surface (Cooke B. and Kothari U. 2001). 
Participatory econometrics conceives the research design as based on three steps: 
qualitative methods to identify the crucial issues; survey design and hypotheses definition 
driven by qualitative work and eventually by a theoretical model and test of hypotheses with 
quantitative methods. The analysis of the impact of Jamaica social investment fund (Rao and 
Ibáñez 2003) in five matched pairs used mixed methods. 
The crucial point of (Rao and Woolcock 2004) is that qualitative is essential to 
understanding the processes object of analysis and to complement quantitative data. The 
authors identify five ways in which qualitative methods can be useful. It allows generating 
valuable hypotheses as derived from fieldwork. It helps to understand the direction of 
causality. It facilitates identification of the nature of bias and measurement error often 
derived from wording of questions that fail to picture the phenomena that the researchers 
want to observe. An example of this problem is the use of the word “beating” that for survey 
respondents failed to portray other forms of domestic violence that the questionnaire wanted 
to take into consideration (Rao and Woolcock 2004). It enables crosschecking and replication. 
It informs the context by providing a stronger meaning to quantitative findings.  
Ten are the principles that should guide mixed methods evaluations of development 
projects (Rao and Woolcock 2004, 185). The iterative process should inform the process of 
survey design. Qualitative questions should be open-ended. Data analysts and people that 
collected data should be closely working together. The researcher should be driven by 
quantitative research design but collect data also using qualitative techniques. The sample 
chosen should be large enough to be representative of the heterogeneities present in the 
population observed. The fieldwork on research site should be long enough to acquire 
knowledge on the site itself. Qualitative information should be used to explain quantitative 
data. Badly trained qualitative researchers can create more damage that not well trained 
quantitative interviewers. Qualitative work should not be considered as an alternative 
method to surveys. Identifying the possible externalities to an intervention improve the 
measurement of outcomes.  
An important on-going project that is adopting mixed-methods is the evaluation of the 
impact of Fair trade certification scheme Fair Trade, Employment and Poverty Reduction 
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(FTEPR) (Cramer et al. 2013). The sampling methodology selected by FTEPRP research differs 
from the approach of “Randomized Control Trials” (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007), 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2012). Randomized Control Trials considers development intervention as 
a treatment and research is conceived as a quasi-experimental design. The promoters of this 
technique argue that it is possible to assess the effects of the development intervention, by 
selecting randomly an equal number of treated and non-treated. FTEPRP research instead 
opted for “contrastive case study that highlights the rationale for purposive selection that 
generate comparison within as well as between sites” (Cramer et al. 2013, 7). 
The choice to use purposive sampling is referred to the objective of research that aims at 
understanding the process of how, for whom and why certification scheme influence poverty 
in the contexts analyzed. The researchers do not aim neither to establish a control group 
neither to isolate an average treatment effect (Ravallion 2007). The research makes a 
comparison inside two countries where Fair Trade Certification scheme are applied and 
within countries across commodities. 
Use of mixed methods in social network analysis: a long history 
In social network analysis (SNA) mixed methods are even more relevant. Social network 
analysis finds its roots in qualitative research. The study of social networks started in the 
Forties in anthropological literature (Bott 1955), (Mitchell 1969), (Barnes 1954). Only in the 
Seventies there was a shift of attention and focus to more quantitative methods to analyze the 
topologies and structures of networks (White 2008). This trend was strengthened with the 
development of software for social network analysis that permitted a relevant advancement 
in quantitative analysis. Additionally SNA is interested not only in the topology of networks 
but also in the processes that generate these networks and on how these networks are 
perceived. 
“Qualitative approaches offer what quantitative cannot: they can add an awareness of 
process, change, content and context” (Edwards 2010, 5). Qualitative SNA tend to focus more 
on personal network than on whole networks (Bott 1955). Qualitative data allows to test for 
reliability and presence of measurement errors and outline and to elucidate on what is 
happening in the network what does this topology actually means (Diani and McAdam 2003, 
chap. 11).  
The strategies adopted by researchers to mix qualitative and quantitative data in social 
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network analysis have been mainly of three types. The first is to combine qualitative 
methodologies, such as ethnography, with quantitative analysis, using mathematical models. 
The second is to use multi-stage research process either starting with qualitative enquiry 
which results will be tested with quantitative methods on a larger scale or instead starting 
with a large quantitative survey and then focus on smaller sample to study more in depth 
groups with qualitative analysis. The third type is mixing on the one hand qualitative methods 
of data collection with mixed-method for data analysis (Edwards 2010). 
An example of the first strategy is the ethnographic study carried in high school classes to 
understand how formal and informal organization of the class influenced student resistance 
to learning and to teacher authority. McFarland collected data on both friendship ties among 
students in the class and episodes of students’ resistance. He used Poisson multilevel 
regression to understand how and which elements of classroom features influenced students 
acts of resistance (D. A. McFarland 2001). 
2.3 The research methodology applied in this research 
The features of the research questions led to the choice of a mixed methods research 
methodology. It was used a combination of two qualitative and quantitative methods for 
complementarity and triangulation purposes and qualitative data as a basis for hypotheses 
elaboration to be tested with quantitative and qualitative methods.  
The combination of the two can allow fighting against what are the main drawbacks of 
both methods: on the one hand lack of context understanding for quantitative and on the 
other hand high level of “positionality” (Sultana 2007) or subjectivity of the researcher for 
qualitative tools.  
This research qualifies for the use of mixed methods (Small 2011). Data collection 
combines semi-structured interviews and qualitative data such as focus groups, field notes 
and cooperative archival documents. Data analysis comprises mathematical models to test 
hypotheses and textual analysis of qualitative data.  
Quantitative model for social network analysis are based on two important assumptions. 
The first is that there is high level of interdependence between the different actors and 
contextual signals influence households behavior (Entwisle et al. 2007), (Erbring and Young 
1979). Specifically in this research households are considered to be influenced by other 
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households, being part of the same settlement, with which they have direct ties. The second is 
that households’ choices are not explained by rational utility model but rather individuals’ 
actions are shaped by other factors such as social norms and intrinsic motivations (Bowles, 
2004), (Ostrom 1998).  
Qualitative is a way to complement and control for the quantitative and allows having 
deeper comprehension of the reality as the researcher can go beyond the simple acceptance of 
what people state during interviews. In a research that aims at collecting households’ socio-
economic features along with mapping social networks of all households living in the villages 
object of analysis, it is fundamental to have a clear comprehension of the context relying not 
only on individuals’ responses to interviews but also on observation of households’ behavior. 
In order to have a clearer insight into the social context along with survey questionnaires, 
participant observation has been adopted.  
The researcher needs to gain trust from people being observed in order to be able to 
collect true information on social ties and household demographic and economic features. 
Moreover qualitative techniques, such as participant observation are necessary to overcome a 
lack of common background between observers and observed and to elicit some hidden 
phenomena.  
Qualitative techniques can therefore allow achieving a better understanding of the 
interviewees and of the context of analysis. Qualitative tools included one focus group, in 
depth interviews and participant observation that allowed having a clearer picture of 
cooperative history, village’s history, choice to join or not join the cooperative and 
identification of the main places/institutions of social aggregation in the villages.  
2.3.1 Qualitative data collection 
Two important features of qualitative research process are: 1) the interest in 
understanding the meaning of phenomenon, 2) the choice to study people, object of the 
research, at their location (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007, 29).  
Qualitative interviewing allows to elicit the meaning of events and processes in which 
people have been involved (Rubin and Rubin 2012, 3). The observation of the context 
analyzed, according to recent literature in anthropology of development, should be carried 
49 
 
out from within: “Arguably the social processes of organizations are better understood from 
within” (Mosse 2005, 11).  
The process of creation of agrarian reform settlements is an important event in the 
biography of people that took part in it (Severi 2012). They have been involved both as active 
occupiers or old sugar cane plantations that have experienced the presence of new neighbors 
and new ruling organizations. 
The four main qualitative tools adopted in this research design are the introduction of 
two qualitative questions in the structured interview, several in-depth interviews with key 
informants, the conduction of a focus group with a selected sample of cooperative members 
and the choice to live for some period in one of the villages object of the analysis and to carry 
period of observation of the cooperative activities. 
The interview started by asking people to tell about how their life history led to the 
agrarian reform settlement. Some of the respondents were already living in the village before 
the agrarian reform while others decided to join the social movements for very different 
reasons. The process ended by asking them to point out what was their perception of change 
having passed through this entire process of village formation and establishment. 
The objective of focus groups is to gather a significant sample of people to discuss about a 
limited number of topics. During the focus group the researcher has the role of the facilitator 
by supporting the discussion allowing all people to express their ideas. General goal of the 
focus group is to make people express their minds freely. Participants of the focus group 
should share some same features, as this would allow them to interact, but also they should 
have some relevant differences as the questions are designed to make people engaged in a 
discussion. Focus group aims at eliciting the different interpretation of people of the reality. It 
is recommendable that the facilitator of the focus group is no group insider as this pushes 
participants to elicit their concepts and motivations. (Groves 2009). 
The focus group used for this research included a sample of eight of members of the 
cooperative, from different villages, that were chosen to include all the typologies of farmers 
from the smallest to biggest producers1. Cooperative members were asked to discuss about 
relevant aspect of cooperative life and also reflect on some of the many challenges that the 
                                                        
1 Focus group questions are presented in appendix 8.2 
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cooperative have been facing. It is important to point out that, only five members were the 
most active in the conversation while three remained mostly silent. 
 
2.3.2 Quantitative data analysis: Exponential Random Graph Models 
 
The study of social networks focuses on the characteristics of the networks (descriptives), 
and on the identification of local configurations that define network formation as well as on 
the influence of social networks on behavior (social influence).  
A network is composed of a set of actors (nodes) that are connected by relations (ties or 
edges). Two nodes in a network connected by a tie constitute a dyad and three nodes 
connected by a tie are a triad.  
Networks can either portray the ties of single actors (also referred as egos) (egocentric 
networks)2 or instead ties among all nodes in a given social space (whole networks)3. This 
research analyzes whole networks and the village represents the network boundary.  
Networks can either be directed or undirected. Directed networks show what is the 
direction of a tie between node i and node j. The tie is symmetrical (or reciprocated) when 
both nodes refer to have a relationship with the other. The tie is asymmetrical from node i to 
node j when only one nominates the other. In the ‘‘undirected’’ network, a tie between i and j 
is either present or absent. 
Networks’ descriptives are the overall characteristics of the networks such as size, 
degree, density, average path length, average degree and number of isolates. Network size is 
the number of vertices or nodes in the network (N). Isolates are nodes with no-connections. 
The degree in an undirected network measures the number of alters with whom ego is 
connected. The average degree is the mean of the number of ties that each ego has. In a 
“undirected” network with number of nodes (N), the density ( 
() ) is defined by the ratio 
                                                        
2 “An egocentric network consists of an actor, the other actors in its immediate locality or neighborhood, and the 
relationships among them.” (O’Malley and Marsden 2008, 224) 
3 ‘‘Whole network’’ studies seek to assemble data on relationships in a theoretical population, that is, on the ties 
linking all units/actors within some bounded social collective, such as all physicians within a medical 
practice. In such studies, it is essential that clear boundaries or rules of inclusion for units/actors be specified 
(Laumann et al. 1983)”. (O’Malley and Marsden 2008, 225) 
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between the observed ties in the network (L) and the number of possible ties.  The geodesic 
distance is the shortest path between two nodes.  
The analysis of networks’ formation focuses on local network configurations or network 
structures that are considered as forces behind network formation. Clustering, centralization 
and homophily are among the most important social forces. Homophily capture the tendency 
to create ties with others that share similar traits. It is considered to be one the main 
mechanisms behind network formation (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Clustering 
or closure is the propensity to form ties with other nodes with which nodes already have ties 
in common. Centralization (Freeman 1978) is tendency of nodes to form links with other 
nodes that already have a high number of ties.  
ERGMs are a class of statistical models for social network analysis that are designed to 
enable the recognition of these social processes or forces, which can be considered the 
structural signature of the network (J. Scott and Carrington 2011). ERG models allow 
generating networks based on local properties that are specified in the model.  
ERGMs, also referred as p* models (Robins et al. 2007) (Anderson, Wasserman, and 
Crouch 1999)(Frank and Strauss 1986) (Pattison and Wasserman 1999), are designed to 
observe social networks, which are the dependent variable, at one point in time. They are “tie-
based models for understanding how and why social network ties arise” (Lusher, Koskinen, 
and Robbins 2013, 9). They aim at identifying which forces can explain why we observe the 
specific network under analysis. 
The model is consistent with the main basic social network theory assumptions. 
Networks are based on local structures and therefore local effects are important to explain the 
global network structure. The presence of ties in a network is not random but there are social 
processes or local properties that generate these ties. There are dependencies among ties. 
They can be specifically modeled by network configurations. Ties are influenced also by actor 
attributes. Ego’s edges are influenced by Ego’s own ties, by Alter’s ties and also by node-level 
attributes present in their local neighborhood. “The patterns within networks can be seen as 
evidence for on-going structural processes. Multiple processes can operate simultaneously. 
Social processes are structured yet stochastic” (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robbins 2013, 10).  
ERGMs are theory driven models, therefore when a researcher decides to use a specific 
local configuration is implicitly adopting a certain theory. 
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The frequent contact network, which is the network that I aim at modeling, as any 
network, can be represented by a random graph. Its main characteristics are being 
constituted by a set of nodes n and dyads m and having a specific density (Erdos and Rényi 
1959). The presence of ties, also referred as edge or link, in a dyad is represented by Yij=1 and 
absence in nodes in a dyad is represented by Yij=0. The presence of a tie in the network, in the 
case analyzed, means that the households (nodes) meet frequently to talk. 
ERGMs have similarities with logistic regression models, as they allow estimating the log 
odds of new a tie occurring in the network for each of the configurations specified in the 
model, but they go beyond logistic regression as they allow for dependence among 
observations. 
ERGMs model the probability that a random network Y is realized by an observed 
network y as indicated by the following equation.  
Pr(
 = ) = 1  exp  ()


 
zk(y) are the model covariates of any K local configuration of the graph that are 
hypothesized to affect the presence of ties in the network . The most commonly used local 
configurations are centralization, clustering, homophily, density and in the case of directed 
graphs also reciprocity and sender and receiver effects. Θk is a vector of statistical parameters 
that will be estimated by the model. c is a normalizing constant that allow the probability 
calculated by the model to sum to 1.  
A positive value of the coefficient θk signals a positive effect of a specific network statistic 
in the formation of ties, while the opposite sign means that these configurations tend to 
hamper the formation of ties. (O’Malley and Marsden 2008, 245). 
The main local dependence structures at edge level are Bernoulli graphs, dyadic 
dependence, and Markov random graphs.  
Bernoulli graphs (Erdos and Rényi 1959) assume that edges in a network are 
independent and that the presence or absence of ties, indicated by a probability α, is fixed for 
all edges (“homogeneity assumption”): α =  where θ is the density or edge parameter.  
Dyadic independent models instead are based on the assumption that “a tie from person i 
to person j is independent from a tie from person j to person i.  Hence the model is no longer a 
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model for ties in the network but for pairs of ties in the network, and the pairs of ties are 
called dyads” (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robbins 2013, 56) 
Markov random graphs are based on the assumption that “there is a fixed number of 
nodes and that edges between disjoint pairs of nodes are independent conditional on the rest 
of the graph. Two edge indicators {i,j} and {i’,k} are conditionally dependent if {i,j} ∩ {i’,k}.” (T. 
A. Snijders 2002, 3). The first models of Markov random graphs were developed in the 
Eighties (Frank and Strauss 1986) proposed as a possible way to model dependence between 
edges both in directed and undirected graphs.  
Estimates in the Bernoulli dependent and dyadic independence assumption are made 
with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Lehmann and Casella 1998). Instead, in models that 
include dependence structures, the coefficients are estimated using Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMCLE).  
The simplest ERGMs are defined by specifying the number of edges or the number of 
isolates in the model.  
The outcome variable in ERGMs is the presence of a tie in the network. Network 
predictors used in ERGMs, also referred as network statistics or local configurations, can be 
classified into exogenous and endogenous. Using exogenous network configurations, such as 
homophily and edge covariance, the normal logic of logistic regression holds; instead using 
endogenous network configuration such as transitivity, centrality and edges, the presence of 
ties is predicted by the presence of other ties in the network. Because of these dependencies 
structures ERGMs are different from other regression analysis. ERGMs aim at testing if some 
structural configurations are prevalent in the network. The interpretation of parameters that 
describe the presence of some network configuration cannot be the same used for standard 
logistic regression results.  (Robins, Lewis, and Wang 2012) 
Density, in ERGMs models, captures the frequency of interaction in the network. It is the 
effect that incorporates the number of edges or links in a network. The parameter edges4 
measures for the overall probability of a link in the network.  
                                                        
4 Command in statnet package in R : edges. “It adds one network statistic to the model equal to the number of 
edges in the network.” (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 3). 
54 
 
Homophily effects capture the tendency to create ties with others that share the same 
attributes. It is considered to be one the main mechanisms behind network formation 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Homophily effect can either be the result selection 
(similar actors select similar other with whom to interact) or influence (actors that are 
connected by ties become similar). With cross-sectional data it is impossible to separate 
between the two social processes above mentioned (selection and influence). Some scholars 
describe the process that led to prevalence of ties between nodes that share similar traits as 
“assortative mixing” (GOODREAU, KITTS, and MORRIS 2009, 111). This effect is captured in 
ERGMs, among others by nodematch and nodecov. The uniform homophily statistic 
(nodematch5) allows testing if the equality (match) in the value of between the two nodes in 
the dyad increases the probability of a tie in the network. (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 
2008, 5).  A positive and high coefficient for this parameter shows sharing the same attribute 
increases the probability of having a tie. The node covariance parameter (nodecov6) instead 
aims at testing whether the covariance between the two nodes in the dyad influence the 
probability of the presence a tie. 
Edge covariate7 coefficient measures the likelihood of a tie to form in the dependent 
network given a tie in the covariate network (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 6). Edge 
covariance allows testing for the presence of a joint effect between several networks. This 
effect is considered important when it is considered that there is no temporal dependence 
between the networks observed. 
Centralization, which is the tendency of nodes to form links with other nodes that already 
have a high number of ties, is captured in ERGMs by the parameter alternating k-star but also 
by a new parameter geometrically weighted degree (Hunter and Handcock 2006). 
                                                        
5 Command in statnet package in R: nodematch (attrname, diff = FALSE, keep = NULL)). “It counts the number of 
edges (i, j) for which attribute (i) = attribute (j), p network statistics are added to the model, where p is the 
number of unique values of the attrname attribute”(Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 4) 
6 Command in statnet package in R: nodecov(attrname) “The attrname argument is a character string giving the 
name of a quantitative (not categorical) attribute in the network's vertex attribute list. This term adds a single 
network statistic to the model equaling the sum of attrname(i) and attrname(j) for all edges (i; j) in the network.” 
(Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 4) 
7 Command in statnet package in R: (edgecov (x, attrname = NULL)). “The x argument is a network; the optional 
argument attrname provides the name of the quantitative edge attribute to use for covariate values (in this case, 
missing edges in x are assigned a covariate value of zero). This term adds one statistic to the model, equal to the 
sum of the covariate values for each edge appearing in the network” (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 7). 
55 
 
Geometrically weighted degree8 is a degree distribution term that represents the frequency 
distribution for nodal degrees where each node counts only once. It helps to model the degree 
distribution geometrically weighted degree distribution equivalent. A positive coefficient 
signals the presence of a centralization pattern. 
Clustering effect is the propensity to form ties with other nodes with which nodes already 
have ties in common. This effect in ERGMs is captured by two shared partners statistics 
Geometrically Weighted Edgewise Shared partners (GWESP) and Geometrically Weighted 
Dyadic Shared partners9  (GWDSP) (T. A. B. Snijders et al. 2006) (Hunter 2007). The positive 
coefficient for the GWESP term is an evidence of transitivity in the undirected network. It 
represents an alternative term for the alternating k-triangle statistic. It accounts for the 
number of common neighbors. (O’Malley and Marsden 2008, 252). The GWDSP is very similar 
to the previous term but it focuses on the number of dyads that the same neighbors whether 
they are connected by a tie or not (Hunter et al. 2008, 12). 
Among the several possible model specifications, I have decided to focus on homophily 
effects. The analysis of homophily effects is consistent with the literature in development 
economics where authors’ use shared attributes to predict membership in groups or risk 
sharing (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012).  
The use of ERGMs allows increasing the robustness of the results and controlling for other 
local structures that go beyond the dyadic level, namely the tendency for centralization and 
clustering. The effect of homophily can be reduced by the tendency to form ties with nodes 
with which they share common ties, i.e, an indicator of closure (“friends of friends tend to be 
friends”).  
                                                        
8 Command in statnet package in R: (gwdegree (decay, fixed = FALSE)). “This term adds one network statistic to 
the model equal to the weighted degree distribution with weight parameter decay. The optional argument fixed 
indicates whether the scale parameter lambda is to be fit as a curved exponential-family model (see Hunter and 
Handcock 2006). The default is FALSE, which means the scale parameter is not fixed” (Morris, Handcock, and 
Hunter 2008, 6–7). 
9 Command in statnet package in R: (gwesp (alpha, fixed = FALSE)) inputs in the model “a statistic equal to the 
geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner distribution with weight parameter alpha. The optional 
argument fixed indicates whether the scale parameter lambda is to be fit as a curved exponential-family model 
(see Hunter and Handcock 2006). The default is FALSE, which means the scale parameter is not fixed” (Morris, 
Handcock, and Hunter 2008, 11). GWESP is defined as the number of unordered pairs {i, j} such that yij= 1 and i 
and j have exactly k common neighbors (Hunter and Handcock, 2004) . 
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ERGMs not only combines all the properties of the dyadic regression model à la Gurbert 
and Fafschamps (Fafchamps M. and Gubert F. 2007) but also allows identifying what are the 
forces that generate the network we observe, such as the presence or the absence of 
transitivity and dyadic dependence which are very frequent phenomena that you cannot 
control for in dyadic regression.  
In dyadic regression models, the presence of dependence in observation is only captured 
by auto-correlation in the standard errors but such dependencies are not explicitly modeled. 
It is also possible to specify the model including a series of network configurations that trigger 
network formation besides homophily such as centralization, clustering, density and edges co-
occurrence which are not possible to include in dyadic regressions. 
The tendency to create ties with similar others (homophily) is crucial as it is related to the 
major risk of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that is to become the mirror of existing 
social structure.  
The main idea is that if there are only few node attributes or edge covariance that make 
people communicate and homophily is the social process that drives interaction among 
households, it is very likely that only one group will benefit from CBOs action and the rest will 
be excluded. The result of these social forces will therefore more likely be no change in the 
context of intervention or rather an increase of inequality.  
Homophily can therefore be one of the reasons of elites capturing of the community-
based organizations and the presences of brokering ties across groups hamper such 
phenomenon. I define groups as those nodes that share the same ties or the same attributes. 
Namely a clan is a completely connected graph or a clique where the link is defined by 
kinship. Nodes that have the same geographical origin or work for the same household can 
compose other types of groups. 
The process of ERGMs construction implies six steps. The first is the definition of ties in a 
network as random variables. The second defines the presence of local social processes that 
are assumed to generate ties in the network such as homophily, transitivity or others (Robins 
et al. 2007, 178). The third is the specification of the model with network statistics that 
describe tie generator mechanisms such as density, triangles or two-star, and three stars. The 
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fourth is the simplification of parameters due the homogeneity assumption10. The fifth is the 
estimation of model parameters. The sixth is Goodness of Fit Estimation (Hunter, Goodreau, 
and Handcock 2008). 
The estimation of parameters is based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MCMCMLE). The model simulates a range of possible networks 
distributions starting from some parameters values that are constantly improved by a process 
of iteration based on the Metropolis-Hastings or Gibbs algorithm (Hunter, Goodreau, and 
Handcock 2013). The procedure, starting from the set of parameters specified, simulates a 
distribution of graphs. It then compares the simulated distribution of graphs with the 
observed graph. The objective of the iteration process is to find the parameter estimate for 
which the observed graph is central in the distribution. The process of iteration stops when 
the parameter estimates stabilize (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robbins 2013).  
The goodness of fit statistics (GOF) gives a measure, both graphical and statistic, of the 
similarity of the simulated network to the observed one. If the networks generated by 
properties specified in the model produced estimates that are around the mean of the 
observed network we can argue that the observed network is well represented by the model. 
GOF also allows showing whether the model is able to replicate the graph distribution that 
were not explicitly model by the parameters specified in the model. 
The analysis Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) diagnostics aims at showing whether the 
model converged and whether there are degeneracy problems 11 . To inspect model 
convergence two are the main graphical tools: traceplot and density plot. In traceplots, 
successive iterations are plotted against their corresponding parameter draws. They allow 
                                                        
10 “Homogeneity assumptions, that is, that all counted instances are equiprobable. This is similar to the 
assumption in linear regression that a covariate’s effect is the same for all observations” (GOODREAU, KITTS, and 
MORRIS 2009, p. 109). 
11 “Degeneracy is an estimation problem associated with models that fit the data poorly. Essentially, de-generacy 
results from the specification of a model that is so unlikely to have generated the network, that the ERGM cannot 
be computed. Degeneracy occurs when the model lumps all or most of its probability mass on just one or a few 
possible graphs. In most cases of degeneracy, disproportionate probability mass is placed either on the complete 
(fully connected) or empty (entirely unconnected) networks (Handcock 2003)”(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011, 
74). 
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inspection of the process of iteration and in particular to highlight steps where convergence 
proved more difficult, which indicates bad mixing.  
ERGMs can be estimated both in the software Mpnet (Pattinson et al. 2012) and by the 
package statnet (Handcock et al. 2003) implemented in R software. The analyses presented in 
chapter four are estimated with statnet R package.  
2.4 Sampling definition 
This section describes the criteria that defined the choice of the sampling strategy adopted. 
Crucial in the choice of sampling inside villages was a pre-test of methodology that is 
presented in the paragraphs below. 
2.4.1 Pre-test of sampling 
The sampling and research methodology has been tested with a pilot study of three weeks 
in Central Mozambique, namely in the district of Caia. Object of analysis were six rural 
producers’ organizations operating in 5 villages of Caia municipality. This pilot study has been 
extremely important as it pointed out the main risks and constraints of primary data 
collection: sampling strategy and formulation of questions. The methodological choices 
applied in this research were directly guided by these research results. In the pilot study the 
choice of interviewing 47 households (25 members and 22 non-members) distributed among 
five different villages did not allowed for a comprehensive representation of the social 
structure analyzed. Most of the rural association members represented the core, while non-
members represented the periphery. To solve this issue it was decided to change sampling 
strategy by reducing the number of villages studied and by interviewing all households living 
in those villages. The pilot study highlighted also the difficulty of using name-generator 
techniques (Marsden 1990) to elicit social ties among households and to recognize the 
households nominated by the interviewee. To prevent such problems names and nicknames 
of all households living in the village were asked to local officer before starting the interviews 
in order to construct a complete roster of names. In this way it was possible to know in 
advance the name of respondent and some of the households’ features before starting the 
interview. 
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2.4.2 Criteria to define sampling strategy 
The main sampling strategies are on the one hand probability sampling and on the other 
purposive sampling.  
Probability sampling is mainly used in quantitative studies where the most relevant 
criteria is to guarantee that every observation has equal probability to be chosen. The main 
rules to select the sample studied is random sampling, cluster sampling, stratified sampling 
and sampling using a combination of the previous quantitative techniques.  
Purposive sampling is preferred by qualitative studies where the choice of population 
should allow for the possibility to answer to the research question. The main purposive 
sampling procedures are: 1) representativeness or comparability, 2) special or unique cases 
and 3) sequential sampling. A further possibility is to use multi purposive techniques (Plano 
Clark and Creswell 2008, 204–206). 
Mixed methods sampling are composed by techniques that combine the two strategies. 
Among the several types of combination the one adopted is the one considered the most 
suitable to respond the research question: mixed multi-stage sampling (Teddlie and Yu 2007). 
The choice of the sample of villages object was based on dependent variable logic both on 
economic and social dimensions. The initial idea was to choose four settlements that were 
scoring the highest and lowest value for each variable. The initial criteria proposed for 
economic variable was per household value of products sold to the cooperative, while for 
social dimension were considered a range of options. The fictional name that I will use to refer 
to the cooperative is Alagoas Sem Terra Cooperative (ASTC). The definition of the first 
criterion was easily adopted as ASTC has this information available while the second was 
much more complex due to limited data availability before survey and difficulty in selecting 
the most appropriate variable.  
The social dimension criteria included several options: 1) the former working experience 
of settlers, 2) the religion’s prevalence, 3) the old and new settlers, 4) level of violence in the 
settlement in the period of settlement head election, 5) prevalence of political party and level 
of political activity, 6) social movement recruiting households, 7) distance from the road, 8) 
settlement spatial organization. The first two weeks of fieldwork were devoted to define what 
would be the most effective variable to define sample criteria.  
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The two criteria to discriminate among these variables were the estimated impact on 
settlements’ social structure and the availability and reliability of data. For most variables it 
was not possible to have information before going to the settlement. The existing data 
available at village level, mainly collected by local health officers responsible for village 
medical assistance, only offered very limited information such as number of households per 
age class and other similar information. Regarding information on political participation, due 
to the electoral campaign period, it was only possible to gather information through direct 
observation that was not feasible due to spatial dispersion of settlements.  
2.4.3 Sampling description 
Besides theoretical criteria that oriented the sampling definition criteria, two criteria 
were used to discriminate among the 18 assentamentos in the municipality object of analysis. 
The three villages chosen were selected as different social movements have led their creation. 
To select among the villages whose process of creation was led by Movimento Sem Terra, the 
criteria was to select one village that could be comparable in participation in cooperative 
actives with the only village that was not created by a social movement but by a private 
association (village A). Village B was therefore selected because it had the highest percentage 
of households’ members in the village after village A. In case two villages had the same 
features I have chosen the village that had the smaller number of households living in the 
village. 
Different social movement mobilizing households impacted several dimension of villages’ 
composition and organization. The three organizations recruiting households in the three 
villages differed: 1) in recruiting techniques, 2) in the way they set the rules to define 
households who can have access to land after a period of occupation, 3) in the spatial 
organization of the settlement, 4) in the way they choose the political representation of 
settlers and in the ability to negotiate with local and national authorities.  
For what concerns the recruiting techniques while MST and CPT were driven by the 
speed of recruitment, the private association followed a longer path, which led household to 
engage in fights for the land. In the rule to choose who can have access to land after a period 
of occupation, the most important difference was the definition of a maximum number of 
households linked by sibling ties, which could live in the same village. MST defined this 
criterion, as they wanted to prevent the creation of new landlords that have a large number of 
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plots, which would then recreate the problem of latifundia. Settlements’ spatial organization 
also differed across different social movements. The two main typologies were either 
centralized (agrovila), or dispersed (casa no lote). Agrovila is the most common in the 
municipality studied and it has been strongly supported by MST. It is a centralized settlement 
where all houses are built in the same area called agrovila and plots can be up to one-hour 
walk from settlements’ residences. Agrovila share some similarities with the ancient arruado 
as houses are very close to each other. In several villages, despite many settlers asked to have 
their house on the plot, MST refused to grant this right and it allowed only old-settlers 
(moradores) to build their house on the area where they were already living before the 
agrarian reform. Casa no lote, strongly supported by cooperative, is characterized by a 
dispersed location as houses were built in each household plot. In the municipality studied 
there is the only settlement that adopted such organization and it is part of the sample. 
Furthermore in settlers’ political representation mechanisms while MST and CPT are 
organized at national level and negotiated directly with INCRA, the private association instead 
was negotiating with INCRA and local mayor but had no representation at national level. 
Village A has 102 households living constantly in village, two out of village for health 
reason and six households that have abandoned their plot. The village is organized as casa no 
lote and it located 23 km away from the main road.   
Village B has 38 fixed residents households and 4 households that come just from time to 
time to take care of their plots. The village is organized as agrovila and it is 5 km away from 
the main road.  
Village C has 40 fixed residents households but it was not possible to interview 3 of them. 
The village is organized in two agrovilas and some houses on the plot. It is 18 km away from 
the main road.  
2.5 Data collection 
The research is based mainly on primary data collected during household survey carried 
out during three months of fieldwork, from July to October 2012 in three villages, created by 
agrarian reform, in a municipality in the North of Alagoas state, in the Northeast region of 
Brazil. Complementary sources are cooperative archival sources, one focus group and some 
in-depth interviews with key informants, as well as few secondary data. Cooperative archival 
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data include cooperative digital management system, cooperative internal documents such as 
general assembly presentations, projects descriptions and reports and cooperative statute. 
Qualitative data comprise one focus group with a sample of cooperative members, two 
anonymous self-administered questionnaires, related to decision taking mechanism in 
cooperative, some key informants’ in depth interviews to collect villages’ history and 
participant observation of cooperative activities’ field notes. Secondary data include a 
previous bachelor thesis on the cooperative and the studies that aimed at assessing the 
situation of the agrarian reform settlements in the municipality analyzed, in order the design 
the plan to support their recovery (COATES 2007). 
The unit of analysis is the household. This choice is consistent with studies, that dealt 
with the same topic, carried out in agrarian societies of developing and emerging countries 
(Entwisle et al. 2007), (Krishnan and Sciubba 2009), (Banerjee et al. 2012), (Jaimovich 2011). 
In such contexts the household is considered to be the unit of production and the fundamental 
social unit. Members of the households are all of the people that live in the same dwelling.  
Notwithstanding its widespread use, considering the household as a unit of analysis is a 
simplification of reality. Inside the households there are different livelihood strategies that 
allow for household subsistence and therefore different members of the households interact 
in different social spaces. Furthermore in a study that focuses on the analysis of social 
networks different members of the family can have different ties. As heads of the households I 
consider the father and the mother of most of the children living in the household. In this 
survey have been considered the ties developed by the heads of the households. Despite the 
limitation described, the advantage of adopting household as unit of analysis is that it allows 
collecting ties among all households that live in the village.  
In order situate this case study in its historical background it was reviewed literature that 
analyzed issues at the macro-policy level such as sugar cane industry, the agrarian reform and 
the role of social movements and the emergence of family farming sector (chapter three). 
2.5.1 Socio-economic variables 
Two types of variables that define households’ features have been collected: socio-
economic status, and network data.  
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Socio-economic status variables 
There were four main goals of socio-economic variables’ collection. First, understanding 
village composition in terms of migration waves, origin of settlers and other possible 
information that could shed light on the presence of pre-existing ties before encampment 
among households. Second, describing previous and current livelihood strategies. Third, 
having a better understanding of households’ engagement in family farming activities. Fourth, 
drawing a general profile of socio-economic status of households. 
Variables that describe village composition include migration origin, migration wave and 
number of years in the village, presence in the village before the agrarian reform and the 
name of the person or organization that told the household about the possibility of going to 
the village (contact to get in the village). The creation of the villages is the results of the 
stratification of different migration waves that I have categorized in two broader groups: old 
settlers and new settlers. Old settlers are households that were already living in the village 
before the agrarian reform mobilization. New settlers include household mobilized by the 
agrarian reform either because they were engaged in a social movement or association 
fighting for the access to land or because they were contacted by some of the old settlers. New 
settlers are then divided into: first comers, first comers’ dependents, old settler’s dependents, 
second comers and third comers.  
Variables describing previous and current livelihood strategies consist of professional 
backgrounds. They have been categorized in five categories of contractual agreements: 1) 
autonomous, 2) employee, 3) mixed, 4) retired and 5) unemployed. The first category 
comprises activities that have an entrepreneurial component being either in agricultural 
sector or petty trade activities. The second correspond to wage work of several types and the 
third is a combination of first and second category.  
Variables describing households’ engagement in family farming activities include: 
dimension of plot, monthly income and expenses, importance of family farming as income 
generation activity such as previous job, present job, access to land before coming to 
settlement, number of plots, type of agricultural production before coming to the village and 
at the time of interview, animals’ possess, percentage of the plot that is used for agricultural 
production, products and place of commercialization, advices for agricultural activities, use of 
tractor and property of tractor used, total average monthly income, households hired for 
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agricultural activities and households for which they work in their plot. The question related 
to advices in family farming was conceived as a name generator technique but it was not 
possible to collect the information in this format because most of the people, in spite of the 
indications, named people that mostly are beside village boundaries. Rather than using this as 
network data I considered that asking for advice is a proxy for relevance of family farming. 
Variables that describe more general households’ demographic and economic 
characteristics comprise number of schooling years, assets such as type of access to water and 
means of transportation. Further data collected include number of times that households go 
outside the village and popularity of the households. The variable “popularity” can be 
considered as a proxy for leadership as households are asked to nominate people that they 
consider to be the most well known and the ones that represent a reference in the village. Past 
studies referred to the importance of leaders to make an innovative behavior spread (Nypan 
1970), (Inguaggiato, Navarra, and Vailati 2013). Controlling for the effect of node attribute on 
popularity means understanding whether households tend to form ties with peers or rather 
with others that are more popular than them. 
 
2.5.2 Network data  
Rural villages, that are often referred with the word "community”, can be represented as 
multiple networks of interdependences that determine power-dependence relations 
(Emerson 1962). In the villages studied I have mapped multiple social networks that connect 
all households inside the village and affiliations in different groups active in the village and 
outside it. “By social networks we refer to the patterns of interaction and exchange among 
people, arising through human social processes; and by multiple social networks, we mean that 
there may be several different types of social networks simultaneously present among those 
individuals” (Robins and Pattison 2006, 3). 
The choice to focus on kinship, frequent contact and labor exchange (agricultural 
employment) and associated life, namely church, political party and local associations, is 
related on one hand to literature presenting similar analyses (T. Conley and Udry 2001; 
Arcand and Fafchamps 2012) and on the other to the meaning that such ties have in the 
context of analysis. I consider kinship and family farming employment as constitutive ties. 
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Such networks could be the result of strategically built ties to create patronage systems. 
Frequent contact network is considered a behavioral tie that is influenced by other two ties. 
Family is a crucial institution in small-scale societies and it is often the way to articulate 
many dimensions of life not only social but also political and economic. Kinship network 
connection, which relates with the other dimensions of social and economic life, is of primary 
importance in understanding the social structure. Furthermore the lack of connection 
between families and the seek for benefits only within its group members is one of the first 
cause of phenomena that are referred to as “amoral familism” (Banfield 1967). Kinship ties 
collected during survey include the following relationships: marriage, brother/sister, 
mother/father and cousin. 
Labor force supply is one of the most crucial elements in agricultural economics; the 
ability to produce more crops is strictly connected to the ability to mobilize more labor force 
(Seavoy 2000). Some authors refer that wealth in peasant economies can be measured in 
terms of the number of people that households are able to mobilize (Guyer and Belinga 1995). 
Family employment is a hierarchical relationship rather than an equal (unranked) one. In 
order to clearly disentangle the direction between employer and employee it has been asked 
either if the household employed someone or if it was employed by someone else or both. 
Because the answers to the two questions were different, I have treated the two networks as 
separate.  
Family farming employment includes the following possibilities: employing just people 
inside the household itself, hiring people from other households with whom they are 
connected through kinship ties (i.e. they are part of the extended family), hiring people that 
live in the same village with no kinship connection, hiring people that come from other 
villages, hiring people that are no fixed residents but that decide to transfer to the village for 
some time. It was not considered for data analysis workers members of the households and 
people that are non-fixed residents in the village. These non-fixed residents are not registered 
by local health officer and not considered as part of the village by fellow villagers12.  
                                                        
12 They are referred by households interviewed as “the land tenant of”, “he is just an old man, living 
drunken that has not fixed residency, living some day in some place and some day in some other”. 
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Frequent contact portrays the frequent interaction among households. To describe these 
ties during the interview I asked respondents to nominate people that they meet on a regular 
basis by going to visit them at their houses. Visiting someone’s house in the context of analysis 
can be interpreted as recognizing importance to this household. I argue that there is deeper 
meaning to this type of declared relationship than simple companionship. The reason why I 
have decided to focus on such network is because it can represent an opportunity for social 
contagion among households. Investigating the social forces behind network formation is 
important in a context where village creation was not driven by kinship or other more usual 
patterns. It was instead the encampment process and the activities of villages’ early 
organization that played a crucial role in the process of socialization among villagers. “Social 
networks shape and are shaped by participation in social movements” (Porta and Diani 2006).  
Two recent articles on social network dynamics in settlements created by agrarian reform 
in Zimbabwe (Abigail Barr 2004), (Dekker 2004) focused their attention on homophily 
patterns and the role of CBOs beside using a different quantitative approach. In such contexts 
it is important to understand what social process allows “households to become from 
strangers to neighbors” (Abigail Barr 2004, 1753). 
2.5.3 Fieldwork organization 
I have spent three months of fieldwork (from July to October 2012) in a municipality in 
North of the state of Alagoas in the Northeast of Brazil. All interviews have been conducted in 
Portuguese, which has been the main working language except for few exceptions of 
important conversations with the Italian nun, main responsible for the cooperative and for 
the Italian voluntaries supporting the work of the cooperative. The support of an interpreter 
was never needed as Portuguese is the only language used in the context analyzed. The access 
to list of village inhabitants as well as information on households was given by local health 
officer (agente de saude). During the first interviews in the village, especially in village A, the 
local health officer accompanied me. The interview has been tested with some people working 
at the cooperative. 
The period spent in Brazil was organized in two main periods. During the first period of 
two weeks, I made participant observation of the cooperatives’ activities and some in depth 
interviews with cooperative’s key figures to understand the history of the cooperative. I also 
aimed at placing the role of the cooperative in the municipality, by identifying retailers that 
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buy farmers’ production, its market and cooperative main competitors. In this period I also 
made exploratory questions and observations to identify: the main activities that compose 
livelihood strategies (family farming, state employee, tourism, seasonal worker in plantation, 
sugar cane cutter with regular contract), the main elements that determine the level of people 
wealth and entrepreneurship (type of housing features, electronic devices ect..) and the most 
important social and economic ties that connect families in villages object of analysis. 
Furthermore I aimed at eliciting the main organizations in the area which provide the 
occasion for social gathering and therefore potential brokers (Ronald S Burt 2005) such as 
social movements, local churches, schools, political parties, local markets and occupation 13.  
During the second period, I was conducting interviews in the three villages object of 
analysis. The main points of the interview, described more in detail in the next section, are: a) 
socio-economic features of households and b) social networks among all households in three 
villages, c) identification of places outside villages where people go most often and number of 
times they go outside villages per household interviewed. Very few interviews were recorded 
due to the sensitivity of the electoral campaign period. 
2.5.4 Interview description 
 
To collect data, I have carried out 177 face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The main 
differences between questionnaires and semi-structured interviews refer to the level of 
standardization of questions’ wording and answers (Creswell 2003). In the interview there 
were a fixed number of questions that households were asked to answer but the ordering and 
wording of questions was extremely similar14 but not identical.  
I have developed a coding scheme that allowed me to classify answers according to 
specific categories but I left people free to answer especially on questions that induce social 
                                                        
13 School was also considered by some informants as an important place for interaction but it has not been considered as only including part 
of the family and usually not households’ minds. 
14 During the interviews I have proceeded as follows: I had on my laptop two files open, one with the list of questions in Word 
and one with an Excel table where in every column there was the name of the information collected. The presence of these 
two files was conceived as a way to guarantee that all the information was asked and the wording would stay the most similar 
possible. 
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desirability bias15. Households’ interviews were distributed as follows among villages: 102 in 
village A, 38 in village B and 37 in village C. These numbers represent all households 
permanently living in village A and B and 95% of those living in village C. The interview was 
carried out in the house where the household resides. They were conducted either at the 
presence of both households’ heads or of one of the two, most of the times only the woman.  
The choice to perform all of the interviews at households’ house is based on the 
consideration that it allows gaining more insight about the reality of households’ features and 
because it allows for better interaction between the researcher and the respondent. These 
two dimensions can make easier for the respondents to answer questions sensitive in nature 
and therefore increase the reliability of data collected. In village A and B some of the 
interviews have been delivered with the presence of the “agente de saude”. 
Table 2.1 Interviewees’ composition by gender 
 Interviewed male Interviewed female Interviewed both 
Village A 22% 62% 17% 
Village B 39% 39% 21% 
Village C 30% 70% 0% 
 
Accessibility and approachability matters explain the prevalence of female interviewed 
(Table 2.1). First, men tend to be out of the households until late afternoon, and second 
women accepted more easily to be interviewed by another woman. In village C the higher 
prevalence of female households’ heads interviewed is related first to a shorter period of time 
with respect to the other villages and second to main employment of households. In village C, 
a higher number of households that are employed as sugar cane cutters. This implies more 
established working hours than family farmers and therefore smaller probability to meet such 
households. 
The reason why in village B there is a more even division of interview between male and 
female respondents is related to an higher percentage of households that are only composed 
by one male. 
                                                        
15 The interview guide is presented in Appendix 8.1 
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Interview organization 
The interview was conceived to be composed of five main parts. The first aimed at 
drawing the trajectory of the household to reach the village and its previous occupation. The 
second investigated the current household’s condition including number of household 
components, economic condition of the household measured both in terms of assets 
(household appliances) and average monthly income, agricultural production for subsistence 
and for commercialization and place of commercialization. The third enquired on household 
mobility outside the village and availability of means of transportation. The fourth aimed at 
mapping intra-village ties among households in the three villages. The fifth registered the 
perception of change of the household from their previous to their current condition. 
The interview started by introducing myself, making a disclaimer about the objective of 
the research and making clear that data will be used anonymously or in an aggregated form. I 
made clear from the beginning that I would ask people names as I was interested in how 
people interact in the village but I explicated that all of these names will become numbers in 
the elaboration. In order to guarantee the protection of respondents’ identity, I also have 
decided not mention neither the municipality name nor the names of the agrarian reform 
settlements studied but only the Brazilian state where I conducted this research. 
I also made clear that the research investigated the role of the cooperative but that I had 
no ties with the institution. To clarify on this point some of the households even asked me 
who financed the research and I specified that this research was part of university graduate 
program and that the funds came from a research institution specialized in development 
cooperation. 
After this short disclaimer, I started the process that I have been repeated 177 times. 
Except for the first two questions and the last question, which I will briefly detail in the next 
paragraphs, the order of questions was not always strictly observed. As already mentioned, I 
had a laptop with me and I recorded the answer to the questions in pre-composed Excel table 
where all of the categories under analysis have been recorded. This allowed me to check at the 
end the interview that I had collected all the planned information. 
The two major households worries were related to three questions related to income, 
agricultural activity and source of information about news in the municipality. They feared 
that declaring a high income they would lose the social benefit that most of the households 
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receive, namely the state conditional cash transfer called Bolsa Familia. Furthermore they 
were afraid that INCRA, (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, National 
Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform) noticing their weak or absent agricultural 
activity, would take some action against them. Some of the respondents asked me directly if I 
was related to INCRA or if I was working for a local political candidate. These were, in that 
period, the two most frequent visits that people received. The strategy to ask questions has 
therefore been targeted to allow reducing such problems.  
However it is important to acknowledge that many households had been already 
interviewed more than once. Many of them recognized questions that had already been asked 
during the questionnaire carried out by the National Statistical Institute (IBGE).  
The interview started by asking the household head to introduce him/herself telling their 
name and nickname (“alcunha”) by which the two households’ heads are generally referred to 
in the village. This clarification has been important as it allowed me to understand the answer 
to name generators questions. In all of the villages most of the people are just referred by 
their nickname and most of the villagers do not know the complete name of villagers. I have 
also asked the respondent to tell me about his/her place of birth, places where she has lived 
and last place where he has been living.  
This first point of the interview is extremely important as it allow me to create a common 
ground and also to allow them to talk briefly about their story. They told about how they 
arrived at the village, where they were coming from and what was their previous occupation 
before living in the village. This more open-ended introduction eventually would make them 
feel at their ease.  
The interview continued by collecting information on household composition: male and 
female head names and number of children or other people that were living in the same 
household and their occupation. Regarding the occupation I asked them to specify whether 
any of the members of the households was working outside the village.  
It was then asked about household mobility outside the village and availability of means 
of transportation. The ability to travel and commute influences both the facility to 
commercialize products and to work outside the village. Those faculties are also a proxy of 
prestige and wealth.  
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The last two questions of the interview referred to household income and perception of 
change.  In the question related to income, people were asked to indicate the average monthly 
income. I was aware that, when households have family farming as main livelihood strategy, 
income varies greatly across months. In this case I asked them to estimate how much they 
earn in total per year from selling their products and to divide it by the number of months. 
The difficulty to calculate the accurate value and a certain resistance in some cases to declare 
their income drove me to the decision to ask them to approximate the value of their income to 
a proportion of minimum salaries. Households have mostly indicated how many salaries they 
earned.  
The last question, related to change, aimed at understanding the perception of change of 
households in the three villages. Two are the possible typologies of change. The first affected 
people that were already living in the village and is caused by the mobilization created by 
social movements, which introduced people in the village. Second affected people that arrived 
within the framework of the mobilization activated by the social movements by changing their 
new living space. I asked them in what measure they felt their situation changed from their 
previous condition and in which terms. 
Network data collection 
In order to construct the roster of households for the three villages, the main source was 
local village’s households’ record books of health service officers (agentes de saude). Local 
health service officers are in charge by the municipality to provide basic health assistance on a 
weekly basis to all villages’ households. They are therefore the most reliable source of 
information to have a clear image of who are the households that are permanently living in 
the villages. Households that have their name registered at INCRA (Instituto Nacional 
Colonização e Reforma Agraria), because they were assigned a plot, do not constitute a 
complete record of households living in the village. There are cases where more than one 
household live in one plot and some households that have more than one plot. 
Most of network data was collected through name generator techniques. Households 
were asked to nominate other people belonging to households living in the village. There was 
no limit of the number of households that they could nominate. It was not repeated in every 
name generator question they should indicate only households inside the village but there 
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was a disclaimer at the beginning of the interview that I was interested in interactions inside 
the village.  
The two network data that were not collected during face-to-face interviews are 
geographical proximity and kinship. Geographical proximity, available only for village A and 
village B, was constructed by using a combination of official villages’ maps, when available 
and accessible, and completed or substituted by participatory village map drawn by the 
interviewed and key informants. Kinship was collected both asking key informant and 
households to tell to whom they are related by kinship ties in the village. The reason for such 
choice was the difficulty to keep track of all kinship ties at the beginning of the village survey 
as I had no information about them and names of people are extremely similar. There were 
therefore three steps for kinship network collection: information from health service official 
for each household to nominate their relatives inside the village, households were asked to 
nominate their kin during interview, lastly when interviews were over, I have cross-checked 
the reliability of network data collected by asking the respondents or their relative to confirm 
if data collected were correct. This procedure allowed me to improve the reliability of the 
data. In village A and B, where I stayed longer, data is considered to be robust. In village C, 
where I stayed less, there might be minor inconsistencies. It is important to point out that the 
level of information disclosure varied from household to household.  
The name generator questions inserted in the interview were the following: 
1. Who told you about the possibility of having access to land in the settlement?  
2. During last year have you called someone to work on your plot? If yes can you name the 
main workers that you contracted? (Hires)  
3. During the last year have you worked on the plot of some villages’ holders? If yes can you 
name the main people that called you? (Work for).  
4. How do you get to know about the news of Maragogi? Is there somebody that you like to 
talk with to get this information? 
5. Are there some people that you frequently meet to talk? Who are they? Can I know their 
names?  
6. If you need help to solve some issue related to your plot, whom do you ask to?  
Beside one-mode network that describe behavioral and social ties between households of 
the same village also households’ participation in villages’ events have been mapped. These 
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two-mode networks are weighted on the base of number of meetings per year of each event. 
The main dimensions covered are: religious services, places of commercialization of 
agricultural products (namely local weekly markets and cooperative), football team, 
associations related to land issues and participation in political parades. Variables related to 
households’ participation in events was not used as network data but rather as node attribute. 
The questions asked where the following. 
7. Do you participate in the activities of some church? Which? How many times per week do 
you attend to? 
8. Beside the church have you already participated in the activities of some group 
(association, trade union, cooperative)? In which way and with which frequency? 
9. How did you get to know about these groups? Did someone invite you or how did you get 
to know?  
The participation in political parades was not directly asked to every household during 
face-to-face interviews, due to the sensitivity of the survey period that coincided with the 
electoral campaign. This information was therefore based on a mixture between 
conversations with key informants, participation in some political parades and symbols of 
parties present on houses’ walls. 
The answers to the question related to access to news could not be used because of 
heterogeneity of answers. Only a minority of households indicated the name of one or more 
households in the village while the majority told the name of the household together with 
other source of information such as radio, telephone or newspaper. Some respondents also 
declared that they perceived the question as too intrusive and preferred not answer. This is 
most probably related to the period of survey. For most people news from town probably 
sounded like news about politics. Having said that, it is quite obvious that they did not want 
me to know how they got informed about such news. I did not clarify what news I meant 
because I wanted them to elicit how they gathered the relevant news from the outside world 
beyond village boundaries. Being the nearest town their administrative and political reference 
I aimed at understanding how they get informed about novelties that were happening there 
that could interest them, being the specific interest varying across households. 
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The answer to the question related to advice in family farming could not be used either 
because only an extremely small proportion of households referred to others living in the 
village or because people referred to people that institutionally should be in charge of the 
issue but in reality were not. For example they would refer that, to have advice to solve issues 
related to family farming, they should refer to the technician; but finally when I asked when 
they last talked to him they referred that the agricultural technician used to be there but now 
is no longer present.  
The situation was similar as regards the question related to the person they refer to when 
there are difficulties in the settlement. Most households nominated the president as the 
person in charge but when they were asked to specify whether this person was of some help 
they responded negatively. Therefore I did not consider such answer as a real tie but simply 
as an indication of the presence of offices in the village. 
The answer to the question on the contacts to get to the village was not conceived as 
being limited to villages’ boundaries but it was as a strategy to elicit the different ways in 
which people got access to the village and also the different migration waves that composed 
the village. As it will be detailed in the next section I consider crucial to understand how 
people got to know about the village and the presence of previous ties before having access to 
the village. 
2.6 Main data collection limitations 
Carrying out household surveys in rural areas foresees a series of challenges related on 
the one hand to difficulty of sampling and on the other hand to variables collected with the 
interview. 
The first difficulty is related multi-activity (multiatividade) of most households in rural 
areas of Brazil (Sérgio Schneider 2003; Wanderley 2000; Neves 1997). Households tend to 
diversify their livelihoods, combining different strategies such as wage salary either 
permanent or seasonal, both in agricultural and non-agricultural sector, public service, small 
petty trade and agricultural production. These features of livelihoods’ organization have two 
main effects: first they hamper the level of precision of income declaration and second they 
increase the difficulty in defining complete list of households’ residents in the area object of 
analysis. Households often have difficulties in quantifying their income from family farming, 
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which is affected by seasonal variability. Furthermore often households commute from urban 
to rural areas in daily or seasonal basis. 
It was possible to have a complete list of villages’ inhabitants using the local official 
officers’ households’ list. Local officers are the most reliable sources of information as they are 
responsible for weekly support to households in health matters. However the income 
declaration is certainly subjective and it can lack precision. Asked about monthly expenses as 
a confirmatory practice, often households declared more than they earn. This is consistent 
with the widespread practice of putting up several debts. 
The second limitation in data collection is related to interviewer’s features and to the 
research period. As already mentioned, interviewees were mostly but not totally females, 
even when the household was not female headed, due to accessibility and approachability 
matters. Primarily it was easier to find women at home as many men are at home only after 
sunset when it was not feasible for me to conduct interviews. The second is that women more 
easily accepted to be interviewed by another female, men sometimes showed more distrust 
than women. The division of labor inside the households and the management of income 
implied that, in several cases, female head of the household were not aware of the total 
amount of family revenues’. 
The third limitation is that very few interviews were recorded due to the sensitivity of the 
electoral campaign period.  
The fourth limitation is related to interviewees’ representation of myself because of 
perceived proximity with the cooperative.  
The fifth is the unequal treatment of different villages as did I not spend the same amount 
of time in the three villages.  In village A and B I had the opportunity to spend more time. In 
village A I lived in the village for three weeks while in the second I mostly commuted from the 
main municipality to the village. In third village I also commuted but I have been there less 
frequently. The three villages differ in accessibility. Village B is very easily reached by any 
weather condition because it is only 5 km away from the paved road. Village A and C instead 
are more difficult to reach because they are much further and only connected by unpaved 
roads. Moreover in village A I was hosted in some of the wealthiest and widely known 
families.   
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The sixth limitation is that I was the only interviewer carrying out all 177 households 
interviews. 
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3. Agrarian reform and the role of social movements 
3.1 Introduction 
Agrarian reform is a controversial agenda in Brazilian politics. There are opposing views 
on the effects of agrarian reform measures implemented so far. Some emphasize the positive 
effects of land distribution while others stress the minor changes in land tenure inequality 
and the low productivity of expropriated areas and interpret it as a missed opportunity to 
include the rural poor (A. Pereira 2003) .  
Agrarian reform is so important in Brazil due to high inequality in land distribution, 
which is considered one of the reasons for structural poverty and misery. Furthermore 
agrarian reform has been present in the political agenda since the Sixties. In addition social 
movements, among which Movimento Sem Terra (MST), played a major role in the 
implementation of agrarian reform. 
The social movements mobilized thousands of households to occupy unproductive land. 
The process of land occupation was a fundamental push towards Brazilian government for the 
expropriation of unproductive land (Sigaud 2004). Social movements promoted a collective 
utopia of land (Wolford 2010), a new migration flow towards rural areas and a path of careers 
in political office for several of their activists. 
Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of land tenure. This 
situation is the result of both labor’s organization based on slavery and an inheritance system 
that prevented non-whites and non-Catholics to have access to land. Such systems of unequal 
opportunity to access to land were reinforced with the Land Law of 1850. The agrarian 
question has its origins mainly on labor relations based on slavery. Yet after the abolition of 
slavery, the land tenantry system was a way to coerce labor force and to keep the labor 
market deliberately imperfect (Martins 2003, 147).  
In the Northeast the prevalence of sugar cane plantations created a hierarchical system 
based on structural inequality and patronage for almost five centuries. Some authors claim 
that this system created the “deepest wounds” as the structure of captivity of the sugar cane 
labor force and political patronage persisted over centuries (Rogers 2010). 
Movimento Sem Terra and the other social movements used the concept of redistribution 
of land as a powerful message of change with a dual purpose. Promoting a sense of union 
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among very different households by creating a discourse of “imagined community” as 
response to proletarianization of rural workers and their descendants (Wolford 2003). 
Having access to land implies controlling the means of production, as Marxist theories argue. 
According to social movements’ ideology fighting for access to land means fighting to diminish 
class inequalities in rural areas and fighting for a more communitarian and collective 
conception of labor organization (Wolford 2010).  
In the Northeast Brazil, in the early Eighties, MST faced serious difficulties in recruiting 
sugar cane plantation workers. Only when there were no other working opportunities 
available and rural workers lacked paternalistic protection from landlords, they decided to 
engage in asocial movements’ fight for land (Wolford 2004). In order to understand what led 
the possible social conditions that enabled MST to mobilize both urban and rural workers it is 
important to understand the significance of sugar cane in the littoral area of Northeast of 
Brazil and how the crisis of sugar cane was reflected in a crisis of labor relations. 
This chapter argues that agrarian reform settlements represent an opportunity to create 
new rural spaces (Bergamasco 1997). Those new villages present positive features as 
agrarian reform settlers have higher heterogeneous composition in terms of profession, 
higher political representation and more freedom in the use of time than average rural 
inhabitants of “assentados” (Leite S., Helena B., Medeiros L., Palmeira M., Cintrao R. 2004) but 
also face the serious risk to reproduce the domination structure present in previous 
“engenhos”. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. After the introduction, section 3.2 provides a brief 
overview of the sugar cane role in the Northeast of Brazil. Section 3.3 provides an overview of 
sugar cane crisis and its effects. Section 3.4 outlines the main features of Brazilian agrarian 
reform focusing on the crucial role of social movements and the role of encampment in the 
process of agrarian reform settlements’ creation. Section 3.5 focuses on the importance of 
agrarian reform in the municipality object of analysis, highlighting the main steps that led to 
settlements creation and the general situation of settlements in the municipality. Section 3.6 
presents the history of villages object of analysis. Section 3.7 closes the chapter with some 
concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Sugar cane role in the Northeast of Brazil 
In the region referred to as “mata do Nordeste”, corresponding to the littoral area, the 
landscape and economy have been dominated by sugar cane monoculture since XVI century 
(Freyre 2004). Such region has the most favorable geographical and climate conditions for the 
production of such crops (Targino 2003).  
Production of sugar cane has been always organized in large plantations around of the 
factory responsible for the processing of sugar cane. This unit of prodution was in early days 
referred as “engenho” or “bangue” and later with the modern techniques, “usina”. Around the 
“engenho” an entire economic, social and political system was developed including: “casa 
grande”, the big house where the landlord (“senhor do engenho”) resided, “fazendas” (literally 
farms) that were the productive units of sugar cane and where the sugar cane cutters resided 
(Freyre 1964). Landlords managed both industrial transformation and agricultural 
production. Most of the families controlling land and financial capital of sugar cane were 
descents oligarchs from the colonial period (Manuel Correia de Andrade 2000). 
Sugar cane industries are agro-businesses that can be considered a synthesis between 
agriculture and industry. Their organization of labor, specialization of tasks and separation of 
work from food basic needs makes it closer to factory rather than to a farm (Mintz 1990).  
The sugar cane industry, represented the first source of employment in the whole “zona 
da mata” before agrarian reform.It still represents a very important occupation. The main 
activities are planting and harvesting, work in the fields, and then transformation into sugar 
in the mill. The most labor-intensive activity is planting and harvesting. People in charge of 
planting and harvesting compose the majority of the labor force in sugar cane plantations. 
They are referred as “cortadores de cana” (sugar cane cutters) and more generally rural 
workers (“trabalhador rural”). However, the latter term refers more generally to all low 
skilled workers involved in large plantations not only of sugar cane but also of coffee. “Sugar 
cane cutters were day laborers that did not possess land nor any productive assets and they 
had to sell their work to eat. They were workers that lived in factory constituted by the field” 
(Mintz 1990, XVIII).  
The development and growth of sugar cane industry has been strongly related to the 
employment of forced labor. Sugar cane production for its cycle of production needs to ensure 
a large number of workers both for crops preparation but especially during harvest period. 
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This period lasts several months and should be developed in harmony with the functioning of 
the mill that extracts juice and then transform it into sugar. Furthermore the cane collected 
has to be processed within a limited number of hours otherwise its concentration in sugar 
decreases.  
Despite the relevant improvement in labor law to protect rural workers’ right, institutions 
such as “salary for production” did not make sugar cane cutters’ working condition improve 
consistently (Antunes 2013). Even today, especially migrant workers face extremely hard 
working conditions. Workers have to collect approximately 6 to 10 tons of sugar cane per day 
and very little health protection is guaranteed (de Menezes, da Silva, and Cover 2012).  
Alagoas is the fifth producer of sugar cane in Brazil and first producer in Northeast region 
(IBGE 2009). Today in Alagoas the first main products are sugar cane and coconut, being the 
latter currently declining in terms of importance. An emerging sector is tourism that has been 
fostered also by a national program called Programa de Mobilização para o Desenvolvimento 
dos Arranjos e Territórios Produtivos Locais do Estado de Alagoas (PAPL). This program 
created by Alagoas government in 2004 together with SEBRAE and private and public 
companies, aimed at promoting collective actions that can trigger local development 
processes (Barreto, Oliveira, and Sicsú 2007). Tourism sector, despite its importance, is 
mainly limited to the littoral area and it is not able to satisfy the supply of labor in the 
municipality. 
The sugar cane industry and its crisis are fundamental elements for the comprehension of 
previous social structure but also to understand the lack of power that made the actions of 
social movements possible. 
3.3 Crisis of sugar cane sector: land conflicts and labor relations  
The emergence of land conflicts in Brazil is deeply rooted in the changes in tenant 
relations among sugar cane cutters and sugar cane industry unit of production responsible, 
called as “senhores do engenho”, and later referred as landlords.  
Sugar cane plantations have a long history in Brazil; the first sugar cane crops were taken 
from India to Brazil in 1532. It is possible to consider the unit of production of sugar cane 
plantations called “engenho” or “usina” as a closed environment. The equilibrium between 
labor force and landlord was guaranteed through the patron client relationship between the 
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sugar cane cutter and the landlord. The landlord or senhor do engenho was the only ruling 
authority and reference point for sugar cane labor force until the military regime.  
Engenhos and fazendas are composed of two elements: sugar cane fields and a small 
inhabited area where there are several small houses organized in “lines of rooms in long block 
buildings (called an arruado)” (T. D. Rogers 2010). Engenhos and fazendas had a local shop 
(called barracão) were households could buy several products that were necessary to 
complete the family diet and the households’ basic needs. House tenants (moradores), that 
were more stable workers, used to have small plots but they were prohibited to produce 
crops that would last for more than one harvest such as fruits or other permanent crops. After 
sugar cane crisis the population residing engenhos and fazendas decreased substantially.  
The main transformations in labor organization have been driven by two main factors: 
quest for modernization of agricultural production (Scandizzo 1979) and state intervention. 
In 1875 emperor Pedro II promoted a change in spatial and labor organization of sugar 
cane industry from “engenho” to “usina” and a substitution of several tasks from labor force to 
machineries. 
In 1888, with Aurea law, slavery became illegal. It was a transformation from slavery to 
captivity (Rogers 2010). The most wide-spread form of dependency between employee and 
landlord was land tenancy (Eisenberg 1974, 183). This form of land tenure arrangement 
refers to plantation employees living in the “engenho” or “fazenda” called “moradores”.  
The main elements that determined captivity, after the abolition of slavery, were debts, 
housing and legal protection from landlord. Moradores had the “privilege” to have housing 
and to farm small plot where they could grow staple crops, such as manioc and banana and 
were paid upon the completion of workload defined by the landlord.  
The condition of “moradores” were comparable to sharecroppers or land tenants (Keen 
and Haynes 2008, 133). “Moradores” bought most of necessary products including food and 
medicines, from the local shop running inside the “engenho” which was managed by someone 
close to the landlord. The reason for workers to buy there and not in other shop beside 
physical proximity is the possibility to buy products on credit thanks to landlord 
intermediation (Scheper-Hughes 1993). Very often workers did not receive a pay that would 
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allow them to satisfy their family needs. The only place where they could ask loan was the 
local shop present in most of engenhos. This reinforced the dependency with the landlord. 
In 1950 landlord and land tenant relationships were altered due to landlord’s decisions to 
eliminate tenants’ plots. This alteration of terms was done to increase the sugar cane 
production. The event caused a lack drop in tenant commitment towards their landlord 
(Rogers 2010). In 1955 Peasants’ Leagues (Ligas Camponesas) were created and in the 1950s 
and1960s, especially in the Northeast region, there were the first rural workers’ uprisings. 
In 1963, the Rural Workers Statute, a law passed by National Congress, extended labor 
legislation to rural Brazil during military regime, introducing for the first time legal rights for 
sugar cane cutters. This regulation also implied the definition of court intervention in case of 
worker and landlord disputes. 
Landlords had to register (“fichar”) their workers and guarantee them labor rights 
including monthly salary and holidays. This practice, however, was considered very costly for 
many small landlords, who preferred to reduce the number of sugar cane cutters living in the 
“engenho”. They sent away many former sugar cane cutters residing in the boundaries of the 
plantation, which were referred as “moradores”. It therefore created internal migration across 
different “engenhos” and important migration flows to the nearby towns. 
The number of households living in the “engenho” decreased and sugar cane cutters 
started to diversify their work. Registered workers (“fichados”) were those that managed to 
preserve their bonds with the landlord (“senhor do engenho”), had a small plot of land to 
plant, had housing and gained labor rights and including holidays and retirement. Illegal 
workers (“clandestinos”) had no housing guarantee, had to commute from near towns or 
other “engenhos”. Those workers enjoyed potentially more freedom but also faced more 
vulnerability. It is therefore understandable why many of the old “moradores” would have 
preferred to stay with the old landlords and not be involved in the agrarian reform. Before the 
sugar cane crisis they enjoyed both labor rights protection from the state and paternalistic 
protection from the landlord. 
In 1964 Land Statute (“Estatuto da Terra”) was issued. Article 94 provides legal basis for 
agrarian reform that took its first steps during the military regime, which started the same 
year. During the military regime, the main objective of the government was not to expand 
access to land for new settlers but rather to control and limit the processes of land 
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appropriation that it could have enacted. Farmers, who had been expelled from the land 
where they worked, started to occupy unproductive land. Therefore a law aimed at 
controlling this flux of illegal occupiers had a conservative role rather than an expansive role 
(Martins 2003).  
In 1975 Brazilian government introduced Proalcool program in order to promote the 
increase of sugar cane for ethanol production, an alternative energy source (De Carvalho C.P. 
2009). This gave an important push for landlords to increase their production. This expansion 
resulted in increased demand of migrant workers to satisfy the high demand of labor for 
sugar cane mills during the harvest and degradation of working conditions (de Menezes, da 
Silva, and Cover 2012). 
In the late 1980’s two negative events affected the sugar cane industry: the fall of 
international price of sugar and the end of government subsidies to sugar and alcohol prices 
(Wolford 2006). This economic conjuncture led to a sugar cane crisis and several companies, 
unable to cope with the new economic situation, declared bankruptcy and closed their firms 
(Targino 2003). Because of these changes thousands of people lost their jobs. In states such as 
Alagoas and Pernambuco, where sugar cane sector represented the primary source of 
employment, this crisis created massive unemployment.  
The large number of unemployed people represented one of the target groups to be 
mobilized by MST for unproductive land occupation. Households, who were mobilized by 
social movements, occupied several sugar cane factories that went bankrupted during sugar 
crisis of the early 1990s  
3.4 Agrarian reform and social movements 
The main legislative foundations for agricultural reform are twofold: the Land statute, 
Law 4, 504 of 1964 and the 1988 Brazilian constitution art. 184. The former states “Agrarian 
Reform is considered to be the conjunction of measures that look to promote better 
distribution of land, through modifications to the regime of its possession and use, with the 
purpose of meeting the principles of social justice and increasing productivity” (Gaspar 2009). 
The latter allows Brazilian government to "expropriate for the purpose of agrarian reform, 
rural property that is not performing its social function" (Article 184). Since 1964, several 
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governments from the military regime to the present day took action to allow households 
access to land.  
The implementation of Land statute drove the creation of two organs: Instituto Brasileiro 
de Reforma Agrária (Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform) (IBRA) and Instituto Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Agrícola (National Institute for Agricultural Development) (INDA). The 
previous was in charge of supervising all the process of agrarian reform, while the latter to 
coordinate the colonization process. These two institutions received a great deal pressure 
during military regime from the landlords. In 1970 they were merged into a single new entity 
called INCRA, Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (National Institute for 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform).  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s studies of INCRA and IBRA revealed the presence of 
large portion of land property that were not productive, while small properties played a major 
role in the production of food crops. In that period two projects have been implemented to 
control the process of colonization of unproductive land: Programa de Integração Nacional 
(National Integration Programme) (PIN), and in the Northeast region and PROTERRA that 
allowed landowner to give INCRA part of their lands receiving compensation in cash. There 
was a very strong resistance from landlords against agrarian reform implementation (Gaspar 
2009). 
In 1985 the first land reform decree was signed during president Sarney’s time in office. 
The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1998 – 2002) was the first to scale up the 
implementation of a market-led agrarian reform (D’incao 1991). Among the program financed 
by World Bank the program referred as “Cedula da Terra” is important to mention (J. M. M. 
Pereira 2012). It was conceived as pilot test and it represented a benchmark for the future 
agrarian reform. 
Social movements’ actions played a fundamental role in accelerating the process of 
expropriation of unproductive land that is part of the agrarian reform. 
“Land occupation and creation of encampment, have become in Brazil, in the last twenty years, the 
appropriate way to claim for the implementation of agrarian reform. Movement of Rural Workers without land 
(MST), trade unions’ movement and many other organizations in rural world used it. Brazilian state legitimated 
movements (this is the way these organizations auto-denominate themselves and they are denominate) to 
dispossess occupied farms (fazendas) and redistribute land among those that are in encampment” (Sigaud 2004, 
225)  
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 Created in 1984, MST is the most well-known social movement both in Brazil and 
internationally. It was a group being part of Comissão Pastoral da Terra that decided to create 
a new autonomous organization. It is considered by some authors among the most dynamic, 
organized and effective social movements in Brazil (Wolford 2010). The other organization of 
agricultural workers called National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, CONTAG) did not represent landless workers 
(Pereira 2003).  
The MST, according to its leaders, built his roots both in popular religiosity and theology 
of liberation (Stédile and Fernandes 1999). Stédile, one of MST leaders, declares that the 
movement started in the South of Brazil as a response to what is referred as “painful 
modernization” of Brazilian agriculture.  
The mechanization of production forced tenants to abandon the land they had been 
working on, leaving these peasants with no employment options. They could neither go to 
towns, where they would be destined for unemployment, nor gain access to new land. 
Organizing occupation to force the government to expropriate the unproductive land was 
therefore considered as a possible strategy to give again access to land to people that had 
been expulsed from their previous land. 
1980-1990 was the decade of rural movements where the motto was “occupy, resist and 
produce”. 1995–1999 was the first "wave" of MST-led occupations. Table 3.1 illustrates the 
number of families settled per period. 
Table 3.1 Families settled by period 
 
Source: Adapted from (L. S. de Medeiros 2013, 6) 
 
MST was born in the South of Brazil; in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where the 
economic and social conditions and people social representation of land are extremely 
Period Government Families settled per year
1964- 1984 Military Regime 3689
1985-1989 José Sarney 16737
1990-1992 Fernando Collor de Mello 14172
1993-1994 Itamar Franco 7183
1995-2002 Fernando Henrique Cardoso 48923
2003-2009 Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 7564
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different from the Northeast region. In the South MST followers were fighting for the land, as 
this was their main source of livelihood.  
In the Northeast, where the sugar cane sector is the main employer in rural areas, the 
economic foundations of the movement were weaker. There was no pre-existing request for 
land from rural workers, “posseiros” and “arrendatarios”, but it was the presence of the social 
movements that make these requests emerge (Sigaud 2004).  
Before the sugar cane crisis MST faced difficulties in recruiting households among sugar 
cane cutters and rural workers in general. The two main forms of resistance towards 
households’ engagement in social movements are related to spatial imaginaries. MST activists 
used imaginaries on the use of land that were totally different from those of sugar cane 
cutters.  
For sugar cane cutters occupying land, even if unproductive, means invading someone 
else’s property.  Furthermore differently from what happens in the south of Brazil, where land 
is conceived as the most important productive resource, land is not conceived as a way to 
create livelihood strategies. People contacted by MST’s activists would have better preferred 
to fixed wage salary and “full paternalistic protection on the plantation rather than a piece of 
land” (Wolford 2004, 147) 
It is possible to observe two waves of adhesion into social movements. The former were 
the most vulnerable workers of sugar cane plantations (“clandestinos”), while the latter 
where sugar cane cutter residents that were left without job and therefore had no other 
working opportunities. 
To understand what are the forces that, in Northeast region, led to the process of 
mobilization of thousands of households to occupy the land, it is fundamental to point out 
what are the motivations behind households’ engagement in the social movements and 
discourse of social movements. 
MST discourse had his foundations on the main concepts proposed by theology of 
liberation and Freire teachings (Freire 2000). MST declared that they aimed to free sugar cane 
workers from the captivity of their employment. MST activists (“militantes”) went often to the 
peripheries of the towns to “rescue peasants’ sons”: most probably the ones that have been 
expulsed by landlords from the 1950s on.  
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MST declared mission was to fight against land concentration, which is considered to be 
one of the main causes of Brazilian socio-economic inequality. By forcing the government 
through means of occupation to expropriate unproductive land they argue that is possible to 
have more equal distribution of land (Johnson 2004).  
Many households instead considered the fight for land as an opportunity for livelihood 
strategies among others (Sigaud 2004). During the interviews this was the most frequently 
self-reported reason to join social movements. For rural workers they aimed at having access 
to a comfortable house where they can rest after a whole life of struggle and continuous 
migration across different plantations (R. M. Medeiros and Ribeiro 2011, 9). For people living 
in the slums of towns and for recent unemployed workers they looked for a safer place to live, 
for a new livelihood and hopefully to have some benefits from the state. Only some people 
declared that their main interest was to have some land to crop. 
In Northeast Brazil many sugar cane cutters decided to join social movements because 
there were no other working opportunities. In addition joining social movements provided 
them with a new political representation towards local government and INCRA officials in 
substitution to the protection they received from distillery or mill landlords. 
 “ Having access to land made a difference in the settlers' lives, but that difference was situated within an 
understanding of land as providing independence from outsiders (including the MST) and a paternalistic 
interpretation of political rights. Because the government was the ultimate overseer of the settlements, the 
settlers now turned to local and state officials rather than the distillery or mill owners when they needed 
assistance.” (Wolford 2004, 150) 
An evidence lack of strong association between engaging in social movements and the 
vocation to become small holders’ farmers is the return to sugar production in settlements’ 
plots after that sugar cane prices’ rose again in 2000 and 2001. Many agrarian reform settlers, 
mostly the ones that were sugar cane cutters before, after a renewal of importance of the 
sugar cane sector, came back to their previous occupation either as labor force employed by 
renewed “usinas” or production suppliers of sugar cane (Wolford 2004).   
Martins (Martins 2003, 151) argues that since the 1950s, the strong pushes for 
modernization in the sugar cane sector, broke the strong patronage bonds between rural 
workers and landlords. Rural workers started becoming a relevant “clientele”, especially for 
the three main organizations, which according to the author, were disputing such clientele: 
the Catholic Church, communist party and peasants ‘unions (“Ligas Camponesas”).  
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Martins also claim that the weak attention family farming and the weak of production 
agrarian reform settlements might also be related to the internal debate inside Brazilian left. 
There were two opposite positions: one sustaining the “trabalhista option” while the others 
the agrarian option. This issue is also related to negative conception among many exponents 
of left wing of the lack of modernity of family farming. “Some of the exponents of the first 
position claimed that the agrarian reform could include direct distribution to the beneficiaries 
and support the start of urban economic activities”(Martins 2003, 144) . 
The main actors involved in the creation of “assentamentos” are social movements, INCRA 
federal institute, the owners of sugar cane industries and households involved in the agrarian 
reform. Social movements mobilized households to occupy land to be expropriated. INCRA 
federal institute was responsible for management of land expropriated by agrarian reform. 
The owners of enterprises were expropriated. Households involved in the agrarian reform 
were mostly social movements followers, but also people that were already living in the 
former “engenho”. They took part only residually in social movements’ activities but that 
gained access to land.  
There is a loop of dependency among the three actors involved in the process of 
implementation of agrarian reform: INCRA, social movements and households that take part 
in the occupations. Social movements are necessary to make the Brazilian state implement 
what is present in the constitution: “expropriate unproductive land for social purpose”. Social 
movements need to mobilize a certain number of households in order to make their 
demonstrations effective. Social movements need to make the state give benefits to occupiers 
in order to be able to attract more households to occupy (Sigaud 2004).  
Social movements emphasized the possibility for agrarian reform settlers to have access 
to state benefits in order to persuade households to take part in the occupations (Sigaud 
2004). The process of encampment constitutes the main part of the fight for land. For 
households involved in the fight for land, the process becomes self-reinforcing according the 
success that this struggle produces. In addition recruiters encouraged households to 
participate in the fight by saying that if the protest would be successful they would receive 
free housing from the government.  
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the elections in 2002 and became president on January 1, 
2003. He made of the continuation of agrarian reform a major point in his electoral campaign.  
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“For us in PT the agrarian reform is as necessary as the air we breathe, because it is not only a matter 
of fixing people in the countryside, but also of solving the problems of unemployment, life quality of urban 
population, of one of our major problems which is infant mortality. (...) Independently from the will of the 
largest land owners [latifundiarios], we want to clearly state that we will implement an agrarian reform in 
Brazil.” (Campello 2013, 8) 
There has been a significant discrepancy between promises and implementation (G. 
Ondetti 2008.) Some scholars claim that Lula did not introduce policies that actually triggered 
structural change for marginalized fringes of society (Bianchi and Braga 2005) (Panizza 2005) 
(Webber and Carr 2012) (Navarro 1997). Other claimed that Lula blocked the agrarian reform 
(Fernándes 2005). In 2004 MST declared red April (“abril vermelho”) and made 80 protest 
demonstrations to protest against lack of implementation of agrarian reform. 
Critical opinions claim that agrarian reform can be considered only a social program, 
mimicking the landlord benevolent behavior towards the most marginalized part of 
population. The main reason lies in the greater attention towards housing founding rather 
than technical assistance and agricultural training facilities and credit. For this reason some 
argue that agrarian reform share some common traits with the program “Bolsa Familia”, that 
is considered to be one of the important basis for Lula government popularity. It is the major 
conditional cash transfer program in Latin America. It was, firstly conceived as emergency 
policy, and kept growing in scale over years. In the next section I will show how the actual 
administration of the agrarian reform changed after the start of Lula legislation. 
Another necessary aspect to mention is the deficiency in technical assistance to promote 
agricultural production, referred by previous studies on agrarian reform settlements in 
Maragogi (Leite S., Helena B., Medeiros L., Palmeira M., Cintrao R. 2004) and confirmed by 
fieldwork. 
3.4.1 Recruitment and political training of settlers: the process of encampment 
The creation agrarian reform settlements in Brazil can be classified in two waves: 1990s 
and early 2000s. The first wave was during the Cardoso government while the second during 
Lula government.  
The comparison between first and second wave of settlement creation is a central 
element in settlers’ narrative on the agrarian reform. During the second wave, rules governing 
the process of encampment changed. The main change was the impossibility to build the 
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encampment on the land that protesters want the government to expropriate. As a result 
people fighting to have access to land have to create their encampment on the streets and not 
on the land. 
Most of the settlements present in the municipality studied were created during this first 
wave, however village C that was created during the second wave.  
The process of settlements creation described in the following paragraph describes the 
seven main phases that are constant across the entire Brazil.  
The first phase was the identification by social movement or other organization of an 
unproductive land to be occupied. Usually people entered in the abandoned “fazenda” during 
night or at sunrise, they constructed their tents made of black plastic (“lona preta”) and put 
the flag of the social movement that was leading encampment, as a symbol of their occupation 
(Sigaud 2004).  
Second is the recruitment of households either by social movements or by other 
associations of households that will occupy land to make pressure on INCRA for 
expropriation.  
Third is the period of encampment that can vary in length, being on average in Maragogi 
municipality from one to two years, but which is much longer in other areas of the state.  
Fourth is the check of land eligibility to be expropriated and the division of land into 
parcels.  
Fifth is selection of households that, after the period of encampment, can have access to 
land and the assignment to each households of a piece of land (“parcela” or “lote” in 
Portuguese), later referred as plot.  
Sixth is the attribution of land to the households selected and the delivery of basic staff 
comprising: “cesta basica” (foodstuff baskets) to support settlers basic food needs, “fundo 
fomento” to start the first plantations, credit for housing, a specific credit to make investment 
to agricultural production for agrarian reform settlements called Programa Nacional 
Agricultura Familiar (PRONAF A) and the construction of the main infrastructure such as 
electricity and water.  
Seventh, yet to occur, in the entire state of Alagoas, would be to turn the village into an 
autonomous entity from the state (“emancipação do assentamento” which turns)  
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The role that local politics plays is crucial to agrarian reform settlers. Many households 
were strangers before the process of encampment and the participation to political parades 
and other activities organized by social movements have been one important way by which 
households got to know each other.  
Additionally politics plays a role in terms of resource dependency. Settlers’ plots will 
eventually become their property when settlements will complete the process of 
“emancipation” (emancipação), foreseen by the government, but before that can happen, the 
land cannot legally be sold but only passed to other households. The land is property of the 
state and most of their service provision depends on the state. Social movements have been 
negotiating with the local administration to have access to resources both at community and 
individual level.  
Lastly, as pointed out earlier, especially rural workers , but also other settlers, expect 
from the state the same political protection and service provisions that they used to ask to the 
landlord. 
3.4.2 Agrarian reform settlements: new “engenhos” or new rural spaces? 
The change from landlord responsibility over workers to state responsibility over 
villagers can be considered as a form of “re-functionality”(Padgett and McLean 2006a). The 
word responsibility, for many old settlers, is translated into respondents’ words as “captivity”. 
The word captive is often repeated during people narratives in the interviews, conducted for 
this research, and it is an important point in the work of Rogers (T. D. Rogers 2010).  
The possibility to have access to land for many of the old settlers (“moradores do 
engenho”) that were sugar cane cutters is considered mostly it as a new form of captivity from 
state towards them rather a resource that can be used according to their needs. In the 
municipality object of analysis as they were not able to reimburse the credit received during 
the period of settlement creation to start agricultural activities, they owe debts to the banks 
and cannot have access to other funds directly designed for agrarian reform settlers nor seek 
loans from other banks. The land cannot be legally sold and settlers are indebted to the state. 
Some of those interviewed said that the state is just another “boss” that substitutes the 
landlord. It is therefore possible to claim an overlap between state’s social policy and 
landlords’ paternalism. 
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Many of the people interviewed, referred that social movements’ activists, when the first 
state funds arrived, advised settlers to take up the maximum value of possible project funding. 
Furthermore in most cases state agricultural technicians allowed no choice to settlers in the 
definition of their project. Probably also as consequence of such behaviors, none of the 
households in any of the settlements in the municipality has paid back their debts towards the 
state. The rule is that until everyone in the village had paid back the debt it will not be 
cancelled and households cannot have access to other funds to invest in agricultural 
production.  
 Several ex-sugar cutters, interviewed during fieldwork, expressed the feeling of no 
change happening. It can be explained by an alteration only in name but not in structure of 
captivity. The two main mechanisms of captivity used towards the sugar cane labor force, 
namely housing guarantee and debts, persisted over time. Nevertheless the way in which 
groups emerged is innovative. Villages’ creation process was not just lead by kinship or 
political patronage but there were several factors contributing to the definition of villages’ 
social composition.  
However, the process that leads to the creation of agrarian reform settlements can be 
considered a laboratory for new type of social interactions, new forms of labor organization 
and eventually negotiations of new social hierarchies.  
“Encampment period is perceived as a provisional moment marked by disarticulation and de-structuration 
of ways of life, by suffering but also by the re-organization of sociability forms inherited by communitarian life 
and by the re-definition of dreams and aspirations.” (Severi 2012, 68) 
“Encampment” and “landless” became new political categories. Encampment, during the 
last decade, has been the main tool forcing governments to implement agrarian reform 
expropriating unproductive land (De Medeiros 2013). Landless (“sem terra”) has become a 
social category and MST has been able to make of it a political force (Rosa 2012). “Sem terra” 
is the name that indicates people that are involved in social movements and that take part in 
the occupation, beside their real land tenure condition.  
The term “sem terra”, as outlined in the previous paragraphs, comprises very diverse 
categories of households from sugar cane cutters to farmers and from small petty traders to 
urban unemployed (Sigaud, Ernandez, and Rosa 2010; Rosa 2012; Severi 2012). In some 
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settlements the presence of relevant differences across settlers both in motivations and 
professional experiences also caused conflicts (R. M. Medeiros and Ribeiro 2011, 8). 
The settlers’ life encountered relevant modifications, first in terms of more freedom over 
their work time and secondly in terms of land property (Bergamasco 1997). Vergara-Camus 
(Vergara-Camus 2009, 179) points out also that the MST demonstrates in order to obtain 
services from the state. The author also stresses that the strength of those communities lies 
on their “relative autonomy” (Vergara-Camus 2009).  
3.4.3 Family farming: the emergence of new rural social actor 
In Brazil for a long time family farming has not been considered a relevant economic 
activity. This is related on the one hand to the structure of land distribution, on the other to 
the condition of overall dependence of rural areas towards urban areas. 76% of rural 
properties are organized in large estates (latifundios) (IBGE 2009).  
In most Brazilian rural areas therefore households’ residence and property of land have 
been largely separated. The creation of agrarian reform settlements introduced a novelty by 
creating spaces where the two dimensions are combined. Moreover, people used to reside in 
the rural areas but everything that was needed for their social and economic reproduction, 
such as medical services; markets and banks, was located in town. Rural space was therefore 
not conceived as an autonomous social space but rather as periphery or appendix of the urban 
space. 
Wanderley (Wanderley 2000, 36) classifies in six different typologies of Brazilian rural 
areas: 1) rural space as a product of consumption of urban population, 2) loss of vitality of 
rural areas characterized by monoculture because of the strong decrease of rural population, 
3) family farming characterized by an intense social life, 4) the devastating effects of rural 
exodus on areas characterized by family farming, 5) the construction of new social spaces: 
social life in agrovilas, 6) the settlements of agrarian reform (“assentamentos da reforma 
agraria”). 
In the 1990s two important transformations occurred in Brazilian rural space: the 
recognition of family farming as a social actor and the request for land by social movements 
(Wanderley 2000). From mid-1990s family farming has become an important issue in 
Brazilian debate both among social scientists and policy makers (Sérgio Schneider 2003). It 
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was registered a rapid increase of agrarian reform settlements (Guanziroli and de CS Cardim 
2000).  
In 1996 was created the first national fund devoted to support family farming: PRONAF 
(Programa de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar). In 2000 INCRA and FAO together 
made an assessment to evaluate the state of family farming in Brazil (Guanziroli 2001). One of 
the main findings was that family farming is more efficient and productive than large-scale 
estate farmers. The relevance of family farming in Brazilian policy debate is shown by a 
recently approved legislative project (52/11 PT-PR) that establishes the creation of National 
Certification for family farming. This new entity will aim at identifying products made by this 
segment of rural economics.  
There are four main characteristics that, according to Brazilian scholars and policy 
makers, qualify a smallholder producer as engaged in family farming (Guanziroli and de CS 
Cardim 2000) and therefore eligible to have access to rural credit provided by PRONAF funds. 
The first is the dimension of the property that should be less than four fiscal modules (modulo 
fiscal) (Brasil 1993). Modulo fiscal is an agrarian unit of measure defined by municipality to 
define rural properties (Law nº 6.746, 10/12/1979). The second is the primacy of family 
farming activities as a main source of income. The third is related to use of labor force in the 
production. Family members should constitute the majority of the labor force; being admitted 
only two permanent employees and only on temporary basis as additional employees. The 
fourth is family leadership in businesses: the head of family itself is the one who must define 
production activities. 
Another fundamental feature of family farming is the presence of production strategies 
that combine both intensive and extensive production techniques and non-farming income. 
This concept is referred as “multi-atividades” (Sergio Schneider 2010; Neves 1997) and 
generally referred to as multi-livelihood strategy in literature on agrarian societies (Frank 
Ellis 2000). Households tend to minimize risks rather than maximize production.  Frequently 
family farmers combine both family labor force and permanent or temporary contracted 
workers. The two main conditions that favor external labor force adoption are the lack of 
internal labor force when family members do not participate in production activities because 
they are too old or too young or migrated, and family specialization in the production of high 
labor intensive crops (Sérgio Schneider 2003). 
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The concept of family farming activity (Brasil 2006) describes family farming production 
unit as the estate that is directly and personally exploited by the farmer and his family, 
guaranteeing the family with subsistence, economic and social progress; its maximum area is 
fixed according to the region and the type of production and the predominant use of internal 
labor force (TINOCO 2008). The first definition of Familiar Property is contained in the Land 
Statute (Estatuto da Terra, Law n. 4.504 30 November 1964, art. 4). The last census in 2010 
included under the category “family farmer” also settlers without title, as opposed to the 
previous census in 1995 (“assentado sem titulação”). This was in addition to “occupier” 
(“ocupante”) that was the only category of families involved in agrarian reform previously 
considered.  
Family farming contributes approximately to 38% of the total value of agricultural 
production. Production of vegetables represented 72% of family farming production, in major 
proportion with temporary crops (42%) and minor with permanent crops (19%). Family 
farming also plays a fundamental role in the absorption of workforce. It employs 74,4% of 
labor force employed in agricultural enterprises (SOUZA et al. 2011). 
3.4 The importance of agrarian reform in the municipality studied 
Agrarian reform is particularly important in the municipality studied for the number of 
mobilized households and the intervention of local mayor. The municipality studied has the 
highest number of new settlements created by agrarian reform: 18 settlements, while the 
national mean is 3.4 per municipality. In the period 1996-2000 it was registered an increase 
of population in the municipality of approximately 7% and in terms of Alagoas state of 
approximately 2% (Prefeitura 2011).  
In the first phase of the agrarian reform, in 1997, the municipality mayor, who held the 
role created a specific commission for agrarian reform to better manage agrarian reform 
and involve civil society. Among the commission’s participants there was a catholic 
congregation operating in the municipality since the 1970s, which nominated a nun to be a 
member of the commission. She had the idea to support the new people, mobilized through 
social movements, by implementing projects to support family farming.  
In 2001 the first project aimed to provide training, credit, technology and 
commercialization of products. In 2003 a producers’ cooperative was created. It involved 
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several households in the various settlements present in the municipality. Furthermore the 
local prefeito supported the creation of local market place (feira livre) for agrarian reform 
village settlers.  
In the municipality the main social movements that have been active in the agrarian 
reform were Movimento Sem Terra (MST) and (Comissão Pastoral da Terra – CPT). Since 
2000 MST, due to political internal division, was dissolved and two new social movements 
were created: Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra (MSTL) e Movimento Terra Trabalho e 
Liberdade  (MTL). 
3.4.1 Creation of settlements in the municipality (1997 – 2006) 
Rural areas in municipalities are categorized in three typologies of population units: 
fazendas or engenhos, which are areas of property of sugar cane factories where sugar cane 
workers (moradores) are living; sitios that are small properties that belong to some owner and 
povoados that are villages in the rural area.  
From 1997 to 2012 in the municipality 18 different settlements have been created by 
agrarian reform. “Assentamentos” in the municipality were created in two phases that are 
characterized by differences in political representation both in national and local government. 
The first 14 settlements were created between 1997 and 2002 during Henrique Cardoso and 
Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), municipal 
administration.  
The other four settlements were instead created between 2003 and 2006 during Lula 
government and a local administration that included Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista, PT) in 
the coalition. These settlements have in total 1431 households and they represent 36.4% of 
the total rural population. 
In the first phase INCRA verified whether areas occupied by social movements were 
actually not productive (“vistoria”) and concluded an agreement with the previous owner of 
the land (“desapropriação”).   
In the municipality studied all the 18 “assentamentos” created were, before the agrarian 
reform, fazendas or engenhos of the same sugar cane industry, which had its headquarters in 
the neighboring state of Pernambuco. The sugarcane company, which had four productive 
units in Alagoas, had debts with Bank of Brazil (“Banco do Brasil”) and therefore it was forced 
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to give several productive units to the bank to have access to new loans (Sigaud 2004, 161). 
The presence of distillery owners’ debt in respect to the Bank of Brazil allowed for a smooth 
transition to land expropriation. The sugar cane company abandoned the land. In several 
engenhos and there were registered cases where old settlers, ex plantation employees, helped 
the new settlers. There were very few episodes of violence during the period of occupation. 
Only two “engenhos” suffered from the threats of previous owners that did not want to 
surrender such properties. 
Instead in other parts of Alagoas, such in the region of Sertão in the center of the state, 
people fighting for the land had to face strong resistance from landlords. Many people I 
interviewed that at first attempted to get the land in these areas.  They referred to have 
suffered several episodes of violence both by the police and landlords’ militia. They 
were“cleared out” (despejo) on average every 6 months and had being living under threat of 
landlords’ militia.  
After the period of encampment was over, INCRA mapped the land, defined the areas to 
be preserved as forest and divided the productive land in plots (“lotes”). The social movement 
determined who could stay and who had to leave In cases with a higher number of occupiers, 
in relation to settlement capacity.  
Agrarian reform settlements can include the following typologies of households: farmers 
without land, small holders (posseiro), waged workers (assalariado) or land tenants 
(arrendatario) and farmers which property does not go beyond one modulo fiscal in the 
municipality (Art. 5)16.  
Eight are the categories of households that cannot benefit from agrarian reform: 1) public 
officers that occupy civil, military or administrative positions at municipal, state or federal 
level; 2) farmers that have as total household income more than three minimum salaries from 
non-agricultural activities; 3) individuals that own, share or co-participate in commercial or 
industrial activity; 4) previous beneficiaries of land regularization executed directly or 
indirectly by INCRA or of agrarian reform settlements or other rural settlement under public 
                                                        
16 The legal basis for the definition of beneficiaries of agrarian reform is the “NORMA DE EXECUÇÃO Nº 45, 
DE 25 DE AGOSTO DE 2005, DOU 166, de 29/8/2005, seção 1, p. 122 – B.S. 35, de 29/8/2005”.  
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supervision (Lei nº 8.629/93) including also spouse except for cases permitted by law, 5) 
farmers, which have properties, that larger than one modulo rural in the municipality; 6) 
people affected by physical or mental disabilities, which impede agricultural work; 7) 
foreigners that have not been naturalized into Brazilian citizens; 8) people that have declared 
condemned with final tribunal sentence except when the person is part of program of ex-
prisoners recuperation (Art 6). 
It emerged from interviews that INCRA and social movement had in village B different 
criteria to decide who was entitled to become a settler. Beside formal rules defined by INCRA 
regulation on eligibility, successful behaviors promoted by the two sides tended to differ. 
Social movement leaders tend to prefer people that were very active in political 
demonstration participation such as marches and strikes while INCRA preferred people that 
showed ability as farmers and started to plant crops. The only commonly agreed rule was the 
order of arrival. The difference in criteria between the two organizations is important as it 
created on the one hand the some confusion in what matters the most being a good farmer or 
a good protester and on the other it did not supported the creation of cohesion among 
settlers. 
In the municipality object of analysis, episodes of violence, including murders, took place 
during the phase in which the first funds to support village creation started to arrive from the 
government. It was a fight for access to resources and for leadership in the settlements. Every 
settlement has the legal form of an association with a president and other officers such 
treasurer and members of fiscal council. There were murders of presidents and other people 
related to settlement hierarchy occurring in more than one of the settlements, including 
village C (where one murder occurred).  
The main three reasons for conflict were the definition of redistribution of funds for 
settlers, election of president of the association, divergence of interests between old and new 
settlers. Management of the funds devoted to housing construction and agricultural project 
implementation were sources of many episodes of corruption and personal use of collective 
funds. The settlements’ presidents in that phase were particularly relevant as they were 
responsible for the management of the water system and relative funds and they were the 
intermediaries between settlement’s inhabitants and external institutions providing funds.  
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The presence of social movements and other organizations that mobilized households 
completely changed the hierarchies, spatial organization, and division of labor and control of 
violence in the village. In some villages the old elites did not welcome the new village 
organization, which overthrew their leadership positions. I define as old elites as individuals 
who previously held land rights over areas as “arrendatarios” and other individuals that had 
very small properties (“pequenos posseiros”). For them the arrival of such a large number of 
mobilized households was perceived as an intrusion in their economic activities. MST and 
other social movements created a new form of village organization by promoting a series of 
collective activities. 
3.4.2 The second wave of settlements creation (2002 - 2006) 
The main social movement-mobilizing household during the first wave was MST, except 
for one village, village A, where settlers organized in one association from the South of 
Alagoas negotiating directly with INCRA. In the second wave the main organizations MTL, 
MSTL and Comissão Pastoral da Terra, mobilized most of the families living in settlements. 
The changes of political administration at national and local levels were reflected in 
differences in the rules governing the creation of settlements and access to funds. The 
delivery of funds for the construction of houses was in goods rather than in money. 
Households had the possibility to negotiate the definition of the project to be implemented in 
their plot. Houses built by INCRA for agrarian reform settlers were of bigger dimension than 
the ones built during the first wave of settlements’ creation. They could no longer establish 
encampment on the land to be expropriated but “sem terra” were obliged to live along the 
streets near the area where they are claiming access to land. This had an impact on the 
difficulties faced by settlers as they could not plant the essential food crops and they were 
living in a situation of greater vulnerability. Fifth the time elapsed between villages’ creation, 
access to land and credit reception became longer. 
All of the households that have been registered in INCRA records to be part of “Projeto de 
Assentamento” were eligible to receive the settlement credit (“credito de implantação”) which 
was composed by the following three components: 1) credit for food (Credito de alimentação) 
that is directed to support households food necessities before the crops planted have grown, 
2) “Credito fomento” to support the purchase of equipment to carry out agricultural 
production and 3) housing credit devoted to support the building of settlers’ houses. 
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The negative aspect that many of the interviewed discussed was the timing for the 
definition of the plots and the access to the agricultural founds was longer than in the 
previous waves of settlement creation.  
“ I have arrived in January, I encamped, in 1999, one year after, INCRA already told us that the land was 
our, we could stay. In 1999, some things already started: delimiting plots, building some houses, money for 
electricity system and some technicians to support family farming. Three years afterwards they created 
another agrarian reform settlement in our municipality. Lula became president in that period. Between 
settlement creation and now I think that already ten years have passed. They do not have their plot yet. 
Beside they have houses, electric energy, they already received the funds for houses twice, until last year 
plots had not been delimited yet and they did not know where their land was. (ID 3 village A) 
Settlers, in the second wave of settlements’ creation had to wait longer to have their plots 
identified and to get access to funds for family farming investments. This implied that the 
agrarian reform slowed down.  
The protagonists of the occupation in the settlements studied argue that the main reason 
was a lack of counterpart of MST to fight against. Since 2002 the ruling party both at national 
and local level has been a left wing coalition, the same coalition that used to support 
Movimento Sem Terra.  
Instead an interpretation reported by a MST representative, is related to the agenda of PT 
government supporting, as an economic strategy, the creation of agro-business rather than 
family farming.  
Lastly others claim that the main reason is the lack of interest of national government in 
agrarian reform due to low visibility at national and international level. In the 1990s there 
was a big debate and expropriating the land was a possible driver of votes’ collection. In 
contrast, after 2000s, the agrarian reform became a minor issue, also because of the weak 
success of settlement productivity,  
It is possible to argue that the occupations, having become the main political instruments 
to put into operation the agrarian reform, were also the reason to stop the agrarian reform. 
Frequent use of violence depicted the MST as a destroying force rather a propelling one. 
“Usually people say that after Lula government the social movements stopped. The reason is that now 
formally social movements are not against the government. Now that the government is partly in favor of 
social movements, we have disadvantages, because we went to quarrel against the government. I consider 
both Lula and Dilma governments good. However for the people of agrarian reform, if we make an analysis 
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they took landlords debts and they passed an eraser on it. Why are they making this to us? During Lula 
government how many fazendas have been expropriated? Now the government does not have the strength 
to fight, even if the people are against it. All of that was conquered with the use of strength. Everything is in 
favor of the government, for this reason they do not have strength anymore. Which is the social movement 
that is active here (in this municipality)? The social movement does not have interest in the settlements 
anymore. They cannot fight against themselves.” (Former MST activist) 
3.4.3 The settlements today 
Settlements, distributed in the rural area of the municipality, have a number of plots and 
therefore a number of households ranging from 38 to 241, for a total of 1431 plots that have 
been granted access to land to 1431 households registered at INCRA. The total number of 
households living in each settlement does not reflect perfectly the number of plots registered 
at INCRA. Two are the main reasons: 1) sometimes more than one household live on the same 
plot; there are households not registered as often they came to live in their siblings’ plots and 
2) some households have more than one plot. There are also few cases of some individuals, 
usually male adults, which have no permanent residence.  
Not all households that were recruited and took part in the occupation stayed until the 
division of land into plots. Many of them went away before that and were substituted with 
families living in the neighboring areas being mainly sugar cane cutters.  Since the creation of 
settlement other families also decided leave the villages: some straight after the end of fund 
distribution by the state, and others after some years of life in the settlement. As the land is 
property of the state and cannot be sold, all of the land transactions happen in the informality: 
there is no public notice of vacant plots and the insertion of a new family is always mediated 
by acquaintance, kinship or friendship network. Owning plot or having legally recognized 
access to the use of plot (“reconhecido gozo do direito de posse”) are the conditions to be 
members of the ASTC (art. 4). It is important to point out that being ASTC member is not a 
necessary condition to sell products to it. 
Settlements now include four main typology of households: farmers that had no access to 
land, farmers that were working in family plots, urban workers, sugar cane cutters coming 
from different areas of Alagoas and old settlers of failed sugar cane industry which land was 
expropriated by the state. It is important to point out that until the process of agrarian reform 
will been completed, village settlers have no land property title. The plot and the house in 
which they live is still property of the state.  
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There are two main conditions for households to acquire property: the first is absence 
households’ debts towards agrarian reform entities and the second is the completion of all 
village features required to become an autonomous entity (“emancipação do assentamento”).  
Table 3.2 below illustrates the list of settlements that have been created in the 
municipality, the names of settlements in which ASTC operates, the total number of registered 
plots per village, the number of ASTC members’ in each settlement and the average income 
derived from participation in ASTC activity per household and the name of the social 
movement that promoted settlement creation.  
These elements led the sample selection. This table also acknowledges also how the 
number of settlements’ creation decreased after the Lula administration. There are only four 
settlements out of eighteen that were created after 2003.  
 
Table 3.2 Municipality agrarian reform settlements’ features  
 
Source: INCRA data and survey elaboration 
  
Settlement 
name
Number on 
Municipality 
Map
Creation 
year
Settlement 
area (ha)
 # 
registered 
plots
# ASTC 
members
% ASTC 
member
s 
Average 
Sold to 
ASTC (R$)
Name of 
social 
movement
Distance 
from the 
road (km)
Village A 3 1998 690 100 26 28 10478
Geremia 
Association
23
Village B 8 1997 445 38 9 23 119 MST 5
Village C 14 2005 453 42 2 4 1337 CPT 16
Settlement D 18 2006 1254 109 0 0 0 MLST 6
Settlement E 4 1997 791 84 5 5 437 22
Settlement F 12 1997 963 120 4 3 2324 MST 6
Settlement G 10 1997 505 68 4 5 2829 MST 3
Settlement H 9 1997 409 40 1 2 0 MST 3
Settlement I 15 1998 406 46 0 0 0 MST 17
Settlement L 13 1997 505 58 7 12 5303 MST 18
Settlement M 6 1997 1086 117 5 4 1319 MST 16
Settlement N 7 1998 400 51 7 13 39 MST 9
Settlement O 11 1998 495 42 1 2 0 5
Settlement P 1 2004 1651 241 1 0 0 MLST 15
Settlement Q 17 1997 863 116 0 0 0 MST 16
Settlement R 5 1997 461 58 0 0 0 MST 19
Settlement S 2 2006 467 52 0 0 0  MLST 0
Settlement T 16 1997 461 49 0 0 0 MST 15
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the geographical location of settlements in the municipality. 
Figure 3.1 Municipality settlements’ map 
 
 
3.5 Villages’ histories 
In the next pages I will present the history and composition of each of the three villages’ 
object of analysis. The history of each village will be divided in the phases of village creation 
described in section 3.4.1 of the chapter. 
3.5.1 History of village A 
Organization in charge of village creation 
Village A is the only settlement in the municipality where a social movement has not 
mobilized most of settlers but instead a private association was the organization that led to 
the village’s creation. This association was located in the South of Alagoas that is considered 
to be one of the very few areas of Alagoas where family farming is a relevant economic 
activity. There was also a group led by an MST representative. The two leaders of the groups 
were Geremias and Severino17. 
                                                        
17 Fictional names. 
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Among the settlers arrived during first migration wave most of them were directly or 
indirectly recruited by Geremias’ association while Severino recruited only a small percentage 
(Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Village A first settlers’ groups  
 
Geremias had an agreement with INCRA and he chose village A, among the three different 
options proposed, because it responded to the features that he considered essential not being 
too close to town and having good land.  
“INCRA had three settlements: village D near to Maragogi, settlement E neighboring with village A. 
Village D was too close to town, village E did not convince him and therefore he selected village A (Id 34 
village A).  
In the first week of January 1998 approximately eight buses of new people arrived in 
village A. At that time only twelve households were there: the family of “barraqueiro”, the only 
local shop tenant, and eleven ex-workers of just bankrupted sugar cane factory 
(“moradores”).  
Households’ recruitment 
Geremias was well known in Penedo and he recruited several families talking on radio 
and visiting directly families’ houses. In total he recruited a group composed by more than 
100 households in the towns and rural villages neighboring Penedo and he organized them 
into one association. His promise to associates was to get access to land near the sea.  
Most of the association’s members had meeting for almost two years before going to 
Maragogi municipality. These households therefore had the time to get to know each other 
and to withdraw from the program if they were not convinced. There was also longer time for 
Geremias to select the families that were interested to join the occupation because they 
wanted to make a living from family farming. Many of the members of Geremias’ association 
were people that already had some experience in family farming.  A few of them were working 
Percentage (%) Absolute value
Geremias’ association 69 29
Severino's group 10 4
Geremias' associations’ acquaintances 7 3
Substitutes from neighboring villages 7 3
First settlers’ acquaintances 7 3
Total number of first comers 100 42
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for a company that was producing rice, others were working for a cooperative that produced 
both fruits and sugar cane, part of them were working on the land of their parents and others 
were sugar cane cutters that used agricultural production as complementary income.   
However, it is important to point out that none of them had experience with production of 
crops that represented the core business of ASTC. Few of them already knew passion fruit but 
the vast majority was producing “culturas de grão” such as beans and cassava. Such 
productions constitute the main staple crops and they are temporary crops, therefore 
permitted to be plant by land tenants. In village A they are not profitable, due to the poverty of 
the soil, damaged by over four centuries of monoculture in sugar cane plantations,. 
The group headed by Severino, which was an MST activist, instead was less homogenous 
in terms of households’ professions some were already working in family farming while many 
were sugar cane cutters. Severino as most MST activists had precise guidelines from MST to 
recruit as many families as possible and therefore there was not much time to make a real 
selection of people. 
Table 3.4 illustrates the previous profession of those people that arrived in village A 
because the two leaders of mobilization Geremias and Severino recruited them directly or 
indirectly. I define this group of households as “first settlers” as they were the first to arrive in 
the village. The table aims to show that people recruited by two leaders of village occupation 
had distinct features in terms of previous working experience. The table portrays only the 
households that have been present in the village since the period of occupation until the 
period of survey delivery. The two groups leaded Severino and Geremias were much larger at 
that time but many of the households left the village. 
The categories of occupation listed in table 3.4 represent the most widespread typologies 
of jobs among villagers. The category mixed livelihood describes households that combine 
more than one of above listed professions as income generating strategy. The category “other” 
represents those professions that are residuals to the categories indicated in the table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4 Village A first settlers groups’ features 
 
The encampment 
Beside previous agreements between INCRA and Geremias, households had to live in 
tents (“abaixo da lona”) for one year before the land was finally dispossessed.  
During this first period of encampment many of the first settlers went away as they were 
disappointed by settlement conditions. There was no electricity, no water nor sanitation. 
People were living out what they were able to grow and what they received as food supply 
(“cesta basica”) by the municipality. Some of the key informants referred that at that time 
village A was known in the whole municipality for the high level poverty that was there but at 
the same for a better organization than other settlements. 
Households that abandoned the settlements were substituted by others living in the 
neighboring “engenhos” increasing therefore the level of heterogeneity among settlers’ 
professional experience. 
All of the interviewed described the period of encampment as a period of great difficulty 
(“sofremos muito”) but also of great solidarity among families. It was not a period of danger; 
no violence, no stealing nor quarreling among households took place during the first period of 
encampment. Tents proximity was defined by kinship and geographical origin, therefore even 
households with very small kids were not afraid. 
Selection of people that can have access to land 
During the first period of encampment, the two leaders of associations Geremias and 
Severino did not get along well and there was not enough space in the village for both of them. 
Geremias’ 
association
Geremias 
association’ s 
acquaintances
Substitutes 
from 
neighboring 
villages
Severino's 
group
First settlers’ 
acquaintances
Sugar cane cutter 17% 33% 100% 75% 33%
Official sugar cane 
plantation
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Agricultural 
production
59% 67% 0% 25% 67%
Urban jobs 7% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Municipal job and 
other
3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mixed livelihoods 10% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total in absolute 
value
29 4 3 3 3
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In the fight between the two leaders, Severino lost. Geremias became the first president of the 
village association. Many of households that were linked to him went to neighboring 
settlements and only a very small group of households of Severino followers remained.  
INCRA for every “Projecto de Assentamento” measured the land and divided it into plots 
that were assigned to households, which took part in the occupation. The number was fixed 
and thus the social movement leading the occupation and INCRA had to decide who could 
have access to land and who could not. 
The first important act of Geremias as president of the settlement was to declare the 
settlement communitarian. As a result he could keep in the settlement all households that 
took part in the occupation and not only the number of households that corresponds to the 
number of plots defined by INCRA.  
“This farm (fazenda) could not host all of the families. It was dramatic to decide who could stay and who 
could not. You got nothing in life just a tent (“casinha de lona”). You received “cesta basica”: it was rice, pasta 
and beans. Therefore it was difficult when INCRA said that not all of the families could stay. We all passed 
through the same suffering. It was in such a way that Geremias, the president of the settlement, got the idea of a 
communitarian settlement. This was not like the other settlements were people went or stayed according to 
what INCRA decides.” (id 3 village A) 
In INCRA reports, village A is not divided in different plots (“lotes”) each one with one 
owner. There are a certain number of families registered at INCRA and there is an informal 
division of land and informal map that explicit how the land is divided but this is not officially 
registered in INCRA offices. 
Leadership in the village 
Many of the interviewed referred positive experience of the period when Geremias was 
president. 
“ Geremias wanted to gather people together. He always wanted to be the leader. His words were law; he 
created groups, organized collective activities such as vegetable gardens. He got speech and he made that 
people created union. The following presidents were ashamed to follow people. Geremia did not have 
education but he had speech. He had discourse to gather resources. He had a loyal team. He worked a lot and 
his wife too. His wife was very strong” (id 57 village A) 
“Geremias was a dictator but he had a clear idea of what he wanted from village A. He had very hard law. 
He was able to negotiate directly with the municipality. When Geremias arrived there was already the team of 
108 
 
Severino. Severino was friendly but he had no ideas. His socialization (“convivência”) was only political.”  (id 34 
village A) 
“We are in a place where everything is missing. When there is leadership, a group that is taking charge of 
things. I miss that period. Geremias was worried to bring the political candidates to listen to the necessities of 
the people, to have a political support, to solve some issue. Today there are only spiteful people that buy votes 
for example by offering a pump to push water to your house, money or a job for your children. Health services 
are precarious. For example I have already problems with the group of ASTC members. There are individuals 
that sell people’s souls. It is only necessary to have a better speech and you win. ASTC is playing a role but it is 
limited to agricultural production. For other issues such as education and health services ASTC has nothing to 
do. Politics have direct influence on people. There is big dependency in respect to politicians. Everything today 
comes from politicians.” (ID 3 village A) 
Geremias negotiated for technical assistance and facilities directly with municipality 
mayor and INCRA federal institute responsible for management of settlements. Besides these 
positive comments from many of the settlers, not all of the households accepted the forms of 
Geremias’ actions. He was imposing a specific way to manage the village that left no space for 
discussion: his decision was the one to be followed. Many of the households that did not like 
his style of action were some of the old settlers. In 2002 he left the settlement and he moved 
to a neighboring state, where he would became eventually again president of a settlement. 
After Geremias a series of presidents followed in the village. Another president took over 
just for few months to substitute Geremias that left the village. After him office of 
representation passed from the new settlers that had become the majority of households to 
the old setters for a period of four years.  
The period between 2002 and 2006 was crucial for the definition of village equilibrium. It 
was an important of fragmentation as it coincided with the change of political party at 
municipal level. The new president of the village, the former “barraqueiro”, tried to get a 
political office at municipal level without success.  
Many of the people interviewed looked with great disillusion at the lack of representation 
as deputy in municipal assembly of their village president. Many people worked for the 
president electoral campaign withot success. Some of the people did not felt represented in 
the municipality and wanted a more close connection with the ruling party. Some of 
households decided to start to vote for the party that was in charge while others continued to 
vote for the party that supported village creation. 
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“ Village A is isolated, therefore it is difficult because we have no representation at municipal level because 
we are not part of the movement. The advantage for the settlements that are connected with the social 
movements is that they can negotiate actions through the movement and not directly with the municipality” (id 
86 village A) 
The new president from 2006 to 2010 was again a new comer and a reference for the 
MLST. In the village, he was supporting the party of municipality local administration.  
Since 2010 the new president is a member of ASTC and also member of the group of 
Geremias. However, his action is not considered to be very effective by many households in 
the village. When I asked about meetings and activities in the village most of the people said 
that not much has being done recently there were just some courses and very seldom 
meetings of village association. 
 
Village composition today 
In terms of settlers’ origin, they can be grouped in four main areas: 1) the village itself 
(old settlers), 2) neighboring “fazendas” and “sitios” 3) Agreste alagoano namely Penedo, San 
Sebastiao and others, where Geremias association was based, 4) Junqueiro where Severino 
group was recruited. 
Geremias contacted thirty-two settlers of the households currently living in the village. 
Among them twenty-seven households, have been members his private association for two 
years. Geremias’ association main goal was to put together people that shared the same idea 
of getting access to land that would be expropriated in the framework of the agrarian reform. 
Most of those households (twenty-two) were from the town of Penedo, where the association 
was based and some from neighboring towns (one from San Sebastiao and four from 
Pindorama). The remaining five households were living in “engenhos” that surrounds 
settlements and they were invited by the settlement president to substitute people that 
desisted from occupation and encampment, as the conditions were considered too extreme.  
The group of first settlers was able to mobilize six new households since 1998, year of 
occupation. Many of the first settlers’ dependents (in total twenty-two households) remained 
in the village and as soon as some households were leaving the village they have been 
substituted in most of the cases by relatives and some of the cases friends that were invited to 
settle in the village. Also some of the “antigos moradores” mobilized mostly their relatives to 
110 
 
come to settle in the village. Among the 107 families that have registered their plot, in 1999, 
only 47 remained the same until today. 
Role of ASTC in the village 
In 2012 households from village A represent the majority of ASTC members among all 
settlements. They contribute the most to ASTC agricultural production (65.6%).  
In 1997 and 1998 there was a “municipal commission for agrarian reform”, the 
charismatic leader of the ASTC was part of this commission and present agronomist of the 
ASTC was at the time the municipal secretary of agriculture. In village A where there was no 
social movement everything was negotiated directly with INCRA and the mayor (“prefeito”), 
certainly the presence of an agreement between the secretary of agriculture and the nun to 
support the settlers played a major role in facilitating the delivery of agricultural services for 
the village. An ex-activist of MST, currently involved in local politics, recalls that at the time, in 
1998, village A had a technician from the municipality to give training to farmers differently 
from what happened in the other villages where technicians were only related to INCRA 
funded projects.  
3.5.2 History of village B 
Organization in charge of village creation 
38 permanent settlers compose village B. Most of them arrived during the first wave of 
migration and mostly they were contacted by Movimento Sem Terra activists. Table 3.5 
illustrates the composition of first settlers in terms of organizations mobilizing households. 
Table 3.5 Village B first settlers’ groups 
 
Percentage Absolute value
MST committee 4 1
First comers 4 1
MST activist 39 9
INCRA 9 2
Atalaia team 17 4
MST activist 2 17 4
Other 9 2
Total 100 23
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MST organized all of the phases of village creation: recruitment, period of encampment, 
selection of people that could have access to land and the early phases of the village creation, 
negotiation of access funds and resources and distribution of them. The national committee of 
MST had a common policy for all the settlements in the state managed these negotiations. The 
selection of households that could stay after the encampment period had been the 
responsibility of INCRA and MST activists and national committee. 
At the time of village B occupation, late 1990s, MST was in its golden period both in terms 
occupation and land expropriations but also in terms of international media coverage of their 
struggle for land. MST had a strong political organization in all Brazil and in every state there 
were state representatives and a large number of activists that constituted the base of the 
movement (“militantes”.) It was therefore a very strong political engine able to mobilize 
thousands of people, with political connections at all levels. 
Village B is in a favorable position for MST leaders and activists in organizing logistics for 
marches, roadblock and demonstration both at municipal level but especially in the capital of 
the state and in other parts of the country. The village is close to the road being separated 
from paved main road linking Alagoas with Pernambuco only by 5 km not paved road. 
Moreover most of neighboring villages are other settlements of agrarian reform. Settlement F 
was the headquarters of MST leaders. This geographical proximity along with common 
history between the different settlements of agrarian reform made village B and its neighbor’s 
very connected. Villages F, G and H were all productive units of the same sugar cane company. 
There are both kinship ties across households of these settlements and common participation 
to events such as religious functions and health services. 
Households’ recruitment 
MST activists (militantes) had only a very short time to recruit as many people to occupy 
the land.  These “militantes” went to be peripheries of towns and in rural areas to recruit 
people for the occupation. In village B two were the main “militantes” that gathered people. 
They did not enquire on the households’ capacity to family farm or interest in land but rather 
tried to convince them to join the movement with promises of a better future in the rural 
areas. The national discourse of social movements was that agrarian reform should have 
supported sons and nephews of agricultural producers that had lost access to land.  
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In the early phases of the social movements’ action there was a period of political training 
of occupiers, later the the social movements leaders aimed to mobilize large number of people 
(Sobral 2006). Afterwards, at the national level, there was shift towards acceleration of 
recruitment. Recruiting a critical mass was necessary for social movement to make their voice 
heard by the government. MST involved very several types of people with very different 
professional background being both farmers with no access to land (“arrendatario”), 
unemployed people in urban areas and unemployed looking for a new job opportunity. 
Therefore many of households recruited had no concrete experience in family farming  (Table 
3.6).  
Besides, people recruited from further away from the place of encampment also sugar 
cane workers living nearby the settlements were involved. Normally those households did not 
take part in the process of occupation, but rather they were called to substitute household 
that withdrew during the period of encampment.  
The history of migration of several families living in Porto Calvo and in the neighboring 
areas to the settlements started with these promises.  
“The government will give you money, will give you housing and you will get a lot of advantages. When you 
will get to settlement the coordinator will give all of the necessary papers.” (Id 118 village B) 
“Village B was the last to be invaded. They had to live in tents. My motivation to get involved in the 
movement was that I did not want to pay house rent anymore. Golias called my husband to come to the village. 
Golias was not a leader. Part of people that were in excess had to go a neighboring settlement.” (id 106 village 
B) 
“In settlement F there was many people living there. The people who stayed were the ones that wanted to 
have. They would become rich they would become like the owners of sugar cane plantations (“fazendeiros”). 
The people from the social movements said that government would give money. These people from the social 
movements received money to gather people to go and occupy the land. Their promise was to have a better 
life” (id 132 village B) 
“ Alberto called me to come and squat. He was one leader and now he is living in village F. There were 
more than 100 people occupying the land. Some stayed and others had to leave” (Id 104 village B) 
“In Porto Calvo there was a lot of movement. Id 106 contacted me and I arrived when I was fired by the 
enterprise I was working in.” (Id 118 village B) 
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Table 3.6 Village B first settlers groups’ features 
 
 
Encampment period 
Households occupying village B had to live one year in tents before INCRA started the 
process of land expropriation (“Desapropriação”). During the encampment period people 
suffered more than in other places as there was no infrastructure where people could find 
shelter.  
“When I arrived there was nothing planted” (id 131 village B). 
Furthermore due to the frequent actions of protest carried out by settlers by means of 
strikes or others, there were some episodes when police entered the settlement and took 
some occupiers t to jail.  
“It was dangerous because of the police, some people were arrested. I was afraid by police 
and not by settlers” (id 104 village B). 
Selection of people that could stay after occupation 
The next crucial moments were first the definition of plots division, the selection to 
households, among those who took part in the occupation, that could finally have access to 
land and second the definition of village organization either in “agrovila” or in the plot “casa 
no lote”. 
The complexity of the first process was related to the co-coexistence of different selection 
rules between INCRA and MST. While the former wanted to give primacy to people that 
showed their ability as farmers by planting crops, the latter instead favored people that were 
very active in the strikes promoted by MST.  
MST 
committee
MST activist 1
MST activist’s 
affiliates
INCRA group Atalaia group MST activist 2 Other
Sugar cane cutter 0% 44% 100% 50% 0% 0% 100%
Official sugar cane 
plantation
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Agricultural production 0% 22% 0% 0% 50% 75% 0%
Urban jobs 0% 11% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0%
Municipal job+ other 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mix livelihoods 0% 11% 0% 50% 0% 25% 0%
Other 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total in absolute value 1 1 9 2 4 4 2
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“There was INCRA and there was the movement. There was strong competition among them. There 
were people that stayed with the movement and people that worked the land.” (id 118 village B).  
The only commonly agreed rule was to give primacy to the first occupiers.  As a result 
households’ members of this group do not report any difficulty in having access to land.  
“The division of plots was easy.  Various people wanted the house in the plot but it was not possible. (Id 
107 village B) 
“INCRA divided the land. For the first it was easy to get access to land. In this first group there were 
people I knew” (id 115 village B) 
The second instead was strictly related to the general policy of MST that favored the 
creation of “agrovila” instead of “casa no lote”. Many households asked to have their house 
built in their plot, but the settlement’s first president did not support the request from the 
villagers. He followed strictly what was required by the general guidelines of MST. At the end 
of the process the only people that managed to have their house built in their plot were: the 
first president, MST activist and the old settlers. 
“The plots are not same; there are plots that are useless. House in the plot, INCRA did not want that. Just 
very few people could have it: old settlers and few others [..] They asked to stay in the plot but it was not 
possible. We had a conflict with the first president that wanted that we stayed in “agrovila”. The leaders of the 
movement at national level decided where we had stay.” Id 134 village B 
Leadership in the village 
In terms of presidents village B has been relatively stable. There were four names that 
alternated over the period of existence of the village. MST selected the first president (id 132). 
He was coming from Maceio and he had no connection with other groups present in the 
village. The other presidents instead are part of the two larger kinship groups present in the 
villages.  Id 118 and id 138 were the two main leaders of the village having been both in 
power for two legislations being Id 118 still in his second one. Id 118 is ASTC member, is the 
one organizing prayers’ meeting for the Catholics and he participates to the blue political 
parades.  id 138  instead participates to the orange political parades, he is part of the 
evangelical church and he does participate in the cooperatives’ activities. The other president 
was a relative of Id 118 that had office for only one mandate.  
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Village composition today 
In this village many of the households had no connections before and got to know each 
other during the period of encampment.  
The first wave of settlers in village B consists of five “moradores do engenho” all ex-
employees and tenant of the cane sugar industry and twenty-three households that arrived in 
1997 to occupy. The second wave consist by eight households that have been invited by the 
first settlers to substitute people that decide to go away from the settlement and two first 
settlers’ descendants. 
Households permanently living in the village, that are the object of this research, can be 
classified in five main groups according to their origin. First the group of five old settlers that 
were living village B before the agrarian reform. Second a group of eleven households mainly 
coming from Porto Calvo being mainly recruited by an MST activist; among them only four 
mainly living in the upper road already know each other before coming. Third among the first 
settlers a group of seven households that came from another encampment in Atalaia that 
finally was not expropriated by the state, among them only two of them knew each other 
before encampment. Four a group of two households that were workers for the sugar cane 
factory in the closest town San Jose da Coroa Grande - Pernambuco. Fifth a group from Maceio 
composed by four households including both old settlers and new settlers.  
It is important to point out that the MST activist decided to settle in the village where he 
was coordinating the encampment. The twenty-three first settlers have then invited relatives 
to substitute the previous settlers that moved out.  The households arriving from Atalaia 
already had a very difficult story of occupation before getting to the village. They had to 
occupy for a long period before being able to get access to the land. 
Role of ASTC in the village 
Village B was the first settlement, after the failure in settlement G, to receive support from 
the congregation of which the nun was part. The nun in first period of activities in the 
settlements put great attention to this settlement and first ASTC president was residing in 
village B. The main drivers of action of nun and her congregation were the hope for change 
that this new organization could bring. She therefore started to support the projects with 
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several means both by participating in social movements meeting and also participating 
actively to settlements’ life.  
Differently from what happened in village A where the nun had a direct role in the 
process, in village B because of the central presence of the social movement that were 
controlling the whole process of negotiation to access to funds the role of the nun was smaller 
than in village A. The first project and ASTC afterwards allowed participants in the project and 
then cooperative members to have access to micro-credit to create small irrigation systems, to 
start small breeding activities and also prepare reservoirs for the production of fish.  
All of these investments had poor results as the number of members and crops sold to the 
cooperative decreased over time. Despite ASTC strong presence with activities and credit to 
farmers, agricultural production devoted to ASTC was extremely low. More generally family 
farming was more a complementary rather than a main income generating activity. It is 
important to point out that the distance from the road was low. It was only 5 km away from 
the main street. The other issue was related to ASTC specialization on some specific cash 
crops namely fruits that require more investment and more labor force. It made it more 
difficult to sell their products to ASTC. 
3.5.3 History of village C 
Organization in charge of village creation 
Village C creation was related to the action of Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT). Comissão 
Pastoral da Terra is one of the oldest social movement in Brazil. It is different from MST as it is 
church based and it declares to use no violent means for its form of protest. CPT was born in 
1975 in the conference of Brazilian bishops, during the dictatorship, as a response to the 
dramatic situation of small holders (“posseiros”), rural workers (“peões”) and migrant 
workers in Amazonia region. CPT is a Christian ecumenical institution including several 
Christian confessions manly Catholic and Evangelical. Despite CPT first focus on Amazonia, it 
soon began to expand its action to the entire country supporting all workers that were 
fighting serious issue such as resistance against dam’s constructions and later supporting the 
cause of “Sem terra”.  
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The main objectives of the organization are supporting family farming; fight against slave 
labor and the main target are rural workers. CPT has a journal and publishes annual reports 
on the situation of land conflict in Brazil. 
 
Recruitment  
The land in village C was not expropriated after a period of occupation but purchased by 
INCRA and it was created in the second phase of agrarian reform. 
This implied the absence of a real period of encampment and lack of necessity to mobilize 
a large number of families to the area but instead that social movements could bring people 
already knowing that the land would be available.  
The number of households that can have access to land for each settlement is limited as it 
depends on the dimension of the village area. INCRA had to assign land to the households that 
were already residing in the village: the former workers of sugar cane plantation. 
Furthermore CPT recruited people that had already been part of the movement for a long 
period and therefore deserved to finally have their “promised land” after years of struggle. In 
this village there is prevalence of old settlers and their family to new settlers (Table 3.7).  
 
Table 3.7 Village C households’ distribution in migration waves  
 
In the group of new comers there were people that had a long history of occupation, 
always in a situation of danger. Namely a group composed by five households had to encamp 
for seven years before being able to finally reach a destination where they could live. They 
passed through several places such as Flor do Bosque, São Sebastião, Rio Bonito and Joaquim 
Migration waves Percentage Absolute value
Old settlers 41 15
First comers 32 12
Old settlers dependents 8 3
First comers dependents 5 2
Second comers 8 3
Third comers 0 0
Mix marriages between different 
migration waves
5 2
Total 100 37
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Gomes before reaching village C (Table 3.8). In this village among old settlers there was a very 
cohesive clan that had several members across neighboring settlements and “povoados”.  
For the new settlers, there was no specific selection rule to recruit people in terms of 
professional experience and none of the interviewed refers to have been involved in 
association, meeting or training before occupation (Table 3.9). It is important to point out 
though that churches, especially evangelical ones, are an important point of reference for CPT 
recruitment. Many of households, even if currently they do not attend church as their 
congregation is not present in the village, they used attend church in their town of origin. 
Table 3.8 Village C first settlers’ groups  
 
 
Table 3.9 Village C first settlers groups’ features 
 
Encampment period 
Village C faced more difficulties than the other villages studied not having access to 
infrastructure and credit for longer periods. It was created during the second phase of 
agrarian reform and this aspect has effects both on village composition but also on rules for 
Percentage Absolute value
CPT activists' affiliate 33 4
CPT activist 1 17 2
CPT activist 2 33 4
Other 1 8 1
Other 2 8 1
Total 100 12
CPT activists' 
affiliates
CPT activist 1
CPT 
activist 2
Other 1 Other 2
Sugar cane cutter 25 100 75 0 100
Official in sugar 
cane plantation
25 0 0 0 0
Agricultural 
production
0 0 25 0 0
Urban jobs 1 0 0 100 0
Municipal job plus 
other
0 0 0 0 0
Mixed livelihoods 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
Total in absolute 
value
4 2 4 1 1
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village creation. Since 2005 neither the houses building neither credit for family farming have 
been completed yet.  
The total number of settlers according to the number of plots, defined by INCRA, is 48. 
Until now though only 42 are registered, as six still have not received their house. Houses 
building have being divided in three phases. The first two have been completed. They have 
built respectively 11 houses and 24. The third that foresees the building of 13 houses has not 
started yet. Access to the credit has also been postponed until the process of registration of all 
households is concluded. 
One of the settlers referred that, in seven years of settlement presence, they did not 
received credit to start projects in family farming. The only funds that they have received so 
far are a very small first financing to buy the first essential staple crop (500 reais), a small 
credit to start first plantations of crops (1250 reais) and a bigger credit received in materials 
to build their house. 
Leadership in the village 
Most of the presidents of village C were women. The first president of the village had been 
appointed from the CPT. She was selected because of her ability of leadership demonstrated 
in the village where she was previously occupying. She had the longest experience in the fight 
for land but she was quite isolated in terms of contacts with the old settlers and with other 
new settlers.  Her office was extremely short being only less than two months. During her 
interview, she referred that her dramatic short experience of presidency that was 
characterized by several episodes of physical threats with shotgun from other settlers. She 
told that one female, of the largest clan in the village being part of the group of the old settlers, 
was strongly against her presidency. The first president referred that this person interpreted 
agrarian reform as an opportunity to have a small land property (“sitio”) for her extended 
clan: she therefore acted against anyone that could be an obstacle to her project.  She co-opted 
some of the old settlers that represented her militia.  
After the first president other three women followed her in the leadership being all of 
them living in the village before the agrarian reform except for one. All of the presidents were 
not able to conclude their office. The current president which family is ASTC member is the 
first one to be in charge for a longer period.  
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There are a large number of ties going beyond the boundaries of the village A. This is a 
signal of the lack of complex system of ties inside the village. The main important necessities 
of rural households (such as buy everyday staple food and basic things (credit to get food), get 
access to mechanical devices for land work (such as tractor and access to means of 
transportation to go the market places to sell their products) are satisfied outside the village. 
Instead in village A and B most of services are performed by people living in the village. Many 
of the interviewed refer households from neighboring areas as people contacted to access to 
important devices such as tractor, to get transport to town to sell products. 
Village composition today 
Most of the new arrived settlers did not know each other. Beside the old settlers living in 
the village before the CPT had access to land, the others have more than ten different 
geographical origins. Among the new settlers kinship ties linked only a very small group but 
the vast majority had no connection before. For new settlers the lack previous ties  with the 
lack of a period of common encampment certainly did not favor the creation of ties across 
different groups. 
The geographical location of the village is also relevant as it is mainly surrounded by 
engenhos rather than by assentamentos. This is very important as it influences both the 
opportunities of work and the models of behavior. The main occupation in the neighboring 
areas is to work for the sugar cane industry.  
 
Role of the ASTC 
For what concerns the role of the cooperative, differently from what happened with the 
other two villages and more in general in the villages where the ASTC operates, households 
have not been contacted directly by the nun. It was instead a relative of an ASTC member in 
village A, living in the neighboring area that invited some households in village C to join ASTC. 
The cooperative analyzed their request and considered them eligible.  
ASTC plays a small role in terms of membership, having only two members, but they are 
active producers. One of two members is among the middle producers among all of ASTC 
members.  
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Summary of the differences among the three villages  
The main differences, observed among the three villages, can be classified in three 
categories: recruitment pattern, early organization of the village, geographical location and 
village spatial organization. 
In village A recruitment and early organization of village was leaded by a private 
association and there was a larger number of households with experience in family farming. 
During the first period of village constitution there was common activities organized among 
villagers such as the creation of common plot to be devoted to the production of vegetables. 
Village A was the furthest from the main road and households were scattered in the village 
being every house being built on the households’ plot.  
In village B recruitment and early organization was leaded by MST, a lower number of 
settlers had previous experience from family farming, the organization of communal activity 
mostly related to strikes and protests and competition among households to decide who could 
stay and who should live and the third by proximity to main road, therefore easier 
accessibility to other working opportunities beside family farming and proximity to other 
settlement also created by MST. 
In village C Comissão Pastoral da Terra organized recruitment but differently from other 
villages there was already a large a large number of settlers before the period of encampment. 
The number of people with experience in family farming is smaller than in the other villages. 
The organization of activities in the period of encampment was not very relevant and there 
was high instability in village leadership. In terms of distance from the main road was similar 
to the distance of village A. The spatial organization of settlements is a mixture between house 
in the plot and agrovila.  
3.6 Current situation of villages 
3.6.1 Agricultural production and family farming: diversity across villages 
The objectives of this section are first to show the presence of relevant variability across 
villages both in the use of soil and typologies of crops produced and second to outline the 
prevalence of new crops towards old crops where the cooperative, referred as ASTC, is more 
active. ASTC offers to his members a sure market destination for high labor-intensive cash 
crops.   
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Family farmers’ choice of crops and quantity depends on capital assets such as soil 
features, plot’s dimension and access to irrigation. Furthermore, a crucial role in this choice is 
played by the capacity of farmers to interpret and respond to agro-ecology that is referred as 
farmer technical competence. Such competence is the result both of previous farmers’ 
experience but also the farmers’ ability to get access to information from other farmers 
(peers) and by the ability and accessibility of technicians to make the knowledge about crops 
production features and challenges accessible. Moreover, the decision of products’ quantity is 
related to costs of production, value of products in the commercialization and certainty of 
commercialization of crops produced.  
Given the same soil features and plot’s dimension the choice of farmers’ to specialize on 
certain products is highly influenced both by presence of people that already knew some of 
the new crops and by the role of social networks in making the information available to the 
rest of settlers. Important implications of the typology of products commercialized are on the 
one hand the average income that farmers can derive from family farming and on the other 
hand the necessity of labor force to produce the crops selected. Both factors influence 
farmers’ decision to diversify their range of activities besides farming. 
In the context analyzed the availability of labor force plays a great role due to low level of 
mechanization and high need of labor force for fruit trees maintenance and harvest. 
The three main market destinations of farmers’ products are: local markets (feira livre), 
intermediaries (atravesadores) and ASTC. The decision on which market to commercialize is 
related to the typology of products, the quantity produced and accessibility of markets. Some 
products can be produced in small quantity but constantly while other have few but big 
harvests. Accessibility of villages can be measured in terms of distance between villages and 
the local market. It varies across settlements being village B the closest while village A is the 
furthest (23 km). 
Local markets offer better prices than intermediaries but they are able to absorb only 
small quantity of products. Intermediaries have the advantage to collect the products directly 
at farmers’ place but pay a lower price. ASTC function is similar to intermediaries as they 
collect crops directly at farmers’ house and it is able to take up large quantities of crops. ASTC 
price is slightly higher than that of the intermediary but it is smaller than local market price. 
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The analyses presented in this section are based on secondary data collected in the study 
commissioned by INCRA that aimed at assessing the situation of the agrarian reform 
settlements in the municipality analyzed, in order the design the plan to support their 
recovery (COATES 2007). COATES, a cooperative of agricultural technicians operating in 
Alagoas and Pernambuco, collected data, between 2006 and 2007, using Rapid Participatory 
Appraisal methods and households questionnaires. Object of analysis were all settlements 
created between 1996 and 1997 in the eleven settlements. It was not involved in the study the 
analysis of settlements that were created after 1997. This implies that village C and other 
seven villages are not included in the study. 
Data relative to costs presented refer instead to COATES data collection in the same 
settlements but in 2010. The duration of the cycle of production used to calculate the cost of 
production for every crop analyzed are taken both from Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural 
Research18  
2007 survey on eleven settlements (COATES 2007), in spite of the difference between the 
time of the survey and time of secondary data analyzed, are considered crucial as they allow 
for a detailed picture of agricultural production in the different villages and production and 
market features of different crops. Furthermore the cultivated area can be considered a good 
proxy for fruit trees. Soursop, citrus, acerola are perennial crops; banana productive has a 
production cycle is of 25 years. The fruit trees present could be increased but trees present in 
2007 are certainly present also in the period of 2012 survey. 
This section will be organized in three parts. Section 3.6.1.1 presents the differences in 
soil’s use and production of crops across all eleven agrarian reform settlements in the 
municipality object of analysis. Section 3.6.1.2 focuses on a group of the most widespread 
crops to illustrate the differences of price of commercialization, total production costs, and 
importance of labor force use across products. Section 3.6.1.3 compares two areas of agrarian 
reform settlements where the cooperative is active (that include the villages object of the 
dissertation) but with different number of members to show the differences in use of the soil, 
different quantity and typology of crops produced and different commercialization 
destination according to different crops. 
                                                        
18 http://sistemasdeproducao.cnptia.embrapa.br 
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3.6.1.1 Soil use and crops  
All agrarian reform settlements analyzed were productive units of sugar cane or coconut 
plantations. They have impoverished soils because of decades of monoculture.  A recent study 
shows that all settlements present the same soil quality (Embrapa Solos 2012). However this 
section shows that settlements differ significantly in soil occupation (Figure 1) and crops 
grown (Figure 3).  
The “percentage of soil used” is intended to measure the percentage of settlers’ plots used 
for cultivation. The settlements’ soil use is divided in three separate areas: family plots of 
approximately 5 hectares, an area for the preservation of the forests (reserva florestal) of 
approximately 20% of the total, and a communitarian area. On the total the area for settlers’ 
plots is therefore approximately 70%. 
Across the eleven villages studied there are relevant differences in the percentage of soil 
cultivation. Village A is the one that uses the largest percentage of soil that represent most of 
the cultivable soil among all villages (Figure 3.2). The remaining settlements instead used 
only a small percentage of the soil available, ranging from 20% to 30%. This implies that 
many of settlers use only a small portion of their plot. 
Figure 3.2 Percentage of soil used: a comparison across villages 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
 cultivated  uncultivated
125 
 
Crops' features 
Crops produced in the area are classified as temporary and permanent crops according to 
the duration of their cycle of production. Temporary crops have a production cycle shorter 
than one year and permanent crops longer than one year (IBGE 2012). 
Before the agrarian reform, because of the typology of land tenure conditions, people 
living in the sugar cane and coconut plantations (moradores) were allowed to produce only 
temporary crops while perennial crops were forbidden. The only exception is represented by 
banana that is a fruit tree but with a much shorter cycle of production than the others 
(Furlaneto et al. 2007). 
The results of COATES’s study show the presences of fifty-eight crops produced in the 
eleven settlements analyzed. Many of these crops are varieties of the same product while 
others share very similar features, both in terms of botanical species production cycle, price of 
commercialization and costs of production. For the analysis presented in this section, crops 
have been aggregated in twenty-eight broader classes of products.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the classes of products that, in the eleven settlements studied, 
occupy more soil. Crops, that were already present before the agrarian reform, are the ones 
that occupy more soil. The first by area occupied is coconut trees which were already present 
in many areas before agrarian reform settlements and that had been sponsored by the first 
state projects after village constitution occupy the largest area. The second is cassava 
(mandioca), which is both a food and cash crop. Third is cultivation of pasture; fourth is 
banana, fifth is sugarcane and only the sixth, passion fruit, is a new crop for the area. 
The total value of products commercialized is quite different from the use of soil (Figure 
3.4). It is important to point out that the value presented is only referred to the product 
commercialized while there is a part of production that is devoted to consumption, being 
mostly composed by cassava. 
126 
 
Figure 3.3 Area of production (ha) for different typologies of crops  
 
Figure 3.4 Products by value commercialized (in R$) 
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3.6.1.2 Focus on most widespread crops  
Two are the criteria that drove the selection of crops on which I focus the analysis. First, I 
included the two crops that constitute the main staple crops and cash crops (cassava and 
banana) and the two monocultures practiced in the area before the agrarian reform and still 
present in the municipality today (sugar cane and coconut). Second I selected crops that have 
been supported first by an Italian development project and then by ASTC both with technical 
assistance, credit and support to commercialization (table 3.10).  
From 2004 to 2008 farmers’ members of ASTC could commercialize all of their products 
including cassava, vegetables and all fruits in the weekly market organized by ASTC referred 
as feirinha. Instead from 2008 ASTC started to purchase only some specific fruits such as 
soursop, which is the first by production of cooperative members’, passion fruit and acerola. 
Citrus and pineapples produced by coop members that, before commercialized them at 
feirinha, organized by the cooperative every Saturday, stopped to find a market destination 
related to the cooperative (Table 3.10). 
Further to the classification in temporary and permanent crops (IBGE 2012), I have 
divided crops in old and new. Old crops are those that were already known in the municipality 
while new crops are those that represent a novelty for the context.  
Table 3.11 presents the area in hectares destined to the eight crops that I have sampled. 
Old crops are present in all of eleven settlements but there is variability in the presence of the 
new crops across villages. While pineapple and citrus are present in ten settlements, soursop 
only in nine villages and acerola and passion fruit only in eight. Most of the areas of the 
villages that are cultivated with soursop and fruit passion are in village A (Table 3.11). 
The percentage of used soil assigned to old and new crops differ greatly across village 
(Figure 3.5). Village A has the highest production of new crops among villages (70%). The rest 
of villages instead range from 10% to 20% of new crops. 
Figure 3.6 presents the different price of products commercialized across different 
channels. Soursop’s price per ton is the highest among all products (1100 R$). The second is 
banana (660 R$). The third is acerola (500 R$).  The fourth are pineapple, citrus and passion 
fruit (450 R.) The most valuable for commercialization are new crops except for banana. 
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However new crops require higher investment in fertilizers, soil preparation and pesticides 
and they tend to require a larger amount of workforce as illustrated in table 3.12.  
Table 3.10 Typologies of crops’ produced 
 
Figure 3.5 Extension of area in hectares by category of products 
 
Figure 3.6 Prices of crops in R$ per ton  
 
Name of the 
crop in 
Portuguese
Name of the 
crop in 
English
Type of 
products
Typology
Initial 
support by 
ASTC
Currently 
commercializ
ed by ASTC
Banana Banana old permanent x
Cana Sugar cane old temporary
Coco Coconut old permanent
Mandioca Cassava old temporary x
Abacaxi Pineapple new temporary x x
Acerola Acerola new permanent x
Citros Citrus new permanent x
Graviola Soursop new permanent x x
Maracuja Passion fruit new permanent x x
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Table  3.11 Area of crops produced by village (ha)  
 
 
Analysis of crops’ production costs 
The total cost of crop production takes into consideration several values including cash 
rent equivalent, machinery depreciation, machinery investment, storage costs, interest rates 
on operation and land taxes. However I have decided to focus only on costs that are only 
related to the crop production and I do not consider the other costs (Michieli and Michieli 
2002).  
Crop production cycle and therefore crops include two main phases: implantation and 
maintenance of crops. The impact of the cost of implantation on the total cost of crops’ 
production depends on the duration of the lifespan of crop. The three main categories in 
which the cost of production can be categorized into are materials (such as pesticides, 
fertilizers, seeds and plant), the cost of use of machinery (including oil) and workforce. Data 
used for the imputation of costs are referred to farmers’ use of everything that is needed 
according to the good practices of agrarian management. Data refers to the cost per hectare. 
 
Table 3.12 illustrates the difference between costs of production of the different crops. 
The total cost of production has been calculated using the following formula: Cost of 
implantation + (Cost maintenance * years of duration of production cycle). The annual total 
cost of production divided by the number of years of duration of production cycle. 
New crops have on average a higher cost of production. The most costly crop to produce 
is fruit passion. It has very high costs of implantation and very short period of production 
cycle (Table 3.12). 
Pineapple Acerola Citrus Soursop
Passion 
fruit
Banana
Sugar 
cane
Coconut Cassava Total
Village A 7 1 20 46 67 4 19 44 9 217
Village B 2 1 4 0 6 16 2 38 17 85
Settlement D 1 2 1 2 2 10 7 65 21 109
Settlement E 0 0 9 7 5 7 7 33 27 95
Settlement F 0 0 1 0 0 10 3 55 12 81
Settlement H 0 0 1 0 0 10 3 55 12 81
Settlement L 4 0 4 7 0 4 12 27 31 89
Settlement M 6 0 3 0 7 14 10 29 29 97
Settlement N 0 1 4 2 9 6 6 25 17 68
Settlement O 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 30 15 66
Settlement Q 0 0 2 2 0 33 26 34 24 122
Total 19 5 47 66 94 123 109 435 213
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Soursop has a high necessity of labor force and a longer period of investment 
recuperation but it has high price of commercialization and high weight of every fruit (de 
Araújo et al.). Every fruit can weight from 0,4 to 10 kg being on average 2,5 kg (Gomes Estrela 
de Freitas 2012). 
The reason why soursop requires an additional amount of labor force for production is 
the necessity of bagging of all fruits present in each trees to prevent from fruit borers (Gomes 
Estrela de Freitas 2012). Bagging practice is fundamental as it prevents from serious losses of 
fruits. It is estimated that 100% of fruits that were not bagged are attacked by borers (Leite et 
al. 2012). 
The costs table prepared by COATES used for imputing costs presented in table 3.12 did 
not include as days of work the time needed for bagging. In order to take into consideration 
such element I have added in the calculation the equivalent for the days needed for the 
harvest as every fruit of the tree needs to be bagged in a specific moment of maturation of the 
crop in order to prevent from fruit deterioration. Another additional cost, which is not 
considered in the calculation, refers to cost for buying the paper used to wrap every fruit. 
The different crops also vary in perishability and seasonality. Crops such as pineapple, 
cassava and banana can be planted during several time of the year and therefore can be 
harvested in different moments with a smaller need of work force. Instead fruits such as 
acerola, soursop and passion fruit have to be harvested all together, requiring a large labor 
force for short period of time. These fruits also have very high perishability: they should be 
transformed into pulp or sold in a very short time after being harvested. Figure 3.7 shows that 
the crop that requires the higher number of days of work is pineapple.  
Table 3.12 Total cost of production and incidence of labor force per hectare 
 
Name of 
crops
Duration of 
cycle of 
production 
in years
Total 
annual 
cost of 
production
Incidence 
of labor 
force
Other 
costs
Workforce
Other 
costs
Workforce Other costs Workforce
Banana 25 3909 830 1131 790 1287 823 2111 39%
Sugar cane 1,2 2420 880 221 110 2238 843 3081 27%
Coconut 50 1215 825 683 765 707 782 1489 52%
Cassava 1,5 1753 1220 473 1220 1642 2033 3675 55%
Pineapple 4.5 3691 2530 3691 1870 4511 2432 6943 35%
Acerola 20 2934 1440 869 1390 1016 1462 2478 59%
Citrus 100 1400 1030 716 905 730 915 1645 56%
Soursop 50 1463 1010 882 850 911 870 1781 49%
Passion fruit 3 9081 1195 7248 1195 10275 1593 11868 13%
Cost of implantation Cost of maintenance
Annual cost of 
production
131 
 
Figure 3.7 Amount of days of work per one hectare 
 
Comparison between the two areas where the cooperative is most active 
Villages’ areas sampling criteria 
The three criteria used to select the other villages on which to make a more detailed 
analysis of crops’ production and commercialization were: presence in the survey, 
geographical proximity, similar dimension in hectares, presence of the cooperative. Figure 3.8 
represents all the settlements present in the municipality. Village A is number 03, village B is 
08 and village C is 14. Figure 3.9 illustrates the different dimensions of settlements. The 
settlements colored in green are neighbors of village B, neighbors of village A are ones colored 
in orange while blue are the settlements that I do not consider in the analysis. Figure 3.9 
illustrates the percentage of ASTC by village. 
Figure 3.8 Settlements’ dimension in hectares 
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Figure 3.9 Distribution of settlements’ cooperative members 
 
 
3.6.1.3 Comparison of agricultural production between the two areas 
The following paragraphs present a comparison of crops’ areas and crops’ values of 
commercialization between the two areas where the ASTC is more active. The following 
graphs shows that besides a similar presence of ASTC in terms of members the level of 
productivity is very different. Furthermore in village B the main crops are the old crops and 
there is not much difference between village B and the rest of neighboring settlements.  
Figure 3.10 illustrates the difference in area destined to the various crops between village 
A and its neighbors. Village A has the largest production of all new crops while the production 
of cassava is higher in village L.  
Figure 3.11 instead shows the comparison in terms of value of crops’ commercialization is 
new crops towards old crops is very different being banana the only products that has a 
similar value to pineapple. 
Figure 3.12 shows that, differently from the previous geographical area, there is no relevant 
difference between village B and its neighbors. The only crop where village B has destined a 
larger geographical area is banana.  
In term of value commercialized instead the highest value is that of cassava and passion fruit 
(Figure 3.13). 
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Figure 3.10 Villages of area A: crops’ area of production in hectare 
 
Figure 3.11 Villages of area A: total value of commercialization in reais (R$) 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Villages of B area: crops’ area of production in hectare 
 
Figure 3.13 Villages of B area: total value of commercialization in reais (R$) 
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Table 3.13 illustrates the different market destinations of the different crops in the six 
villages analyzed. Sugarcane, pineapple and banana have only one possible market, the other 
products’ have different market destinations. This table also shows that ASTC is an important 
market destination of soursop and passion fruit. Table 3.14 illustrates how the price of crops 
varies across different market destinations.  
Table 3.13 Crops markets’ destination  
 
 
Table 3.14 Crops’ prices (R$) 
 
 
3.6.2 Current employment situation in villages  
In the settlements object of analysis, working opportunities first of all depend upon 
accessibility, given the very bad conditions of the roads, especially during the winter season. 
There is relevant variability in terms of settlements distance from the main road (Table 3.15). 
This plays a crucial role in defining the level of mobility that households can sustain.  
 
ASTC Intermediary Market
Acerola 33% 0% 67%
Banana 0% 0% 100%
Cassava 2% 30% 69%
Citrus 67% 0% 33%
Coconut 25% 31% 44%
Passion fruit 90% 0% 10%
Pineapple 0% 0% 100%
Soursop 92% 0% 8%
Sugarcane 0% 100% 0%
ASTC Intermediary Market
Banana   862
Sugar cane  22  
Coconut 500 271 250
Cassava 500 123 808
Pineapple   433
Acerola 600  500
Citrus 500  435
Soursop 1000  1025
Passion fruit 450  750
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Table 3.15 Households’ mobility and distance from the main road 
 
In settlements that are nearer to road, such as village B, households tend to have higher 
level of mobility that allows them to be engaged also in urban activities, namely related to 
tourism sector and construction industry. In more remote locations, such as those of village A 
and C, being impossible to commute every day from the settlement to urban area, households 
decide either to stay in the village working in family farming or in nearby sugar cane 
plantation or to leave the village for temporary cyclical migration periods. Many of the 
households for several consecutive years go to work from six to ten months in labor-intensive 
plantations.  
Households, engaged in family farming, either work for themselves or work for other 
households living in the village. Households employed in the nearby sugar cane industry, can 
be distinguished between “fichados” (legally registered) and “clandestinos” (informal 
workers). The first category commutes every day with sugar cane industry bus to the nearby 
sugar cane plantation. Many of these households beside their work in the plantation also work 
their plot, especially in the period that is not devoted to harvest of sugar cane, when they have 
minor workload in the plantation. The second category instead works in sugar cane industry 
just occasionally upon the necessity of bigger workload in the period of harvest. It is 
important to point out that those just represent a minor part of the households. 
People, that decide to migrate to work far from the village, mostly work in agro-
industries. Only in very few cases they are employed in the service sector in Brazilian capitals 
in the center-south of the country. The male head of the households or one of the male sons 
mostly composes this migrant labor force. This implies that I was able to interview the female 
head of the household that continues to reside with the children in the village. Working for 
some seasons in sugar cane or other labor-intensive agro-business is, especially for young 
men, a strategy to create some savings to be able to start a new family and then come back to 
the village. However there is a small group of households in village A that made of this cyclical 
migration a more stable livelihood strategy.  
Village A Village B Village C
Average number of times 
outside the village per year 54 106 61
Distance from the main 
road (km)
23 5 19
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3.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined the history of sugar plantations and its fundamental role in 
Northeast of Brazil in shaping labor organization, social meaning of land and patronage bonds 
between landlords and sugar cane workers. It then presented how social movements’ action 
mobilized this social context and how they built up households engagement, leading to the 
formation of these new rural entities: “agrarian reform settlements”. It also showed the 
elements of transformation that this policy allowed for.  
In addition it stressed the vulnerability of the agrarian reform settlements to the risk of 
creating no change but reproducing re-functionality of the pre-existent dependency 
structures. Very important in this respect, is the role that politics played in the creation of 
those settlements and the motivations that moved households to join the struggle for land. 
Fourth it specified the role of family farming. Fifth it focused on the municipality object of 
analysis, describing the history of village formation of the three settlements surveyed and on a 
sample of agrarian reform settlement. 
Social movements conceived the struggle for land as a combat against exclusion from 
many services such as education, health and housing (Severi 2012). However, it is possible to 
argue that it was a fight to place include farming in the Brazilian agricultural policy agenda. 
Adopting family farming as main livelihood strategy for agrarian reform settlers meant 
investing resources and being able to manage savings. These skills, for people that have no 
prior experience in family farming, are hard to achieve with no training and credit. The 
investment, provided by Brazilian government in technical assistance and extension services, 
in the area object of the analysis, did not used sufficient means to fill the gap of training and 
management skills that sugar cane cutters faced when approached family farming. I argue 
therefore the decision of households to work in family farming is also related to positive 
contagion among households with different professional backgrounds. 
In the section on family farming production in the villages, I have illustrated the 
differences among villages between use of the soil and crops production. The old crops are 
still those that occupy more soil. 
The analysis of the most widespread crops shows that new crops have higher value of 
commercialization but they are more risky crops. They need farmer technical competence 
that only very few farmers developed from their previous experience and they have specific 
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harvest seasons and high level of perishability. Therefore they require on the one hand a sure 
market and the other the ability to mobilize workforce during specific periods of cycle of 
production. 
The analysis of the two areas sampled shows that village A is the most productive 
settlement both in terms of area cultivated and value commercialized. Village A shows a 
prevalence of new crops towards old crops. Village B instead produces mostly old crops and it 
does not show relevant differences with neighbors. 
Village A produces the highest value of soursop and passion fruit. These crops constitute 
the core products for ASTC. Soursop requires a high quantity of labor force because of the 
process of bagging and the necessity to harvest all of the products in a very short time. 
Passion fruit requires very high initial investment (9000 reais per hectare) and it has a very 
short production cycle. Both need to be processed or sold shortly after harvest. The 
introduction of soursop and passion fruit induced a new demand of labor in the village. In the 
peaks of production cycle, it is necessary for farmers to have a higher number of workers that 
the household itself is not able to provide.  
The next chapter illustrates how important differences in the way in which households 
have been mobilized affected villages’ composition and villages’ social networks. 
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4. Formation of the villages and features of the social networks 
4.1 Introduction 
Two of the most important aspects of Brazilian agrarian reform are the mobilization of a 
large number of people and the creation of agrarian-reform-settlements (Wolford 2003).  
This research argues that the most innovative element of agrarian reform is not access to 
land per se but rather the possibility of the creation a more heterogeneous social space of 
professions and a new freedom in the use of time. As referred in chapter three, in the 
Northeast region of Brazil, there was not a pre-existing request of land by rural workers. 
Nevertheless in the early Nineties, economic and political conditions (especially sugar cane 
crisis) allowed social movements to mobilize a large number of people to occupy 
unproductive properties, pushing the government to expropriate the land (Sigaud 2004) .  
Family farming could become a way to promote bridges among households that 
otherwise will not be connected. In the assentamentos there is the opportunity to recreate 
new organizational forms based not anymore on a single landlord dependency but on a more 
plural system.  
The term family farming has been chosen to identify a different economic activity from 
previous plantation agricultural system. Households are the main production unit of farming 
activities in the villages. Family farming employment describes the working activities that one 
household carries for another household to support farming activity.   
The Brazilian state played a weak role in supporting family farming as a livelihood 
strategy. Therefore the decision of settlers to invest in family farming is the combination of 
settlers’ past experience, the ability to manage savings and of social influence among settlers.  
The theory that drives this research refers to social structure ability to adapt to change 
(Parkinson 2013b; Petersen 2001). The multiple networks that connect households’ define 
the social structure of assentamentos. Applying this theory to assentamentos’ response to 
agrarian reform and to the activities of a producers’ cooperative, the main argument is that 
the capacity of assentamentos to adapt to change, depends on the overlap between multiple 
social networks. For simplicity I will refer to assentamentos as villages in the text. 
Information has been collected on three networks: frequent contact network, kinship and 
family farming employment. Frequent contact network, which describes frequent meetings of 
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households in the village, is considered an approximation of how people interact in each of 
the three villages.  
The first hypothesis is that different histories of villages’ formation led to differences in 
ties’ generator mechanisms. Analyzing villages with different histories of creation, but of the 
same municipality and included in the same macro phenomena of agrarian reform, the 
analysis carried out with Exponential Random Graphs (Robins et al. 2007) aims at eliciting the 
presence of differences in the most significant social processes that generate frequent 
network formation. ERGMs allows testing if the presence of a link in the frequent contact 
network is influenced by the tendency of nodes to associate with others that have the same 
attributes (homophily). 
The second hypothesis is that the family-farming engagement has a role in fostering 
network formation and it is not non-redundant to other ties’ generator mechanisms. Main 
reasons why family farming has a bridging role is related both social and economic aspects. 
Households, having family farming as main livelihood strategy, are more likely to form ties in 
the frequent contact network. Family-farming employment creates non-overlapping ties 
between households. Households that produce more crops need to hire more labor and they 
tend to hire households with whom they have no other ties or share few or no common 
attributes. The presence of a tie in the frequent contact network is influenced by the presence 
of a tie in the other two networks collected (family farming employment and kinship).  
To test such hypotheses a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analysis will 
be adopted. The description of villages’ histories allows showing how actions taken by 
different organizations (described in chapter 3), which mobilized people, varied in the crucial 
moments of village creation, namely households’ recruitment and villages’ early organization. 
The chapter is organized in seven sections. After this introduction, section 4.2 provides a 
brief description of the research question explaining why social network structure plays such 
a crucial role.  Section 4.3 explains data transformation before the analysis. Section 4.4 
presents the hypotheses. Section 4.5 describes the model specification to test the hypotheses. 
Section 4.6 presents the results that allow inferring how different histories of villages 
contributed in creating different social mechanisms behind network formation. Section 4.7 
draws some concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Villages’ formation and the importance of social networks 
Projetos de Assentamentos, are new villages that emerge from expropriated unproductive 
farms of sugar cane plantations. Starting from the desegregation of an highly hierarchical 
society of sugar cane plantation (engenho/ fazenda) there is the opportunity to recreate new 
organizational forms based not anymore on a single landlord dependency but on a more 
plural system where family farming employment could become the new form of patronage. 
The major changes for villagers in assentamentos are access to means of production, a 
new freedom in the use of time and of land (Manuel Correa de Andrade 2001), lack of highly 
strong controlling systems, possibility to stay for long period in the same place, which was 
never possible for people that lived in engenho as workers without contract (clandestinos) and 
the possibility to confront with people with different biographical histories. 
Assentamentos can be considered quasi-natural experiments in terms of village 
composition and network formation as they include both old and new settlers; moreover 
family farming supported by a producers’ cooperative is an innovation for the context.  
The presence of relevant number of new villagers, which did not arrive through the usual 
pattern such as kinship or work opportunity, raises the question of how new and old villagers 
connect and what make households communicate.  
The co-presence in the same village of old and new settlers does implies neither 
interaction nor peaceful co-existence, especially because the two groups have very different 
features. The creation of assentamentos creation in the framework of the agrarian reform does 
not mean that their main economic activity is family farming. As a result to understand if 
these villages differ in their organization of labor from previous sugar cane plantations it is 
crucial to focus the analysis on social networks for two main reasons.  
Households, that were living in the villages before agrarian reform, and households, 
which were mobilized by social movements, differ in three main dimensions: previous 
professional experience (Table 4.1) level of education (Table 4.2), and kinship system.  
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 4.1 Employment status: old settlers and first comers before agrarian reform 
 
Old settlers, that in the sample analyzed, were mostly working in sugar cane industry as 
waged workers and mostly had a low level of education. Both during the interviews carried 
out in this research and in the life histories collected by other researchers (Severi 2012), it 
appears clearly that continuing migration and need to work to get money for the family are 
two very important factors that prevented children from regular attendance to school.  
Table 4.2 Years of school attendance: old settlers versus first comers  
 
Rural workers employed in sugar cane sector and households with tradition in family farming 
have different kinship systems. The former tend to have more fluid kinship systems having 
higher mobility patterns and high level of financial instability. Kinship ties, namely marital 
unions, very seldom formalized into marriage contracts, have shorter duration and very 
rarely children, in adult age, stay with the household. Most commonly, they start early the 
work life as waged labor force and are often employed as migrant labor force either in sugar 
cane or other high labor intensive agro-industries. Instead, households that have a longer 
family farming tradition tend have smaller mobility patterns and larger families and longer 
marital relationships. The contamination between the two systems of kinship is certainly an 
interesting laboratory that the agrarian reform can allow for. 
It was not possible for Brazilian government to provide settlers with a significant and 
extensive over time technical assistance to promote family farming, given the mobilization of 
a large number of people and the creation of a large number of settlements in a short period 
Old settlers 
(%)
First comers 
(%)
Old settlers 
(%)
First comers 
(%)
Old settlers 
(%)
First comers 
(%)
Autonomous 8 43 0 30 0 8
Employee 75 48 80 57 93 92
Mixed 8 7 20 13 0 0
Retied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unemployed 8 2 0 0 7 0
Absolute value 12 42 5 23 15 12
Village A Village B Village C
  Village A Village B Village C 
  Old settlers (%) 
First comers 
(%) 
Old settlers 
(%) 
First comers (%) 
Old settlers 
(%) 
First comers 
(%) 
0 33 21 60 17 13 17 
1-3 33 45 40 22 60 33 
3-5 25 19 0 13 13 42 
>5 8 14 0 48 13 8 
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of time. There were in fact specific funds and projects designed by National Institute for 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) but their action was short and, not tailored to 
villagers’ needs. According to key informants, the selection of projects to be implemented was 
decided at village level, sometimes even at municipal level, not taking into consideration 
skills, aspirations and specific characteristics of single farmers’ plots. The presence of a short 
and not very personalized technical assistance for farmers was therefore not able to 
compensate for the different level of settlers’ experience in family farming and different level 
of previous capital assets that could allow households to invest in family farming. The 
decision of settlers to invest in family farming is the result of the combination between past 
settlers’ experience in family farming, the ability to manage savings and social influence 
among settlers, higher when there is non-redundant interaction between households..  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Data  
Data were collected with household survey conducted in the municipality studied, in 
three agrarian reform settlements selected out of the 18 existing in the municipality (INCRA 
2012a), (INCRA 2012b). The methodology for data collection is described in chapter two. 
The criteria to select villages, more extensively described in chapter two, were: 1) 
difference in villages’ history namely social movement recruiting households to occupy the 
land, 2) percentage of households’ members of the cooperative and 3) household average 
income from sell of products to cooperative. The aim of this sampling strategy is that different 
village creation rules led to different households’ features and network formation patterns. 
This sampling strategy that combines features of both purposive and probabilistic sampling is 
called mixed-multi stage sampling (Teddlie and Yu 2007) (Table 4.3).  
For each village households’ heads of permanent residents have been interviewed 
collecting both attributes and social, economic and kinship ties among them. The number of 
households per village is respectively 102 in village A, 38 in village B and 37 in village C. They 
represent all households permanently living in village A and B and 95% of those living in 
village C. The total number of household living in each settlement does not reflect the number 
plots registered at INCRA: more than one household live on one plot and some households has 
more than one. 
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Table 4.3 Villages’ main features 
 
 
Network data transformation  
Frequent contact network and family farming employment were collected as directed 
networks (O’Malley and Marsden 2008). It is in fact possible that if A nominates B the 
opposite will not occur. Kinship and spatial contiguity are instead by definition undirected. 
For none of the networks studied it was decided to consider direction of ties but rather to 
symmetrize all of them because the most crucial aspect of the analysis is the presence or 
absence of a tie and not presence or lack of reciprocity. Analyzing the case of each network it 
be will provided an explanation of why it was followed such transformation strategy. 
Family farming employment networks include two types of ties that in principle are the 
transpose one of the other: households that hire (“hire”) and households being hired (“work 
for”). However, it was decided to keep the two network separated as they are considered to be 
more informative being separated rather than being joined. The “work for” network in fact by 
placing at the center of the network households that hire more households provide an 
interesting picture of households’ leadership in the village. The “hire network” instead does 
not allow giving relevant insights on village distribution of power but it is important to 
confront it with the other. It is important to show that, only in village A, there is just one single 
household that hire and is hired by another. This information shows that hiring or working 
for others refer to two different statuses rather than to a form of exchange. Households that 
hire are households that produce more or focus on more labor intensive crops, while 
households that work for others are people that work as employee for others either as main 
livelihood strategy or complementary income. In family farming employment network 
direction was not considered to be very informative. In fact the presence of an unreciprocated 
tie might not be connected to lack of transitivity but rather to a cognitive bias. Namely if 
employee would tend to remember all of their employers because of substantive value of this 
Settlement 
name
Year of 
creation
Settlement 
area (ha)
# Plots
Total 
population
% Coop 
members
Income 
from coop 
(R$)
Members 
contribution to 
total coop 
production (%)
Name of social 
movement
Village A 1998 690 100 437 28 10478 66.0 Private association
Village B 1997 445 38 285 24 119 0.6 MST
Village C 2005 453 42 279 5 1337 0.3
Commissão 
Pastoral da Terra 
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tie, employer could only remember the last people he employed and therefore the last ties he 
had. A possible comparison with a similar case refers to student-professor relationship: 
professors might remember the last students that graduated with him or her while students 
are more likely to remember a higher number of professors that taught them.  
Frequent contact network describes behavioral ties that have some common elements 
with friendship. This network is not referred as friendship because of the ambiguity of the 
term and cross-cultural variability of the meaning. The choice not to consider the presence of 
mutuality but the mere presence or absence of ties, on the one hand is prone to criticism as it 
creates a loss of information, on the other hand it reflects the absence of a theory that is able 
to consistently explain the presence of such important asymmetries in villages. The reason for 
such asymmetry can also be simple cognitive bias. It is important to notice that in village B 
where there is the highest asymmetry beside a small group that is closely connected, the 
networks tend to be quite sparse. Furthermore considering only mutual ties as in some 
analysis on friendship networks (Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock 2008) would have meant 
modeling an extremely sparse network.  Such choice is consistent with the literature. A recent 
similar study also did not consider direction of ties. This study explored network variability 
across villages only focusing on the presence or absence of a link among households in the 
networks observed (Entwisle et al. 2007).  
In the analysis the most relevant aspect to be captured is the presence of frequent 
meetings among households as they describe the pattern of interaction in the village. It is 
possible to argue that the influence that one household exerts on the other is higher when 
both households in the dyad declare the presence of a tie. This aspect would have been 
relevant if this network would be an input for auto-correlation models that aim at explaining 
households’ behavior by social influence. In this case the outcome variable is the presence of 
the presence of ties, this can be considered not to be a crucial aspect. Lastly, using a simple 
analysis based on color-coding of nodes on attributes, it was not possible to identify a specific 
pattern that differentiates mutual dyads from the rest.  
In the models presented later in the chapter all of networks will be considered as 
undirected. The symmetrization of ties has been based on weak rule therefore it was added a 
tie when at least one of the two nominates the other (Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4 Network data as collected  
  Village A   Village B   Village C   
  Mutual Asymmetric Mutual Asymmetric Mutual Asymmetric 
Kinship 253 0 26 0 13 17 
Contact 34 139 4 76 12 55 
Work for 1 71 0 17 0 14 
Hire 1 65 0 19 0 11 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
Chapter three has illustrated the histories of the three villages and how they differ in the 
crucial moments namely households’ recruitment, early organization of the settlement and 
leadership in the village. 
The villages can be defined as organizations. The unit of analysis is the household and 
they are the nodes in the network. A network describes the social relationships (such as 
friendship) among nodes. Multiple networks that connect households in each village define 
villages’ structure. Nodes have socio-economic characteristics, such as gender, income, status, 
that are defined as attributes. 
Social movements had different strategies to recruit households. As a result, at the time of 
creation, some villages were composed by a larger number of experienced farmers than 
others. Recruitment patterns and early villages’ organization influenced network variability 
across villages in terms of: 1) kinship networks’ overall features, 2) tie generator mechanisms 
in frequent contact network, 3) overlapping among tie’s generator mechanisms in frequent 
contact network, 4) presence of marriages between households of different geographical 
origins.  
The use ERGMs aims first at identifying what are the node attributes that create 
homophily effects in the frequent contact network and whether the presence of ties in the 
other two networks collected has an effect on the presence of tie in the observed network, 
second at showing which node attributes creating homophily effect are non-redundant by 
inserting all of the variables together, third at testing for homophily effects controlling for 
closure and transitivity. 
Section 4.6 of this chapter tests whether differences in villages’ histories and network 
topologies are reflected in different social processes and local structures that trigger frequent 
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contact network formation. Specifically it aims at identifying what are the common attributes 
or common edges that increase the probability of a link in the frequent contact network. It 
was decided to focus on this specific network because it can be considered as a behavioral 
network that is result of constitutive social networks such as kinship and agricultural 
employment. 
4.3.3 Selection of predictors for model specification 
 
The hypotheses on the presence of structural differences between frequent contact network 
in the three villages are tested with exponential-family random graph model (ERGMs) (Robins 
et al. 2007), described in chapter two. ERGMs generate networks that match the observed 
network with respect to local the configurations, also referred as local forces, network 
statistics or effects, (D. McFarland et al. 2010) that are specified in the model. 
The outcome variable is the presence of a tie in the frequent contact network.  
The predictors are five “network statistics” or “network configurations” that describe 
social mechanisms that are likely to increase the probability of a tie in the network. First, 
edges, which is the most basic term embedded in the model, and that accounts the overall 
tendency to create or refrain from building ties that is the intercept of the model. Second, 
homophily, which is the prevalence of ties between nodes that share similar characteristics. 
Third, edge covariance that describes the effect of the presence of a tie in another network on 
the network observed. Fourth, clustering, which is prevalence of ties between nodes that 
already share ties in common. Fifth, centralization, which that is tendency of nodes to form 
links with nodes that have high number of ties.  
The outcome variable in ERGMs is the presence of a tie in the network. Network 
predictors used in ERGMs, also referred as network statistics or local configurations, can be 
classified into exogenous and endogenous. Using exogenous network configuration such as 
homophily edge covariance the normal logic of logistic regression holds. Instead using 
endogenous network configuration such as transitivity, centrality and edges, the presence of 
ties is predicted by the presence of other ties in the network. Because of these dependencies 
structures ERGMs are different from other regression analysis. ERGMs aim at testing if some 
structural configurations are prevalent in the network. The interpretation of parameters that 
147 
 
describe the presence of some network configuration cannot be the same used for standard 
logistic regression results.  (Robins, Lewis, and Wang 2012) 
After identified what are node attributes and network co-occurrence have an effect on tie 
formation, the model controls for effects that go beyond dyadic level. The model is specified 
with three structural terms: geometrically weighted degree that is one degree distribution 
effect, geometrically weighted edge wise shared partners and dyad wise shared partners that 
are shared partner distribution effect that capture the presence of closure. 
Among all characteristics that describe households the model tests the ones that are 
considered most likely to create homophilous effects. In the literature nodes’ attributes that 
are likely to create homophily effects are similar livelihood strategy, participation to the same 
events, common background and similar status. (A. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a; 
Arcand and Fafchamps 2012). 
In this study the nodes’ attributes which can create homophily effects are classified in six 
typologies: 1) settlers' attributes from the past, 2) villages’ formation attributes, 3) social 
activities in the village, 4) economic activities in the village, 5) hierarchy indicators, 6) 
activities outside the village and 7) covariate networks.  
Settlers' attributes from the past comprise the origin of settlers, i.e. the place where the 
household lived immediately before the agrarian reform, and previous employment sector 
before agrarian reform. 
Villages’ formation attributes describe migration wave in which the household has 
arrived and permit the classification of households according to the person or organization 
(contact) that informed about the possibility to have access to the land. The village 
composition observed in 2012 is the result of the combination of several migration waves of 
households that arrived in the villages, as described in chapter 3. 
Social activities in the village comprise participation in the same religious congregations, 
membership in village football team and membership in village association. For what concern 
religious congregation in village A there are two evangelical and one catholic congregations, 
and in villages B and C one catholic and one evangelical congregation. 
Economic activities in the village comprises a dichotomous variable that describe family 
farming as main livelihood strategy, household participation in cooperative activities in terms 
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of production sold to the cooperative during the year previous to survey and of average 
amount of products sold to the cooperative since households’ membership in the cooperative 
and current sector of employment. 
Hierarchy indicators comprise a variable that indicates the number of households hired 
for agricultural activities, a variable number of households for which they work for and an 
indicator variable that shows whether a member of the household had an office in the village 
since village creation.  
Activities outside the village comprise participation in political parades and production 
sold in the same market. 
Covariate networks are kinship and agricultural employment. The hypothesis that I would 
like to test is whether the presence of a tie in these other two network has an effect on the 
presence of a tie in the frequent contact network which is the outcome variable. 
4.4 Villages’ histories and early organizations’ effects on networks’ features 
Movimento Sem Terra, Comissão Pastoral da Terra and Geremias’ association differ in 
criteria to recruit and mobilize households, in the rule to define households who can have 
access to land after a period of occupation, in the organization of activities in the period of 
encampment, in the spatial organization of the settlement and in political representation of 
settlers and ability to negotiate with local and national authorities and in the way in which 
access to land was negotiated (expropriation versus acquisition).  
The argument is that the above mentioned differences in villages’ local histories, more 
extensively described in chapter three, influenced four dimensions: first the number of 
households with previous experience with family farming (Table 4.5), second percentage of 
old and new settlers (Table 4.6), third the overall features of kinship networks (Table 4.7) and 
fourth number of marriages between villagers of different geographical origins (Table 4.8).  
Marriage between settlers with different geographical origins define weddings between 
two individuals that are either children of first settlers with different geographical origins or 
children of first settlers and old settler; or between two individuals that came separately from 
different locations to join village encampment, either alone or with their parents, and got 
married in the village. 
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Table 4.5 Households’ livelihood strategies by village 
 
Table 4.6 Comparison between old and new settlers 
 
Table  4.7 Kinship network overall features 
  Village A Village B Village C 
Density 0.047 0.024 0.045 
Isolates  12% 50% 19% 
Average degree19 4.71 1.36 1.62 
 
Table 4.8 Marriage between settlers with different geographical origins 
  Villag A Village B Village C 
Number of marriages between people with 
different origin 
12 1 2 
Percentage of marriages between people with 
different origin 
12% 3% 5% 
 
                                                        
19 The degree in an undirected network measures the number of alters with whom ego is connected. The 
average degree is the mean of the number of ties that each ego has. 
 
Sugar cane 32 7 37 0 68 11
Official of 
sugar cane
3 0 3 0 3 0
Third sector 32 1 16 8 14 0
Agriculture 8 49 21 45 5 24
Municipality 
and others
2 9 8 11 3 3
Mixed 
livelihoods
6 25 13 32 0 41
Other 17 9 5 5 8 22
Village C - at 
survey (%)
Village A – 
before (%)
Village A – at 
survey (%)
Village B – 
before (%)
Village B - at 
survey (%)
Village C – 
before (%)
Migration 
wave
Village A (%) Village B (%) Village C (%)
Old settlers 12 13 41
New settlers 88 87 59
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The next paragraphs briefly summarize the histories of the three villages. A sequence of 
social networks visualization, produced with the software UCINET (Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. 
and Freeman, L.C 2002), shows differences in kinship networks’ topology among the three 
villages and different number of marriages between people of different geographical origin of 
settlers. Households represent nodes and they are color coded according to the different 
origins of settlers. The kinship network in village A is polycentric while village B and C have 
sparser network. 
 
Village A 
In village A the charismatic leader of a private association (Geremias), that led the process 
of encampment and expropriation of the land, recruited a large portion of households that live 
in the village. Most of these households were members of an association that was based in the 
south of Alagoas. The association allowed more time for households’ recruitment process. The 
result of this recruitment pattern is shown by a higher number of households that already had 
with experience in family farming (32%) and by the presence of households that already 
knew each other before encampment for almost two years.  
At the moment of settlement establishment Geremias, who became the first president of 
the settlement, declared the settlement collective. This allowed him to prevent to send away 
households that were exceeding the number of plots indicated by INCRA. There were no rules 
limiting the number of households connected by kinship and there is in fact low percentage of 
isolates in kinship network (12%).  
During the period of encampment and early period of settlement composition several 
collective activities were organized in the village. This latter element probably favored the 
creation of more marriages among different groups both among old settlers and new settlers 
and also among new settlers of different origins. There are in fact in the village 12 marriages 
across different groups (where geographical origin defines groups).  
In terms of settlers’ origin four are the main geographical areas: 1) the village itself (old 
settlers) colored in blue, 2) neighboring “fazendas” and “sitios” colored in light blue, light 
green and pink, 3) Agreste alagoano where Geremias’ association was based colored in red, 
grey and purple, 4) Junqueiro where Severino group was mostly recruited colored in black. 
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The remaining geographical origins codified as other were colored in dark green. Mixed 
marriages across origins are colored in yellow. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the network of kinship colored by origin. It is important to notice 
two large components: one clan and one polycentric structure. The former is composed by an 
old settler (id. 72) that contacted several of his relatives to live in the village and latter is 
composed by a combination of old and new settlers. 
 
Figure 4.1 Village A kinship network: nodes colored by origin 
 
Figure 4.2, is the network representation of an affiliation matrix, where the rows represent 
the household and the columns geographical origin of husband and wife. The graph shows 
that in total, in this village there are twelve marriages between people of different 
geographical origin, among which four of them are marriages between old settlers and new 
settlers.  The twelve marriages are the twelve nodes colored in yellow that connect the 
different groups defined by common origin. 
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Figure 4.2 Village A network representation of settlers’ origin 
 
Village B 
Village B was created by Movimento Sem Terra that defined a maximum number of 
households linked by kinship that could live in the same village. The observed kinship 
network is quite sparse, being only 50% of households connected by kinship ties. Only a very 
small number of households already knew each other before the process of encampment. MST 
activists calling people to occupy had in fact short time gather people and therefore collected 
households with very different work experience. Mostly they were employed in the sugarcane 
sector (37%) and only 21% were already living of family farming.  
Most of the people got to know each other during the period of encampment. Many 
households have been literally socialized by politics: most of activities promoted by MST were 
especially participation to demonstrations, occupation and other forms of protest to make 
pressure on the government to expropriate the land. Furthermore at the moment of land 
division in plots when MST indicated households that could have access to land, participation 
in political parades was an important criterion.  
Figure 4.3 shows that households permanently living in the village can be classified in 
four main groups according to their origin. Five old settlers that were living village B before 
the agrarian reform are colored in light green. The eleven households mainly coming from 
Porto Calvo being mainly recruited by an MST activist are colored in red. Seven households, 
which came from another encampment in Atalaia region, are colored in blue. Two households 
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that were workers for the sugar cane factory in the closest town are colored in black. Four 
households coming from Maceio are colored in dark green. Households that have other 
geographical origin are colored in pink. The only household which marriage is classified as 
mixed across origin is colored in yellow. 
 
Figure 4.3 Village B kinship network: nodes colored by origin 
 
 
Figure 4.4, the network representation of an affiliation matrix defined by villagers’ 
geographical origin, shows that in this village there is only one marriage between two people 
from the same migration wave but from different origin, namely one person recruited by MST 
activist coming from Porto Calvo and another that was part of Atalaia group. Instead there are 
no marriages between old settlers and new settlers. 
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Figure 4.4 Network representation of settlers’ origin 
 
 
Village C 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra created village C, differently from the previous two 
settlements, the land has not been expropriated after a process of occupation but instead it 
has been bought by INCRA.  
There are a larger number of households that were already living in the village (27%) or 
in the immediate neighboring area that arrived there as soon as they received information by 
their relatives that it was possible to get access to the land. 
Most of the new settlers did not shared a common history of occupation but rather INCRA 
with the intermediation of Comissão Pastoral da Terra called households that already had 
experience of struggle in different settlements across the state of Alagoas. A small group of 
three households have already been occupying in other settlements for over six years. 
This situation is represented by figure 4.5 that shows the presence of a larger group 
mostly composed by old settlers colored in red and few new settlers connected by kinship 
ties. The presence of different colors, representing different origins, of nodes being part of the 
larger clan is due to the fact old settlers called their relatives to join them in the village. 
The main geographical origin of households living in the village are: 1) the village itself 
(old settlers) colored in red, 2) neighboring “fazendas” colored in pink, 3) Maceio colored in 
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dark green, 4) Porto Calvo colored in light grey, 5) Messias colored in black, 6) Porto Pedras 
colored in light green, 7) Jacuipe colored in light blue.  Households that have other origins are 
colored in dark blue and marriages mixed across origins are colored in yellow.  
 
Figure 4.5 Village C kinship network: nodes colored by origin 
 
 
Figure 4.6 is the network representation of the affiliation matrix defined by villagers’ 
geographical origin. It shows that there are only two mixed marriages: one between one of the 
coordinators of the villages in its early phases of creation and the daughter from one family 
part of the largest clan of old settlers and one between the children of old settler and new 
settler are neighbors.  
The first marriage we can consider that as a form of co-optation. This marriage was in fact 
between the first coordinator of the village appointed by CPT and the daughter of one of the 
families of the larger clan. 
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Figure 4.6 Network representation of settlers’ origin 
 
 
4.4.1 Why more mixed marriages across origin in village A? 
 
In village A there is, among villages studied, the highest number of marriages across 
origin, being in total 12. By analyzing the geographical location of these couples, in relation to 
their families of origin, it is possible to observe that most of them are neighbors. These 
marriages therefore can be considered as the result of what anthropologists call casamentos 
em casa (Nogueira 2013) or marriages between neighbors. 
“Casamentos em casa” join relatives and neighbors in a sort of “extended family”, where 
those that connected by kinship among them, confirm their belonging to the family and to the 
family’s land, and people from outside are integrated, reaching the point where it is 
impossible to think about a real division between relatives and not relatives, between those of 
the family and those from outside. The matrimonial practice is an important and ancient 
strategy of reproduction in peasant families, preserving the direct relation with the 
perpetration of group domination (land inheritance) over the land, the major heritage for 
these families (Bourdieu, 2004; Garcia Júnior, 1983; Godoi, 1998, 1999; Moura, 1978; 
Woortmann, E.,1995; Woortmann, K., 2009). According to Bourdieu (2004), peasants’ 
marriages have as primary function to guarantee the continuity of a family, without 
compromising the integrity of its heritage. In this sense, a reproduction/ conservation of the 
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integrity of peasant heritage which is destined to “preserve the kin unity and the circuits of 
reciprocity that in her and for her are active, as well as the moral conception of relationship 
with the land  (Woortmann, E.,1995, p. 225)” (Nogueira 2013, 253). 
Couples married across different origins are in fact mostly the children of old settlers 
(“moradores do engenho”) that married with new settlers. It can be argued that is not by 
chance the fact that many of these marriages involve old settlers as they were often 
moradores, a high position in the sugar cane plantation very hierarchical society (Sigaud 
2008). The access to a small piece of land by the senhor do engenho represented a privilege in 
respect to the rest of people living in the fazenda. Until the 1962 in fact sugar cane workers 
had no labor right: there was no minimum salary and the payment was the result of the 
negotiation with the landlord. The possibility to use such piece of land represents in fact a 
very precious resource and an important element of distinction from the other households 
living in the fazendas (Guilhoto et al. 2007, 210).  
Many of these marriages joined physically contiguous plots that sum up to a larger 
portion of land. Most probably the main motivation is therefore to increase family land 
property.  However the question is why this strategy was implemented mostly in village A and 
not in the other villages. The argument proposed is that more mixed marriages are the result 
of the combination of three main factors: more work opportunities inside the village, co-
presence in the same living space between old and new settlers, more remote location of 
village A in respect to the other two villages.  
In village A many young people, specifically the children of old settlers and new settlers, 
did not leave the village permanently. The presence of large family farmers represents in fact 
a work opportunity mainly for young male adults. Several young men engage in what is 
referred as “pre-marriage migration” but then they come back home to create new 
households. “Pre-marriage migration” has both a practical and symbolic meaning as it allows 
on the one hand to build some savings to start their adult life and on the other it is a rite that 
establishes the transition from boy to man (Guilhoto et al. 2007, 219). In the early phases of 
household creation several young males are involved temporary activities both in family 
farming employment working for some of the large producers in the village or in sugar cane 
plantation as causal labor force only in the peaks of the season (clandestinos).  
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Furthermore in village there is no physical division between old and new settlers as in 
village B. In village B, where the settlement creation process was driven by MST, the old 
settlers were the only that could have their house on the plot, while this was not possible for 
new settlers, apart from two exceptions. A side effect of this is a physical segregation between 
the two groups: old settlers in the plot and new settlers in the agrovila. Instead in village A, 
where no social movement led the settlement creation, Geremias’ leadership prevented 
INCRA from sending away exceeding families and allowed all households to build their house 
on their plot. In addition the activities developed in early years of village creation favored 
more cohesion between old and new settlers. While in village B the main activities were 
participation to political parades instead in village A several activities inside the village were 
organized. 
In village A the physical distance from the main road limits the mobility of villagers given 
the difficulties of access to the village. This imply that for young people, after they finish the 
school, the main space of social interaction is the village and this is where they are most likely 
to find their spouse. It is interesting, however, to make a comparison between village A and C 
in respect to villagers’ marriage behavior as they share similar distance from the road but 
where there are differences in the marriage behavior. In village B very few young people stay 
in the village in adult age. In contrast in village C there are more young adults but they tend 
not marry people living in the village but people that have different geographical origin 
4.5 Different ties’ generator mechanisms of frequent contact network  
The three frequent contact networks have a small number of isolates20 and similar average 
degree21 (Table 4.9) but they present different local structures (Figures 4.8, 4.9, 4.10).  
Table 4.9 Frequent contact network overall features 
  Village A Village B Village C 
Density 0.034 0.114 0.101 
Isolates  2% 5% 0% 
Average degree 3.39 4.21 3.6 
 
                                                        
20 Isolates are nodes with no-connections. 
21 The degree, in an undirected network, measures the number of alters with whom ego is connected. The 
average degree is the mean of the number of ties that each ego has. 
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The nodes (Figure 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9) are colored with the attributes that are more important in 
determining the link between households in the frequent contact network. 
The network of village A is the most interconnected being difficult to separate single 
cliques, except at the periphery of the network (Figure 4.8). In village B and C instead it is 
easier to identify cliques. This means that in village A, besides being homophily on origin an 
important effect, this does not create segregation. 
 
Figure 4.7 Village A contact network colored by origin 
 
 
In village B there is a dense group where all households are connected to each other while the 
rest of households are only connected by a smaller number of ties (Figure 4.8). Households, 
that arrived together at very beginning of encampment process and that are currently living 
in the same road, compose the mostly densely connected group. 
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Figure 4.8 Village B contact network colored by wave 
 
 
In village C the contact network is sparser and there are few brokering nodes between the 
more dense groups that can be identified in the network (Figure 4.9). 
 
Figure 4.9 Village C contact network colored by kinship 
 
161 
 
4.5.1 Model specification 
The overall hypothesis that is tested in this sub-section is that the three observed 
frequent contact networks of the three villages are based on different social processes are the 
result of different villages’ histories.  
Two main important elements differentiate villages’ histories. The role of kinship, as in 
village B, MST defined a specific number of households that could be linked by kinship in the 
same settlement, and while in the two other villages there were not such limitations. The 
presence of different shared attributes that are ties-generator mechanisms and that are 
derived from different recruitment patterns.  
The main possible reasons for establishing contacts that are considered in this analysis 
are the following: kinship, geographical origin, being arrived during the same migration wave, 
attending the same church, and going to the same political parade. In villages B and C, 
villagers had no time to get to know each other before occupation as MST and CPT were 
extremely fast in the process of mobilizing people; by contrast, the association organizing 
people in village A allowed for better knowledge of people before occupation.  
For each village, I estimate a model that analyzes the effects of particular network 
configurations on the presence of ties in the frequent contact network among households:  
 
   Pr  (!"# = 1|) = log  ()  (!"# = 1|) =  ()  ()  (!"# = 1|) ()  (!"# = 0|)
= "# + ,,"# + --"# + ."#   
 
The dependent variable is the probability of a new tie occurring in the network. The 
predictors are three vectors of network configurations zn: sociability (edges22), uniform 
homophily (nodematch23), and edge covariance (edgecov24). In ERGMs the coefficients 
represent the effect of each network configuration on the log odds of a new tie occurring25.  
                                                        
22 edges command in Rstatnet 
23 nodematch command in Rstatnet 
24 edgecov command in Rstatnet 
25 In order to estimate the effect of the network statistic specified in the model on the odds of a new tie occurring 
it is necessary to take the exponent of the coefficient of the parameter. 
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Three steps have been followed in order to identify the presence of different tie generator 
mechanisms namely homophily on node attributes and edge covariates. Moreover this 
procedure allows to identify is family farming is a tie generator mechanism. Each model is 
estimated separately for each village.  
Several bivariate models that have as predictors in the model (network configurations) 
are edges plus the effects described above. The aim of this model specification is to 
understand what network configurations have an effect when inputted alone and to identify 
the direction and size of each effect singularly.  
Multivariate full models with all the network statistics whose effects have been tested in 
single bivariate models. The hypothesis is that some network statistics are redundant with 
respect to others. This model allows identifying the most important network configurations. 
The full model estimates’ results show that the most important network configurations are 
edge covariance on kinship and homophily on origin and migration wave.  
A stepwise procedure has been followed to test if the development of family farming 
activities in the villages created new network configurations that in turn generated new ties 
that are non-redundant to the preexisting ones. The first model includes one history-related 
network configuration (wave homophily and origin homophily) and kinship edge covariance. 
The second model includes also the predictor edge covariance on family farming employment 
to the model. The third model includes as predictors in addition engagement in family farming 
homophily effect. Lastly, the fourth and fifth model include additional structural effects such 
as geometrically weighted degree, geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners, 
geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners to increase the fit of the model and to 
control respectively for tendency towards centralization and clustering effect.  
4.5.2 Bivariate models results 
 
Table 4.10 reports the results from the bivariate models and shows the coefficients, 
standard errors, and levels of significance of all network statistics specified in the model. For 
significant parameters the odds ratio have been included in order to make clearer which 
parameter has the strongest effect.  
The table 4.10 does not show the effect of edges for each of the bivariate models, as they 
are all significant and negative. The negative sign of the edges parameter means that there is 
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an overall tendency to refrain from building ties. The frequent contact networks of the three 
villages have in fact a low density. The decision to show only homophily effects’ and edge 
covariance effects’ estimates allows visualizing the comparison among the different villages.  
The similarities that households can share have been classified in six typologies of 
characteristics: 1) settlers' attributes from the past, 2) villages’ formation attributes, 3) social 
activities in the village, 4) hierarchy indicators, 5) activities outside the village and 6) 
covariate networks. 
Table 4.10 confirms that sharing common geographical origin is a tie generator 
mechanism in village A, where many households had the opportunity to get to know each 
other before taking part in the mobilization, while this is not the case in village B and C where 
fewer people knew each other before coming to the village. In village B households that 
arrived during the same migration wave are more likely to be in connected in the frequent 
contact network. In village C instead there are no network statistics that describe settlers’ 
attributes from the past nor villages’ formation attributes that have an homophily effect in the 
observed network. As illustrated in chapter three, in village C there was not a specific rule 
based on households collected attributes that has driven the process of village creation. As 
results settlers were very heterogeneous in their characteristics at the moment of settlement 
creation. 
The comparison of the total number of significant parameters across villages shows that 
village A has a larger number of network statistics that are significant: in total ten homophily 
effects and three edge covariance effects. Village B and village C have a smaller number of 
parameters that are significant being respectively seven and nine. In village C three out of 
nine parameters are edge covariates. In village C households are more likely to have frequent 
contact when they have another type of relation than when they share similar characteristics 
(homophily). 
The results of the model show the presence of several differences across villages in 
significant networks configuration. In village A there is plurality of significant network 
configurations that refer to all of the categories of attributes referred. In contrast in the other 
two villages these homophily effects are not significant. In village B and C significant 
homophily effects refer to participation in social and economic activities in the village. 
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In village A the significance of variables referring to settlers’ attributes from the past can 
be interpreted as a confirmation of qualitative analysis of the village’s history. The parameter 
shows that many households already knew each other before getting to the village. The 
statistics “contact to get to the village” and “previous employment before” are positive and 
significant. Especially members of Geremias’ association have been meeting for almost two 
years before reaching the village. Furthermore in village A also common attendance in the 
same village church has an effect is a tie generator mechanism. This network statistic 
measures the number of times that households attend the church activities per year. In village 
A there are two evangelical congregations and one catholic congregation. Evangelical church 1 
is the oldest congregation that started its activities when the settlement was created. It is 
located in the main square of the villages where also the Catholic Church is located. It is a 
larger church in terms of members. Instead evangelical church 2 is a smaller congregation 
where many of the affiliates are also connected by kinship ties. It is also the only church that 
has not a building in cement but that it is a hut.  
In village B there are few significant effects and most of refer to migration patterns in the 
village while no households’ characteristics from the past are significant. Participation to 
strikes and protest acts represented during village creation process an important factor of 
socialization between households. Both participation to the same political parade and village 
president are significant homophily effects. The other significant homophily effects describe 
activities inside the village, which are a female association and having sold the same value to 
the cooperative. These activities however are related, as many of the members of the female 
association are also cooperative’s members. 
In village C the two only positive and significant homophily effects describe common 
activities inside the village namely participation in village football team and in the catholic 
congregation. All other significant homophily effects have negative signs meaning that sharing 
those characteristics hampers the creation of new ties. Furthermore sharing other common 
ties is an important mechanism that predicts the probability of a tie in frequent meeting 
network. 
In both village B and C the predictors that describe households’ engagement in 
cooperatives’ activities (value sold to coop in 2011 and average production sold to the 
cooperative 2007-2012) are significant parameters. However, the negative sign of the 
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coefficients indicate that this is probably an indicator of hierarchy rather an indicator of 
equality. The majority of villagers do not belong to the cooperative therefore this negative 
sign is mostly capturing how the non-participation to the cooperative influence the 
probability of a tie. 
The only effect that is significant in all three villages is being engaged in family farming in 
2012. This network statistic portrays the higher probability of households to be frequently 
meeting when they share family farming as livelihood. However while in village A and B 
family farming has positive coefficient, in village C the coefficient is negative. In village C the 
coefficient of the parameter of edge covariance in family farming has a positive sign; it can be 
interpreted as the presence of more interaction related to a hierarchical process such as 
working for another households (work for network), rather than a interaction between peers.  
Table.4.10 Bivariate village models estimated coefficient of frequent contact network 
 
Coefficients significance codes: p value<0.001 ‘***’ p value =0.001 ‘**’ p value =0.01 ‘*’ p value = 0.05 ‘.’  
 
Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds
Actor dyadic effects (Homohily)
settlers' attributes from the past
employment sector before agrarian reform 0.56 0.16 *** 1.76 0.33 0.27 -0.04 0.26
geographical origin 1.03 0.16 *** 2.79 0.22 0.28 0.09 0.34
village formation attributes
contact to get in the village 0.49 0.17 ** 1.62 -0.29 0.37 0.31 0.31 1.36
migration wave 0.41 0.17 * 1.51 0.72 0.24 ** 2.05 -0.09 0.30
social activities in the village
catholic church 0.39 0.17 * 1.48 -0.40 0.24 . 0.55 0.26 * 1.74
evangelical church 1 0.40 0.19 * 1.49 -0.04 0.30 -0.03 0.30
evangelical church 2 0.64 0.27 * 1.90
footbal team member 0.10 0.16 -0.03 0.24 0.53 0.26 * 1.69
membership in village association 0.01 0.16 -0.61 0.25 * 0.54 0.25 0.35
economic activities in the village
engaged in family farming 0.35 0.16 * 1.41 0.55 0.24 * 1.73 -0.66 0.26 * 0.52
 employment at survey time 0.34 0.16 * 1.40 0.06 0.26 -0.33 0.31
value sold to coop in 2011 -0.14 0.15 -0.81 0.32 * 0.44 -0.69 0.35 * 0.50
average production sold to coop '07-'12 -0.29 0.16 . -0.53 0.24 * 0.59 -0.69 0.35 * 0.50
hierarchy indicators
village president  (node covariance) 0.69 0.25 ** 2.00 0.83 0.23 *** 2.29 0.33 0.25
number of households for which they work  0.04 0.16 0.08 0.55 -0.60 0.26 * 0.55
number of workers hired 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.24 -0.26 0.26
activities outside the village
production sold in the same local market 0.04 0.20 -0.19 0.24 0.12 0.26
political parade participation 0.30 0.16 . -0.50 0.25 * 0.61
Coviarate networks (edge covariance)
 edge covariance hire network 2.48 0.29 *** 11.93 -0.09 0.76 1.68 0.64 ** 5.37
edge covariance in  kinship network 3.05 0.17 *** 21.03 0.89 0.48 . 1.95 0.40 *** 7.04
edge covariance in work for network 2.17 0.39 *** 8.76 0.90 0.58 3.26 0.61 *** 26.10
Village A Village B Village C
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4.5.3 Full model results 
The second step of the analysis is specifying the model with all network statistics that 
have been tested singularly in the bivariates models in table 4.11.  
A correlation analysis on the variables describing homophilous traits (Appendix 4.1) has 
been performed to control for possible multicollinearity. The two pairs of variables with a 
correlation higher than 0.6 with each other in the three villages are: 1) employment sector at 
survey time and engaged in family farming, 2) average production sold to coop 2007-2012 and 
value sold to coop in 2011.  
A sensitivity analysis on the effect of omitting highly correlated variables (reported in 
Appendix 4.1) led to a finer selection of the network statistics: in village A and C employment 
sector at survey time and average production sold to the cooperative in the period 2007-2012 
have been removed. In village B three variables (namely employment sector at survey time, 
average production sold to the cooperative in the period 2007-2012 and production sold to the 
cooperative in 2011) have been omitted in the full model. 
Furthermore in all three models the variables number of workers hired and number of 
households for which they work were omitted in the full model because these two aspects are 
already captured by the edge covariate terms describing family farming employment network. 
By introducing both terms in the model it is possible that this could introduce 
multicollinearity problems. 
Table 4.11 shows the full model estimates and standard errors for the network statistics 
and the odds ratio only for the parameters that are significant. As expected, in the three 
villages, the number of significant network statistics decreases significantly from the bivariate 
model presented in table 4.11. In village A and B it decreases by more than 50% passing 
respectively from 13 to 7 and from 7 to 3 significant effects, while in village C it decreases 
from 9 to 4 significant effects. This result confirms the redundancy of some network statistic 
which effect is already captured by others.  
In village B and A, the estimate of nodecov "village office" was significant in the bivariate 
model and keeps its significance also in the full. Furthermore the value of the estimate does 
not change significantly. The positive sign indicates that the probability of a tie is higher when 
both households had an office or when at least one of the two had an office in the village. 
Given the very few number of households that had an office in the village (in total maximum 
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4), the probability of a tie between two households is higher when at least one of the two has 
or had an office in the village.  
Table 4.11 shows that in village A there are more network statistics with positive and 
significant coefficients, seven in total. This implies that, in this village, there are more shared 
households attributes’ that generate ties in the observed network. In village A the traits that 
result significant that have significant homophily effects are the following: attending the same 
village church, having the same geographical origin, having had the same previous 
employment before moving to the village. Furthermore the presence kinship and family 
farming employment ties increase the probability of tie formation in the observed network.  
Most homophily statistics relating to attendance of religious functions lose their 
significance in the full model in village A, with the exception of evangelical church 2, which 
keeps its significance. As described earlier evangelical church 2 is a very specific congregation, 
which is smaller and has both a specific geographic and group focus. The fact that keeps its 
significance can be interpreted as the fact that sharing such characteristic is a mechanism to 
create ties which effect cannot be described by others. 
Migration wave network statistic loses significance, probably because its effect is partially 
captured by migration origin. Several people that shared common migration origin also 
arrived in the village during the same period. 
In village A differently from B and C the effect of family farming engagement is not 
significant in the full model. The possible reason for this is that being engaged in family 
farming is partly captured by other parameters that are proxies for the importance of family 
farming, such as the employment sector before agrarian reform, as most households that were 
farmers before are still farmers, and by the edge covariance in the two parameters, that 
describe the family farming employment network.  
In village B model has the lowest number of significant effects, with only three network 
statistics showing significant and positive estimates: engaged in family farming, migration 
wave and village president. It is important to observed they are only homophily effects while 
there are no edge covariance effects that are significant in the full model. 
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In village C four network statistics result significant: two homophily effects (football, 
engaged in family farming) and two edge covariance effects (kinship and work for network). 
Engaged in family farming homophily effect, as in the bivariate model is negative. 
Table 4.11 Estimated coefficients of village frequent contact network full model 
 
Coefficients significance codes: p value<0.001 ‘***’ p value =0.001 ‘**’ p value =0.01 ‘*’ p value = 0.05 ‘.’  
 
The goodness of fit of the model shows a good level of convergence for village A (Figure 
4.10) and C (Figure 4.12) and an acceptable level of convergence for village B (Figure 4.12). 
This result is important as it shows that the difficulty of modeling village B network cannot be 
explained by the relative lack of power or size effect. Village B and C have the same dimension 
but village C specification shows a much better level of convergence.  
 
Village C
Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds
edges -5.20 0.47
**
* 0.01 -2.48 0.48
**
* 0.08 -2.69 0.65 *** 0.07
Actor dyadic effects
settlers' attributes from the past
employment sector before agrarian reform 0.42 0.18 * 1.52 0.37 0.29 0.35 0.33
geographical origin 0.52 0.20 ** 1.68 0.22 0.33 -0.19 0.45
village formation attributes
contact to get in the village 0.07 0.20 -0.86 0.45 . 0.49 0.38
migration wave 0.25 0.21 0.74 0.26 ** 2.09 -0.25 0.40
social activities in the village
catholic church 0.24 0.20 -0.18 0.28 0.49 0.31
evangelical church 1 0.32 0.21 -0.38 0.33 0.18 0.36
evangelical church 2 0.63 0.29 * 1.87
footbal team member 0.00 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.65 0.29 * 1.92
village association -0.18 0.18 -0.24 0.28 0.21 0.40
economic activities in the village
engaged in family farming 0.29 0.17 . 0.58 0.25 * 1.79 -0.83 0.30 ** 0.44
employment sector at survey time*
value sold to coop in 2011 0.01 0.19 -0.20 0.39 -0.76 0.45 .
average production sold to coop 2007-2012*
hierarchy indicators
village president  (node covariance) 0.68 0.29 * 1.97 0.63 0.27 * 1.87 0.36 0.30
number of households for which they work *
number of workers hired*
activities outside the village
production sold in the same local market -0.14 0.23 -0.18 0.25 0.36 0.30
political parade participation 0.11 0.17 -0.19 0.27
Coviarate networks
edge covariance in hire network 1.45 0.38
**
* 4.28 -0.31 0.80 1.30 0.77 .
edge covariance in  kinship network 2.81 0.19
**
* 16.61 0.92 0.54 . 1.71 0.48 *** 5.52
edge covariance in work for network 1.78 0.39
**
* 5.95 0.90 0.66 3.15 0.68 *** 23.27
Village A Village B
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Figure 4.10 Goodness of Fit of village A full model 
 
Figure 4.11 Goodness of Fit of village B full model 
 
Figure 4.12 Goodness of Fit of village C full model 
 
4.6 Family farming as social mechanism to generate ties 
Engagement in family farming is a reason for proximity in the frequent contact network 
across the three villages. However, the importance that this activity has for villagers varies 
greatly across villages. Village A is the most successful settlement in terms of agricultural 
production, not only because many of the settlers had already experience in family farming 
(Table 4.12) but also because of the co-evolution of intertwined social ties that allow for the 
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creation of ties across households that better allow to adopt family farming as main livelihood 
strategy. 
In order to have a more complete picture of how family farming varies in importance 
across villages, it is necessary to take into consideration a series of variables that include not 
only the number of households that declare to be family farmers and family farming income 
distribution across villages (Figure 4.13) but also to consider how many households there are 
in each class of family farming income over total income (Table 4.12) and difference in 
typologies of crops produced, as described in chapter three. While in village A there is a high 
percentage of production that is composed by products that were not present before the 
agrarian reform, in the other villages the “old crops” represent still the prevalence of the 
production (Figure 4.14). 
 
Figure 4.13 Extension of area in hectares by category of products 
 
Table 4.12 Households’ engagement in family farming in the three villages  
  Village A Village B Village C 
Family farming as main livelihood strategy 
before agrarian reform 
32% 21% 5% 
Family farming as main livelihood strategy 
in family farming after agrarian reform 
49% 45% 24% 
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Figure 4.15 illustrates the difference in the distribution of income from family farming in 
the three villages. While the median value does not differ significantly it is possible to observe 
that the range is very different across villages. In village A in fact values go up until 2000 reais 
(approximately 630 euro) corresponding to more than two Brazilian minimum salaries. 
However, family farming income could be a biased variable: on the one hand because of the 
difficulty for households to calculate net monthly income from family farming, and on the 
other hand because households could refrain to declare high income because they may fear to 
lose their social benefit from the state (Bolsa familia). 
Figure 4.14 Family farming income distribution in the three villages 
 
Table 4.13 presents a comparison of the percentage of households per class of weight of 
family farming on total income. Table 4.15 illustrates households’ average income from family 
farming for each category of weight of income from family farming over total income. They 
show that village A is the village where family farming plays a more important role in terms of 
income generating activity. Even if in terms of net income of pure family farmers the average 
is the same (Table 4.14). 
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Table 4.13 Percentage of households by category of income 
Family farming income over total income  Village A Village B Village C 
0 18 21 24 
0.1. ≤ x ≤0.5 31 37 49 
0.5≤ x ≤0.9 7 8 19 
1 43 34 8 
 
Table 4.14 Average family farming income (R$) by category 
Family farming income over total income Village A Village B Village C 
01. ≤ x ≤0.5 407.8 276.1 289.4 
0.5≤ x ≤0.9 578.2 380.0 651.4 
1 706.8 711.2 683.3 
 
The pictures below (Figure 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17) represent the three frequent contact 
network color coded as follows: dark green dots represent households that were living from 
family farming before coming to the settlement and continue to be farmers; light green dots 
represent households that started to live from family farming when they arrived to the 
settlements, purple dots represent sugar cane cutter that did not change their livelihood after 
the agrarian reform, and grey dots stand for households that are not represented by the 
previous cases. 
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Figure 4.15 Village A frequent contact network  
 
 
Figure.4.16 Village B frequent  contact network 
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Figure 4.17 Village C frequent contact network 
 
 
 
The three networks of the three villages show how households, that declared to be 
engaged in family farming as main income generating activity, tend be close to each other in 
the frequent contact network. However, the position in the network of households that have 
as main livelihood strategy family farming differs across villages, while in village A family 
farmers are mostly at the center of the network, in villages B and C they are at the periphery. 
4.6.1 Family farming employment as cross-cutting tie 
This subsection shows first by network visualization and second by applying ERGMs that 
family-farming employment is a form of brokerage. 
Figure 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 show the different brokering force of family farming 
employment in connecting different groups defined by kinship. Nodes are colored by origin, 
kinship ties are red and family farming employment ties are green. The brokering connection 
is present in the three villages however the number of brokering ties varies across villages. 
In village A the presence of family farming ties totally changes that network structure of 
the village (Figure 4.18). There is a shift from a situation of potential clash between two 
cohesive unconnected blocks to an integrated system. If we look only at kinship ties we see 
two distinct and isolated groups being one large endogamous cohesive clan and the other a 
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more polycentric structure where households of different origins are tied together by 
marriage.  
Family farming employment ties keep together the two groups in a quite articulate way. 
The presence of multiple ties between the two groups makes the whole structure less 
vulnerable to possible tie removal that can separate the two groups. Most of the households 
are in fact integrated in the system and there are only three households that are left aside. In 
village A family employment network includes 77% of the households. On a more general 
scale this also means that many households are able to find their source of employment in the 
same village where they reside.  
 
Table 4.15 Family farming employment network in the three villages 
  Village A Village B Village C 
Isolates 33% 50% 54% 
Density 0.014 0.024 0.021 
Average degree 1.41 0.89 0.76 
 
Figure  4.18 Village A kinship and family farming employment ties 
 
 
Figure 4.19 instead illustrates that in village B the situation is different; despite the 
brokering role of family farming employment between the two main groups, many families 
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are left aside with the percentage of isolates being 50%. In village B there are 45% of the 
households that declare to make their living mostly out family farming but when it comes to 
income from family farming the values are mostly below one minimum salary (Table 4.14). 
This data show that family-farming production is mainly for subsistence and not on a scale 
that creates the necessity to hire somebody even occasionally to work on his or her plot. 
There is in fact a quite strong correlation (0.44) between income from family farming and 
number of households employed in family farming. 
 
Figure 4.19 Village B kinship and family farming employment ties 
 
In village C the brokering role of family farming employment is important but vulnerable 
(Figure 4.20). There are only three ties that connect the main clan mostly composed by old 
settlers and their relatives and some of new settlers. The role of family farming is certainly the 
lowest among the three villages: only 22% of households make their living out of family 
farming and most of households (57%) live out of a mixture between sugar cane employment 
and other activities. 
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Figure 4.20 Village C kinship and family farming employment ties 
 
 
4.6.2 The role of cross-cutting ties in favoring adaptiveness 
 
To test if cross-cutting family employment network played a role in favoring village 
adaptiveness to family farming it would have been necessary to have the three networks 
collected and households’ engagement in family farming at two time points, namely at the 
time of village creation and at the time of the survey.  
Attributes that describe households’ engagement in family farming at the time of survey 
comprise the following variables: 1) number of families that declare to be engaged in family 
farming, 2) importance of family farming over the total income, 3) average income from 
family farming, 4) typologies of crops produced, and 5) number of people hired. 
The only attribute that describes villagers’ engagement in family farming at the time of 
creation of the village is a binary variable that indicates whether the household declared to 
have already been engaged in family farming before coming to the village. 
In all the three villages there is an increase of the number of households that declare to be 
engaged in family farming from the time of village creation to present: these changed 
respectively for village A, B and C from 33 to 51, from 8 to 17 and from 2 to 9. Despite this 
increase in the total number, the values are different when it comes the number of households 
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that derive more than half of their salary from family farming in the three villages: in village A 
50%, in village B 42% and in village C only the 27%.  
In order to understand how higher and non-redundant connectivity of village A allows for 
better adaptiveness to family farming, the optimum would be to test with a social 
autocorrelation model the importance of social influence in determining the choice of 
households to engage in family farming as main livelihood strategy (representing more than 
50% of the total income). However this relies on longitudinal data both on attribute and ties 
that are not available. 
Given the absence of such information, some of the collected homophilous traits, namely 
common origin and common migration wave, can be considered as proxies of previous ties 
created at the moment of village creation. New ties instead are considered to be those related 
to family farming employment, new marriages and common participation to village events 
that provide villagers with the possibility to create new ties.  
Family farming employment as a crosscutting tie is very important in allowing for better 
village adaptiveness, as it allows for a better diffusion of family farming by creating ties 
between households that would otherwise not be connected. The main argument is that in 
villages, where there are more non-redundant social mechanisms that allow for ties’ 
formation, there are more opportunities for building new ties. In village A, the number of 
family farmers would not have increased over time if, at the time of village creation, the 
households with experience in family farming would not have got in contact with other 
households that did not share the same characteristics. Furthermore it is possible to consider 
this process as self-sustaining, as more households live from family farming, more households 
would be hired and therefore more opportunities of contagion will arise, if sharing 
engagement in family farming is a tie generator mechanism. 
Exponential Random Graph Models aim at testing the following three hypotheses. First, in 
the three villages, the frequent contact network, that portrays interaction among villagers, 
have different number of ties' generator mechanisms that are positive and significant. Second, 
the role of family-farming employment as cross-cutting ties varies across villages, as 
illustrated in figure 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21. Third, households that both declared to be engaged in 
family farming tend to be connected in the frequent contact network. 
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In village A the frequent contact network is the result of a combination of both edge 
covariance effects and homophily effects, while in village C the main tie generator mechanism 
is edge covariance as there are very few significant homophily effects, that are positive and 
significant; instead in village B there are very few significant effects.  
The more general argument is that village A is the more responsive/adaptive to the 
innovation introduced as there is no complete overlap between different networks, village C is 
instead characterized by redundancy/multiplicity in fact the probability of creating a tie 
between households is mostly explained by the presence of other ties and lastly in village B 
there are few effects that are able to explain the presence of ties between people in the 
network.  
In village A there are more opportunities for households to create connections between 
households. ERGMs results show that in village A there is wider number of homophily and 
edge covariance effects contributing to network formation instead in the other villages, only 
households that share a very specific and low number of characteristics are likely to meet. 
4.6.3 Presence of a gender bias in frequent contact network 
 
Frequent contact network, having interviewed mostly women especially in village A and C 
(being respectively 62% and 70%), mostly portrays frequent meetings between women. 
There is therefore a gender bias26. An important question is whether family farming 
employment as cross-cutting network refers more to gender integration rather than to social 
integration. In order to understand the gender division of labor in family employment it is 
necessary to take into account four factors: first livelihoods’ strategies composition, second 
the typology of crops production, third whether the household is female leaded and fourth the 
household’s wealth. The reasons why the household could be female headed are either 
because the man has temporally migrated to work or whether he has permanently left the 
household because of death or separation from the spouse. Literature on gender division of 
labor in family farming is unanimous in stating that the contribution of female in family 
                                                        
26 One possible evidence is the fact that only in village B, where the village association is composed by women co-membership proved to be 
significant, while instead in village C and A, where the local association are mostly composed by males, co-membership in local association 
are not significant. Furthermore prevalently male events such as co-attendance in market are not significant. 
180 
 
farming is underestimated and it is often invisible (SILVA and SCHNEIDER 2010; Cordeiro and 
Scott 2007; de Melo 2002; Galizoni and Ribeiro 2014).  
“The recognition of female work in farming does not imply important changes in the 
relationships between men and women. This is because symbolically and in practice men work 
produces products and goods that are exchangeable and that can be socialized, instead female 
work for being fragmented and discontinuous – and therefore more intense – produces less 
products for unity worked  (Ribeiro, 1993). In this way the qualification of work is not built by 
the efforts required but instead by the final product. The value of work is qualified later 
depending on whether they were performed by men or women, as indicated in Paulilo (1987). In 
this way female work in farming is recognized and considered important, but when confronted 
with masculine temporary work sugar cane region of Sao Paolo state, it is considered “lighter” 
because performed in better condition than the latter. (…)  When the man does not migrate or, in 
the stream of family cycle, stopped migrating, her work is revalued in the composition of family 
work and several times, in these situations masculine and feminine work are considered as 
complementary but coordinated by the man.” (Galizoni and Ribeiro 2014, 8)  
Recent studies also acknowledge that, both the increasing importance of pluriatividade, 
i.e. the fact that households work both outside and inside of the family enterprise and 
combine both farming and non-farming activities (Kageyama 1998; Nogueira 2013) and the 
crucial role of migration in livelihood composition (Guilhoto et al. 2007, chap. 12), increased 
significantly the role of female in family farming related activities (Medeiros and Ribeiro 
2011).  Female, even when males migrate, tend to remain at home as they have to take care of 
the house, the plot and the children (R. M. Medeiros and Ribeiro 2011, 9).  
Also in sugar cane plantation according to the different times of the year workers engage 
in several activities further than sugar cane planting and harvesting such as small trading, 
farming and livestock breeding (Sigaud 2008, 79). Female workforce contributes both to the 
cultivation of crops that are mainly related to subsistence but also they play a role in the 
production of labor-intensive fruits. In this case study several of the households interviewed 
referred to contact females to work in their plot for soursop bagging process. 
The fact that the women specifically engage in activities that take place inside the 
household or in the plot just outside (Galizoni and Ribeiro 2014) is also related to the amount 
of agricultural work load that the household has and on the ability of the household to hire 
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others to work on their plot. Women in fact very often intervene in periods of high request of 
labor (R. M. Medeiros and Ribeiro 2011, 6). 
It is possible to state that if on the one hand the non-involvement of female in farming 
heavy activities, is a way to protect women from physically heavy duties; on the other it 
prevents the social recognition of the crucial role of female work that very often significantly 
contribute to family farming activities. 
In order to have a clearer picture of whether family farming employment network 
portrays mainly a male network it is necessary to do a specific ethnography on the villages 
studied that focuses on gender division of labor. Only after such data collection it would be 
possible to describe how households are organized and what are the characteristics of labor 
relations in family farming. It would be therefore necessary to codify several households 
typologies according to the factors above mentioned namely composition of livelihood 
strategies, presence of migrant workforce, level of wealth, typologies of crops produces and 
enquire both with observation and in depth interview on farming labor organization inside 
the household. 
 
4.6.4 Family farming as non-redundant tie generator mechanism: results of stepwise 
models   
 
The figure 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21 showed that family-farming employment ties are not 
overlapping with kinship ties.  
This sub-section tests the hypothesis that family-farming employment is non-redundant to 
the main ties formation mechanisms, namely homophilous traits and kinship network. In 
order to do so a stepwise approach has been followed. 
The estimates of homophilous traits and other edge covariance effect, which do not decrease 
significantly, show that the family farming employment edge covariance and homophily effect 
of family farming are not redundant.  
The first model is specified with the most important homophilous effect and kinship 
network edge covariance. The homophily effects in each village model were chosen because 
they are proxies of each village history. In village A the model is specified with geographical 
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origin and in village B the model is specified with migration wave homophily effect. For 
comparability matters, in village C, the same model specification has been used for village B. It 
is important to point out however that in village C model all homophilous traits’ estimates 
lose their significance when they are added to kinship edge covariance. 
 The second model for each village adds family farming employment as edge covariance.  
The third model for each village model adds homophilous traits effect of engagement in 
family farming.  
The fourth model, after having imputed homophilous traits, the structural terms 
geometrically weighted edge-wise shared partners and geometrically weighted degree 
distribution, controls respectively for transitivity and centrality effects, to test if the 
homophily parameters decrease their significance.  
The fifth model adds an additional structural term namely, geometrically weighted dyad-
wise shared partners was added to test whether it improves the fit of the model. 
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The results of village A’s model (Table 4.16) show that all of the effects specified are non-
overlapping and except for edges they are all positive. Adding to the model edge covariance in 
kinship network and homophilous traits in family farming, the estimates do not change their 
value significantly and their sign does not change.  
Only one parameter, nodematch on family farming, loses significance when controlling for 
transitivity (geometrically weighted degree distribution and the geometrically weighted edge 
wise shared partners parameters). Such phenomenon is consistent with literature. Homophily 
is likely to decrease in the coefficient when a particular share of homophily is due to the force 
of transitive closure rather than to homophily. This can indicate that A and B have 
homophilous ties not as a result of homophily but because of triadic closure effects. In other 
words, first there are homophilous ties with A, and the homophilous tie A has also an 
homophilous tie with B, and because of closure/transitivity, there is another homophilous tie, 
that is B, but not so much because was homophilous for B in that case, but because A’s first 
choice was homophilous. The fact that only one parameter (node match family farming) loses 
significance can be interpreted as a sign that triadic closure is not so strong to capture the 
other homophily effects, namely geographical origin and the other edge covariance effects.  
 
Table 4.16 Estimated coefficients of village A frequent contact network models 
 
Coefficients significance codes: p value<0.001 ‘***’ p value =0.001 ‘**’ p value =0.01 ‘*’ p value = 0.05 ‘.’  
The goodness of fit plots (Figure 4.21) is not different from plot of the full model (Figure 
4.10). This shows that reducing the model to a small number of parameters it is able to 
capture the main social process that describe the process of network. The fit of the model 
increases slightly only when adding the structural terms formation (Figure 4.22 and 4.23). 
parameter Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds
edges -4.00 0.11 *** 0.02 -4.09 0.12 *** 0.02 -4.27 0.15 *** 0.01 -4.96 0.23 *** 0.01 -5.49 0.41 *** 0.00
geographical origin 0.64 0.18 *** 1.89 0.62 0.18 *** 1.85 0.63 0.18 *** 1.87 0.54 0.17 ** 1.72 0.56 0.18 ** 1.74
edge covariance in  
kinship network
2.92 0.18 *** 18.61 2.93 0.18 *** 18.68 2.92 0.18 *** 18.49 2.51 0.18 *** 12.36 2.56 0.18 *** 12.87
edge covariance in  
family farming 
employment network
2.26 0.34 *** 9.62 2.28 0.34 *** 9.82 2.28 0.33 *** 9.74 2.21 0.34 *** 9.10
engaged in family 
farming
0.34 0.17 * 1.40 0.32 0.17 . 1.38 0.32 0.16 * 1.38
Geometrically weighted 
edgewise shared 
partners
0.76 0.13 *** 2.13 0.76 0.13 *** 2.14
Geometrically weighted 
degree
1.28 0.49 ** 3.61 1.76 0.61 ** 5.82
Geometrically weighted 
dyadiwise shared 
partners
0.06 0.04 1.06
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) diagnostics (in appendix 8.6.1) also confirm a good 
level of model convergence for the model with structural terms. 
Figure 4.21 Goodness of fit plots of village A stepwise model 4 
 
Figure 4.22 Goodness of fit plots of village A stepwise model 4 
 
Figure 4.23 Goodness of fit plots of village A stepwise model 5 
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Table 4.18 illustrates the estimates of village B four models. Kinship edge covariance 
parameter loses its significance by adding family farming employment network edge 
covariance. This result can be explained by the presence of only four dyads linked both by 
kinship and frequent contact network, and only two dyads connected both by family farming 
employment and frequent contact network and it can indicate some overlap between kinship 
edge covariance and family farming employment network.  
The positive and significant coefficient of family farming homophily effect shows that 
sharing a common, i.e. being engaged in family farming activity is a non-redundant tie 
generator mechanism.  
In this reduced model for village B, controlling for transitive closure (geometrically 
weighted edge wise shared partners) none of the two homophilous traits loose its significance 
and the estimates coefficients show only minor changes. Instead the geometrically weighted 
degree parameter is negative and significant.  
Model 5, is presented for the purpose of comparing it with the other two villages. 
However clustering, represented by the alternating terms, as already shown by model 4is not 
significant and by adding an additional alternating term makes the model degenerate (Figure 
4.26).  
 
Table 4.17 Estimated coefficients of village B frequent contact network models  
 
Coefficients significance codes: p value<0.001 ‘***’ p value =0.001 ‘**’ p value =0.01 ‘*’ p value = 0.05  
Goodness of Fit plots (Figure 4.24) shows some difficulties of ERGMs to predict some specific 
values in the degree distribution such as proportion of nodes with degree 5 and degree 10 as 
well as the proportion of edges that have 4 edge-wise shared partners. This issue is most 
parameter Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds
edges -24.55 0.18 *** 0.00 -24.77 0.18 *** 0.00 -27.96 0.24 *** 0.00 -2.67 0.35 *** 0.07 -0.34 30.40
migration wave 0.74 0.24 ** 2.10 0.75 0.24 ** 2.11 0.75 0.24 ** 2.12 0.57 0.21 ** 1.77 0.53 0.17 ** 1.70
edge covariance in  
kinship network
0.99 0.49 * 2.69 0.89 0.50 . 0.86 0.50 . 0.82 0.47 . 1.02 0.52 * 2.79
edge covariance in  
family farming 
employment network
0.74 0.60 0.87 0.61 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.64
engaged in family 
farming
0.58 0.25 * 1.78 0.56 0.24 * 1.75 0.36 0.17 * 1.44
Geometrically weighted 
edge wise shared 
partners
0.20 0.16 -1.17 0.68 .
Geometrically weighted 
degree
-1.25 0.60 * 0.29 -2.36 19.21
Geometrically weighted 
dyadiwise shared 
partners
0.20 23.66
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
186 
 
probability related to the difficulty of modeling the presence of an almost “caveman structure” 
(a very cohesive clique where everybody is connected with everybody) surrounded by a 
sparser network. Even adding the degree distribution term (geometrically weighted degree), 
the fit of the model does not increase. 
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) diagnostics (in appendix 8.6.3) show instead an 
acceptable level of model convergence for the model 4. 
Figure 4.24 Goodness of fit plots of village B stepwise model 3 
 
Figure 4.25 Goodness of fit plots of village B stepwise model 4 
 
Figure 4.26 Goodness of fit plots of village B stepwise model 5 
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Table 4.19 illustrates the estimates of the four models of village C. Differently from the 
previous two villages’ homophilous traits, referring to process of creation of the village, 
inserted in the model are not all significant. In this village, in fact, only football team 
homophily effect is not redundant to kinship network. By adding family farming employment 
edge covariance and homophilous traits in family farming the estimate of kinship edge 
covariance estimates do not decrease significantly. However in this village the estimates of 
uniform homophily in family farming parameter is negative and significant. This result 
indicates that the likelihood of adding a tie between any given i and  j is reduced by the 
equality of the engaged in family farming parameter. . The positive sign of family farming edge 
covariance seems to suggest the presence of relations between farmers that act as employers 
and their employee.   
Controlling for transitive closure family farming estimates do not lose its significance and 
the estimate’s coefficients show only minor and not significant changes. Both the goodness of 
fit plots (Figure 4.27) and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) diagnostics (Appendix 
8.6.3) show an acceptable level of model convergence.  
 
Table 4.18 Estimated coefficients of village C frequent contact network models  
 
Coefficients significance codes: p value<0.001 ‘***’ p value =0.001 ‘**’ p value =0.01 ‘*’ p value = 0.05 ‘.’  
 
 
 
 
 
parameter Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds Estimate S.E. odds
edges -23.07 0.16 *** 0.00 -24.66 0.17 *** 0.00 -20.64 0.22 *** -2.99 0.39 *** 0.05 -2.77 0.91 ** 0.06
edge covariance in  
kinship network
1.98 0.40 *** 7.26 1.85 0.43 *** 6.37 19.18 0.44 *** 1.83 0.42 *** 6.21 1.83 0.42 *** 6.25
migration wave -0.20 0.31 0.82 -0.10 0.32 0.90 -0.11 0.32 -0.12 0.32 0.88 -0.13 0.33 0.88
edge covariance in  
family farming 
employment network 
3.13 0.63 *** 22.81 3.19 0.64 *** 3.18 0.64 *** 24.12 3.19 0.67 *** 24.26
engaged in family 
farming
-0.73 0.28 ** -0.82 0.31 ** 0.44 -0.84 0.32 ** 0.43
Geometrically weighted 
edgewise shared 
partners
0.52 0.19 ** 1.68 0.52 0.19 ** 1.68
Geometrically weighted 
degree
2.33 1.24 . 2.14 1.43
Geometrically weighted 
dyadiwise shared 
partners
-0.03 0.12
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Figure 4.27 Goodness of fit plots of village C stepwise model 3 
 
 
Figure 4.28 Goodness of fit plots of village C stepwise model 4 
 
Figure 4.29 Goodness of fit plots of village C stepwise model 5 
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
The chapter, using the combination of narrative of villages’ histories and visualization 
villages’ networks, allowed showing how the substantial variability across villages in 
households’ attributes and social network features is influenced by recruitment patterns and 
early organization of villages.  
The recruitment pattern had an effect on the number of households with previous 
experience in family farming and on the number of households that already knew each other 
before the occupation.  
Village’s early organization influences the selection rule to choose settlers after the period 
of encampment. Furthermore it influences the creation of collective activities, which favors 
the interaction between old and new settlers, and the density of kinship network.  
The use of ERG models showed that homophily on some households’ attributes and edge 
covariances are relevant elements in determining links in frequent contact network. The 
uniform homophily effects that influence ties formation in the frequent contact network are 
different across villages because they had diverse households’ recruitment patterns and 
villages’ early organization.  
The homophily uniform statistics differ across villages: the only parameter that is 
significant across villages relates to family farming. Engagement in family farming is a 
mechanism that generates ties among households. Uniform homophily in family farming as 
main livelihood strategy is a mechanism that generates the presence of ties in the three 
villages. Family farming employment is non-overlapping to the main social processes 
generating ties. 
Edge covariance in kinship is extremely important in village A and C where there were no 
limits in terms of households that could be linked by kinship in the phase of village creation 
but less in village B. In this village the social movement limited to five the number of 
households’ members of the same family that can live in the same village.  
Village A is the most complex village in terms of networks and the village with the highest 
family farming production. There are a wider number of factors contributing to network 
formation while in the other villages there is a smaller number of factors that are able to 
explain the contact network. In village A same geographical origin, edge covariance in kinship 
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network and employment in family farming are the most important elements to trigger links. 
The main homophily effect is “common village origin” as some households already knew to 
each other before coming to the encampment 
In village B instead it is more difficult to identify what are the generator mechanisms of 
frequent contact network. In village B the main homophily effect is “common migration wave” 
because people did not know each other before coming to the village and friendship were 
created participating to encampment. The other important local configurations are node 
covariance of village president and engagement in family farming. 
In village C the co-existence in the same network of households is the major factor that 
allows predicting the other networks while few shared attributes have a relevant effect. In 
village C the presence of a large group of old settlers, the lack of previous ties among new 
settlers and a short period of encampment of new settlers characterized by episodes of 
violence did not favor the creation of ties between households. Kinship represents the most 
important driving force of contact network and there is strong overlapping between different 
households’ ties. It is possible to argue that that this “multiplicity” can be considered as an 
anti-risk behavior in response to a long exposure to violence for old settlers and early 
tensions between the groups of old and new settlers. The lack of activities that allowed to 
create ties among settlers with different origins and the presence of conflicts in the early 
period of leadership definition led households to be conservative in their ties formation. 
It was shown that village A is the most similar to scenario 2 of network overlap 
(presented in chapter one) as the frequent contact network is predicted by the combination of 
both family farming employment and kinship network that are not completely overlapping.  
Family farming is an element that in all villages allows supporting the creation of a more 
integrated network. In village B however it was observed that family-farming employment is 
overlapping with the main ties’ generator mechanisms. In village C instead family-farming 
employment is a non-redundant mechanism but the fact that two households are both 
engaged in family farming refrains from building ties. These two elements can be referred to a 
role of hierarchy in ties’ creation.  
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5. Alagoas Sem Terra Cooperative and social networks in the villages  
5.1 Introduction 
 
A number of important economic and social transformations took place in the agrarian 
reform settlements. The new settlers arrived and created ties with the old settlers, who were 
mostly sugar cane workers. Many of the households in the settlements used family farming as 
their main source of livelihood, which was a new economic activity in the region.  
A crucial difference between sugar cane plantations and family farming lies in the 
organization of labor, the distribution of power and the level of autonomy from urban areas. 
In the former, a large unskilled labor force lives in large estates that have one landowner, with 
whom they entertain vertical unequal relationships. In the latter, there is a large a number of 
very small land properties, and more horizontal relations connect the farm holders. In sugar 
cane plantations, intra-village ties are very unlikely because the labor force is very easily 
substituted — sugar cane cutters are potential competitors with one another. On the other 
hand, family farmers derive their main source of livelihood from inside the village and might 
develop intra-village relations when they face a common issue such as finding a market to sell 
their products to scale up their production. In contrast, sugar cane cutters derive their main 
source of income from outside the village.  
The emergence of family farming, in the settlements object of analysis, has been 
supported, almost since the foundation of the village, by a series of projects and then by a 
producers’ cooperative that was born in 2003 with the specific purpose of supporting this 
new economic activity by providing training, credit, technology and distribution of products. 
The fictional name used to refer to the cooperative is Alagoas Sem Terra Cooperative (ASTC).  
Chapters three and four outlined how, in the three villages studied, there are two main 
factors that allow for the creation of ties between households that do not share homophilous 
traits: kinship and agricultural employment. On the one hand the history of villages’ formation 
explains the marriages across households of different origins. On the other hand, the role of 
agricultural employment, as described in chapters three and four, varied greatly across 
villages as a result of different processes of village formation and is related to the importance 
of family farming. 
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Family farming can be considered an element that creates cross-cutting ties in the 
villages. Households that are engaged in family farming tend to communicate with one 
another. Family farming employment lies outside of the main tie-formation mechanisms in the 
villages and thus creates connections between households that otherwise would not be 
connected. This implies that households engaged in family farming are more likely to be 
connected with other households that do not share common traits than with households that 
have different livelihood strategies.  
This chapter describes the history of ASTC and highlights its support to family farming. 
The possibility that cooperatives play a role in creating a bridge across groups is also outlined 
by a recent article (Majee and Hoyt 2011). The cooperative shapes and is shaped by pre-
existing social network structures. Namely ASCT plays an important role in sustaining family 
farming.  
The cooperative, by supporting the introduction of new crops and guaranteeing a market 
for some households’ crops, supports farmers’ productivity and family-farming employment 
networks. As ASCT focuses on high labor-intensive crops (chapter 3), it consequently 
supports the labor market of family farmers. Therefore by supporting agricultural 
employment, ASCT supports one of the main sources of brokerage across households. This 
implies that, in the three villages, the number of agricultural employment network’s ties 
depends on the joined effect of the selection of crops produced by farmers and the guarantee 
of market destination for crops.  
Not all households that have family farming as main income are members of the 
cooperative. There are farmers that do not sell to the ASTC. Initially the cooperative have 
provided training to introduce new crops such as soursop, citrus, passion fruit and pineapple, 
along with support to strengthen the production of old crops such as banana. While only 
members received credit and training, the entire villages, where ASCTC has members, 
benefitted from the introduction of new crops.  
ASTC members’ composition is heterogeneous in terms of most relevant village 
attributes, namely kinship, income, religion and party. These households’ features are 
important because they could be lines on which conflict could arise.  
It was collected information in village A and B on households’ in “political parades” 
during the municipality electoral campaign in 2012, which coincided with the period of 
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fieldwork in the village. It was used the word “party” to denominate households’ participation 
to political parades. It is possible to argue that this can be considered a proxy for party 
membership.  
The connections between emergence of family farming and the role of ASTC in the 
villages encompass three main dimensions: the dependence of the cooperative on external 
donors; municipal politics; and the trajectory of specialization of ASTC commercialized crops.  
The role of ASTC in supporting agricultural employment is weakened by three main 
factors. First, continuing specialization of ASTC towards specific products creates barriers of 
entry for both current members and new members. Second, the ambivalent narrative of 
ASTC’s leader, when addressing different donors, produces difficulties in creating a uniform 
organizational culture and in setting ASTC members’ expectations. Third, the non-neutrality 
of the cooperative’s political position, due to its history, creates barriers to its own access to 
municipal funds. All of these factors can hamper the bridging role of ASTC and expose it to the 
strong risk of becoming the mirror of a specific political or economic group. The analysis 
presented in this chapter is based on the burgeoning materials produced by ASTC (project 
reports, cooperative power point presentations, cooperative management systems), as well as 
on participant observation of the cooperative activities, in depth interviews, and on a focus 
group with a sample of the cooperative members. 
There were other studies on ASTC by bachelor’s students and experts on earlier 
missions. However, there has been no social inquiry into the effect of the cooperative on social 
structure. Most of the studies performed to date have focused mainly on technical and fiscal 
aspects, with the presence of experts as agronomists and accountants.  
After this introduction, section 5.2 illustrates the objectives of the ASTC. Section 5.3 uses 
coalition theory to interpret the features of ASTC: the relevance of external funds over the 
years and the main turning points in the cooperative on its trajectory towards specialization 
in crops. Section 5.4 outline the cooperative’s positioning in local politics and the negative 
effects in terms of access to local funds and other municipality actions. Finally, section 5.5 
focuses on village A to outline how the trajectory towards specialization has been influencing 
political position of villagers. 
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5.2 ASTC’s mission 
The producers’ cooperative – the object of the analysis, was born from the initiative of a 
nun, a member of a philanthropic Catholic association, who has been operating in the 
municipality since the Seventies. 
ASTC is active in 12 agrarian reform settlements, among the 18 settlements currently 
existing, and in a few other localities (“fazendas” and “sitios”) in the same municipality and in 
the neighboring municipalities. Households living in those settlements represent 69.9% of the 
total households in the agrarian reform settlements. There are 65 participating households, 
representing 4.5% of households living in the 12 agrarian reform settlements where the ASTC 
is operating. 
Households living in the 18 settlements are referred as “sem terra” in ASTC and in the 
general narrative beside their real land tenure arrangement, as outlined in the previous 
chapters. Agrarian reform settlers include households that have passed through a period of 
occupation as small landowners and sugar cane workers living in the village before the social 
movement occupation, and households that were living in surroundings of “assentamentos” 
and were invited to settle in the newly created villages. Most of them had to face a significant 
change both in terms of social role, from land labor workers or employed/unemployed 
individuals in the urban slums to small landholders or producers. Others had to transition 
from being sugar cane cutters to agricultural production. Households that arrived from other 
parts of Alagoas, attracted by the promise of a piece for land (varying from 3 to 11 hectares), 
had to cope with occupation and struggle that ranged from several months to several years in 
the case of the second wave of  “assentamentos”. 
ASTC was born to support specifically these “sem terra”. However, the ASTC statute has 
recently changed to include all small producers, not only those living in agrarian reform 
settlements and the municipality where the ASTC has its headquarters, but also in the 
neighboring municipalities.  
The general objective of the cooperative is  
[To] strengthen the productive activities, knowledge, information, organization and competitiveness of 
small producers, making possible, their sustainable insertion in the social and economic context of the 
region, having always as principles the respect for biodiversity in all of its manifestations (Art. 2 
cooperative statute). 
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There are seven specific objectives stated in ASTC’s statute. First, strengthening the 
subsistence agricultural production of farmers, the production of fruits and vegetables, the 
flower production, small animal breeding and the production of organic compounds. Second, 
supporting the process of industrialization of agricultural production, cattle breeding and 
handicrafts. Third, supporting the commercialization of processed and non-processed 
agricultural products. Fourth, promoting the protection of natural heritage with 
environmental education, promoting recycling, conservation of hydric resources, rational use 
of flora and fauna resources, and reforestation of impoverished areas. Fifth, promoting eco-
tourism. Sixth, organize or coordinate the training of members and their family in family 
farming, ecology, organic agriculture, production and industrialization, gender issues, popular 
culture, folklore and entertainment, and marketing information systems. Seventh, providing 
credit to cooperative members responding to the amount of products provided by cooperative 
members or in phases of production, respecting the financial equilibrium of the cooperative 
(Art.3 cooperative statute). 
“ASTC is an enterprise that helps members. If it were not for ASTC, members would suffer too much, 
because they would lose their production.” 
“ASTC is trying to change a little the reality of our municipality: before we produced, but we did not know 
where to sell. ASTC also tries to help the relations between farmers“ Quotes from focus group 
5.3 ASTC history and the role of donors  
This section shows that coalition theory allows the interpretations of the turning points 
of ASTC history, the way in which decisions were made, and eventually forecast the 
cooperative’s decisions. It also illustrates that ASTC trajectory towards specialization could 
hamper the brokering position of ASTC in the villages. Furthermore cooperative specialization 
makes narrative, used by the ASTC charismatic leader and founder, to attract funds for 
smaller farmers contradictory. The main argument of the charismatic leader is that ASTC 
plays a crucial role in supporting the most disadvantaged people. However, ASTC choice to 
buy mainly high value fruits is leading to the gradual exclusion less wealthy producers. The 
main obstacle for participation is the necessity of investments and additional labor force 
required to specialize in the production of high value fruits. 
Organization theory identifies four key elements of which an organization is composed 
(Scott 1998): 1) Participants, who are the actors that play a role in the organization’s activities 
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and derive some benefits from the organization; 2) Social structure, which captures the 
persisting patterns of relationship between participants in the organizations; 3) Technology, 
the way in which the organization accomplishes its objectives; 4) Environment, which defines 
the physical, cultural, technological and social context in which the organization is embedded.  
The cooperative can be interpreted under the framework of coalitions theory (March 
1962), (March 1992),  (Hula 1999). The theory interprets actors as engaged in resource 
exchange that is regulated by rules. The choices taken by the organization are the result of the 
process of bargaining between actors.  
The three main mechanisms adopted to manipulate and control coalition formation and 
outputs are to control rules’ formation, to control access to resources, and to control identity 
and preferences. Actors usually decide to join coalitions to derive benefits from being able to 
reference an explicit policy or goal of the organization, to participate in the definition of 
coalitions goals, and to receive a symbolic reward from participation.  
Actors have different positions in the coalition: core members, players and tag-alongs. 
Core members are the ones that are mostly involved in the activities of the coalition and that 
are at core of defining strategies. Players are actors that only have specific interests in the 
activities of the coalition. Tag-alongs are actors that only have small interest in being part of 
the coalition but still find it relevant to participate (D. A. McFarland and Gomez 2013). 
5.3.1 Application of organization theory to ASTC 
Organization theory captures the main features of the organization: ASTC actions are the 
result of resource exchange and the negotiation process between the different actors involved 
and the ability of the coalition coordinator to use different narratives towards different actors 
allows the coalition to persist.  
Coalition theory is part of the group of theories that capture dependency inside the 
organizations and not with the environment. A critique to the application of this theory refers 
to the fact that ASTC has resource-dependency bonds with organizations that are strictly 
outside and not inside the cooperative. They are not sub-units of the cooperative but rather 
autonomous organizations whose existence is not questioned by the end of the cooperative. 
However, given their strong ability to influence the cooperative decisions and actions, and the 
inexistence of the cooperative as an autonomous organization, they can be considered 
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equivalent to subunits of the cooperative. It is possible to consider the actors that make 
cooperative action possible as members of a coalition. The process of exchange of resources 
between actors (Emerson 1962) is the constitutive element of the coalition. The interests of 
the different actors involved in the organization differ. The presence of ambiguity as an 
element allows the coalition to persist (March 1994).  
Furthermore, the presence of such potentially high level of conflict between different 
stakeholders is an element that favors the emergence of a charismatic leader. The key element 
of coalitions is the fact that that they are characterized by the presence of different goals 
among stakeholders. The sustainability of coalitions can be considered related to the duration 
of key elements that constitute an organization: goals, participants, and the identity that this 
organization is able to promote (D. A. McFarland and Gomez 2013). 
The other important element is that coalitions tend to start strong and end weak. This 
aspect is often referred in ASTC members’ narratives referred to as follows: “the cooperative 
was born big and this makes it hard to make it sustainable”. Being a large complex 
organization with a large physical building, quite a wide range of activities to support, and 
members distributed over different geographical areas is one of the reasons why the ASTC 
must always exist as a coalition of several actors that, besides having often diverging interests, 
can provide the support to her actions.  
The creation and support of a producers’ cooperative supported by external actors 
involves at least four actors: international donors that finance the intervention, local 
government that negotiates with the donors for the definition of priorities, NGOs that 
implement the project, and local elites that are the intermediaries between the NGOs and the 
rural population. It is possible that those different actors might have conflicting objectives; 
therefore, the characteristics of these new institutions are also the result of a negotiation 
process among different interest groups. It is important to analyze the dynamics of 
interdependence among such actors, identifying what is the resource that flows among them 
and what is the process of decision making.  
The members of the coalition that compose ASTC are: 1) households that decide to join 
the cooperative and to sell products to it, 2) national or international donors financing 
cooperative activities, 3) customers that purchase cooperative products and 4) municipal 
political parties that support or hamper cooperative activities. 
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Chapter four has described the interaction between ASTC and the village social structure. 
This chapter focuses on outlining the presence of exchange flows between different members 
of the coalition that make the presence of the cooperative possible and explore the role of the 
coalition leader. 
The main forms of exchange between actors involved in the coalition are the following: 
ASTC members sell their products to the ASTC that collects their products at their place and 
guarantee a market destination. Brazilian private enterprises claim social corporate 
responsibility by supporting the cooperative projects. Municipal politics trade political 
representation with vote. Italian donors respond to their necessity to donate to projects that 
support the most disadvantaged people and to promote organizations that are considered to 
be virtuous.  
Coalition theory foresees three types of positions in a coalition: core members, players 
and tag alongs. The core members of the coalition are considered to be the most productive 
farmers’ members of ASTC that have core interest in the continuity of cooperative action, as 
well as the Italian local authority and Italian associations that have been supporting the 
cooperative since its foundation. Players are cooperative members that have a small 
production, and Brazilian donors that support specific aspects of cooperative action. The 
category of tag-alongs is comprised of occasional donors such as groups of Italian volunteers, 
linked to Catholic church, that come to visit the project, as well as some ASTC members that 
are not producing anything for the cooperative but still receive some small benefits related to 
participation in some training and symbolic benefits from membership. 
Under this framework, the nun, being the charismatic leader and founder of ASTC, is the 
coalition leader. She plays the role of broker between the different actors that are involved in 
ASTC activities. She is the one that attracts Brazilian and Italian funds to support the activities 
of the cooperative, which is yet far from obtaining financial autonomy. The nun plays a crucial 
role by ensuring funding for cooperative activity and self-sustains her position in the 
organization (“she brings resources from Italy, she writes the projects”). She is in contact with 
different organizations by means of project funding and, at the beginning of ASTC activities, 
she was directly involved in local politics as she was part of a special commission that created 
by the municipality for agrarian reform. 
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The coalition leader’s use of different narratives for the different donors is reflected in 
the notion of ambiguity that is present in coalition theory. Ambiguity and control over 
resources are the strategies that allow coalitions to exist and persist over time. While the nun 
has no control over rulemaking, which is the responsibility of technicians in the cooperative, 
she plays an important role in the definition of identity and preferences. She presents the 
cooperative as an alternative model to the dominant role of landlords and political patronage. 
As other recent studies point out, poor people are the most dependent on politicians’ bonds 
(De Wit and Berner 2009). The nun presents the cooperative as a way to escape from this 
captivity. Also, the choice of the founding date of the ASTC is strongly related to this narrative. 
The ASTC was founded on the day of Brazilian independence, on September 7, 2003. The 
difference in the narrative used for different donors will be presented in the next sections that 
will also explain the importance of local politics on cooperative actions. 
5.3.2 The genesis of ASTC 
Before the first project to support agricultural production and commercialization of new 
citizens of the municipality (“sem terra”), the nun’s first activities in rural areas were related 
to evangelization. She had the idea to support family farming when she got involved in the 
council, created by the mayor (prefeito), for the management of agrarian reform “Conselho 
Municipal da Reforma Agraria”. The presence of agrarian reform represented for the 
municipality a very relevant source of change in terms of the number of inhabitants. 
“We decided to enter in agrarian reform commission created by the municipality mayor. The 
mobilization of people by social movements, in the framework of agrarian reform, caused, in very 
short time, a dramatic increase of municipality inhabitants (with all of the problems that this 
brings also in countries with bigger resources!). During the discussions, that could have made us 
escape from the main objective, we remembered that the main characters of the story are “sem 
terra” and we tried to be the continuation of their shy and clumsy voices. Everybody understood 
that we are on their side, helping them to read with critical view the different proposals they 
received and creating space so that they can feel at their ease and they openly speak of their 
difficulties” Quote from letter to Italian association followers  
“The nun was taking part in the “Conselho Municipal da Reforma Agraria”, created by the ruling mayor 
in 1997, and she, along with her congregation, was carrying out a work of evangelization in the rural areas. 
When she was doing her work of evangelization in rural areas, she noticed that people, besides having 
received land, some basic infrastructure and some financial help from the government, did not have the 
financial conditions to develop production and many households were in a worse condition than before. One 
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day, when I was in the “Conselho”, she invited me, (I was at that time, municipal secretary of agriculture) to 
meet to discuss in order to have some ideas on how to improve living conditions of these people. Hence we 
had the idea that we could help them by providing technical assistance to improve the agricultural 
production and by supporting commercialization of their products. It was in the period when the nun was 
always travelling to Italy. She travelled to Italy with this idea and brought an agronomist from there to 
prepare a project to be presented in Italy. It was therefore in 2001 when the first project started with 
resources from Italy”.  Interview with the first ASTC director. 
The nun started to operate in one of the most remote settlements. The choice to work 
with these settlements is a specific mission of her religious congregation. After the failure of 
the activities in this settlement and death threats to the priest living in the settlement who 
was supporting their project, the nun and her congregation started to focus on other 
settlements. More specifically, the following target of their action was village B and only later 
village A. 
The general objective of the first project (2001-2003), financed by an Italian local 
authority, was supporting households in agrarian reform settlements to improve their living 
conditions. The main discourse referred both in the project description and in the cooperative 
general assemblies was: “the cooperative should help to undermine and eradicate the 
centennial culture of dependence from sugar cane industry for the people of Alagoas.” More 
specifically the first project was to support “peasants” to become autonomous in their 
agricultural production and to create a communitarian organization that can transform and 
commercialize the crops produced. The dream was to fight with “sem terra” families to escape 
misery, conquer dignity, freedom and rights to citizenship in its deepest meaning”. (Excerpt, 
project report 2009-2011 p.18) 
 “The nun got the idea of the cooperative. She came here to visit the settlement. She saw the 
necessity of members. She started the first project: we started with a weekly market (“feirinha”) in 
the place that would have become the headquarters of the cooperative. She started to take our 
products, and at the time when we did not know how to process our crops, we took the products 
and sold them to the general markets in Recife. Then the cooperative was created and they started 
to make processed fruits in order to better preserve them and prevent them from losses.” 
Interview id 4 village A 
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Coalition’s members 
Since its creation, the ASTC has been supported by several donors such as Italian local 
authorities, Italian religious organizations, and Brazilian funds both from public sector and 
from private enterprises. The importance of external funds for ASTC’s existence is 
acknowledged to be extremely important by both a large number of the interviewed members 
and also by non-members. The nun has been the main person responsible for writing projects. 
She has been representing ASTC, both in Italy and in Brazil, to attract funds to support the 
projects she started. 
“Respondent Id 4: today this exists just because of the nun. If it were not for the nun, this 
cooperative would not exist. 
Interviewer: But let’s imagine that one day she starts to be tired and she decides to go home. In 
your opinion will you continue with the cooperative?  
Respondent Id 4: yes, we will see if it can continue. I think it will not. Everything that exists in the 
cooperative is the nun.  
Respondent id 1: she is the heart of the cooperative 
Respondent Id 4: because if it were not her, it is her that elaborates the projects, it is her that 
makes the calculations, she acquires a lot of funds from Italy to be brought here, also with the Brazilian 
entities, was it not her that got the funds?”  
The main partners of ASTC have been, from the beginnings of the activities, an Italian 
association and a Brazilian religious association. The Italian association was specifically 
created in 2001 to support the activity of the nun and her religious group that has been 
operating in the municipality since 1997. The association is based in the Northeast of Italy and 
initially composed of the nun’s relatives, but later it grew bigger, and in 2012, it opened a 
branch of the association in a neighboring region where the nun has been promoting her 
projects for almost ten years. The Italian association has been the key partner of all initiatives 
promoted by the nun. 
The initial activity of the Italian association and the Brazilian religious association was to 
support children. But from 1998 the main focus of their activity shifted to support “sem terra”, 
or to be more precise, the inhabitants of agrarian reform settlements. 
The first project to support agricultural activities started in 2001 and ended in 2003. It 
was financed by an Italian local authority and aimed at overcoming the following obstacles: 1) 
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lack of technical knowledge of “sem terra” in the management of their plot, 2) lack of 
transportation means to commercialize agricultural products, 3) impossibility to get access to 
credit at a facilitated price and 4) lack of knowledge of the principles of self-management and 
the rules of co-habitation. The main motivation behind the implementation of the project was 
that the Brazilian government was not able to support these new small farm holders closely 
enough. The government did provide them with a house, some infrastructure in the 
settlement and some initial credit to start their agricultural activity, but was insufficient in 
everyday technical assistance. The importance of having access to microcredit was 
particularly relevant as all settlers were not able to give back the credit received from the 
government and therefore they could never have access to any form of credit at a preferred 
rate from any Brazilian bank. (2000 project report).  
Since the launch of the first projects promoted by nun, there have also been activities 
financed by Brazilian entities. Most of them were especially aiming at providing training and 
technical assistance to farmers. Only from did 2006 ASTC start to receive more funds from 
Brazilian than from Italian donors. The first important project with Brazilian donors started in 
2006 and was supported by a very important federal enterprise (Table 5.1). 
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Table  5.1 First projects and ASTC access to funds 
  
Italian local 
authority 
Italian 
other 
fund 
Italian 
government 
fund 
Brazilian 
federal 
funds 
Brazilian 
Bank 
funds27 
Brazilian 
state 
funds28 
Brazilian 
private 
enterprise 
fund 
Brazilian 
technical 
assistance 
funds29 
2001 
NA 
      
NA 
2002       
2003        
2004 
€110,000 
       
2005 5,000 €       
2006 216,000 €  49,000 R$  
100,000 
R$ 
135,000 
R$ 
660,000 R$ 
 
2007  45,000 €    
2008    
216,000 
R$ 
  
2009        
2010 
60,000 € 
       
2011 
2,500 € 
    
590,000 R$ 
 
2012       
2013               
 
 
5.3.3 ASTC history turning points 
Currently the cooperative purchases, transports and processes a limited number of fruits 
to be commercialized as pulp to make juice.  Such services represent an important facility to 
farmers because of the very difficult accessibility of rural areas. 
The trajectory towards specialization can be understood as a result of negotiation inside 
a coalition. These turning points can be interpreted as a result of the dominant coalition 
because the most relevant changes always took place during times of fund shortages, and it 
was always the new donor that defined the new actions that the cooperative had to pursue. 
In 2008 the project presented to the Italian local authority, which has provided support 
to “sem terra” since 2001, was not approved. ASTC had to cope with resource shortage, decide 
what were the most relevant activities and on what cuts to make. In order to evaluate the 
                                                        
27 This fund supported the creation of a micro-credit fund. 
28 This fund supported the creation of a micro-credit fund 
29 This fund was devoted to support short training courses for farmers. 
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cooperative’s activities, ASTC engaged a Brazilian consulting company to evaluate its own 
activities.  
First turning point: end of weekly market (“feirinha”) 
The activities implemented by the first project (2001-2003) targeted agrarian reform 
settlers and aimed to support these new landowners in the production and commercialization 
of their crops, providing them with technical assistance, training and access to credit 
especially for small irrigation systems. There was no focus on triggering the production of 
some specific crops. The project aimed to enable farmers to diversify their diet and supported 
the production of several different types of crops. 
The ASTC was founded in 2003. Since its creation, ASTC also processed fruits, such as 
passion fruit, to make frozen pulp to be sold, but this was still a very marginal activity. The 
project did not have sufficient infrastructures where they could perform these 
transformational activities.   
A very important activity of this first period of the cooperative was the presence of a 
weekly market, called “feirinha”, that had been operating in the headquarters of the 
cooperative since 2004. The actual physical structure of the cooperative was conceived as a 
covered market, where the cooperative’s members could commercialize their products. ASTC 
members brought several types of products such as cassava, banana, oranges, lemons, passion 
fruits and vegetables. The revenues derived from selling such products were not disbursed 
directly to the ASTC. Rather, each farmer gained in proportion to products sold. ASTC offered 
to farmers was a space to sell. Furthermore ASCT facilitated sales of members’ products to 
local hotels and restaurants. 
According to key informants, the first two years were successful as “feirinha” took place 
on Saturday, which was a very convenient day as it did not coincide with the daily municipal 
market and it was the day that most tourists bought groceries. The main market clients beside 
tourists were hotels and restaurants from the municipality. The cooperative, during that 
period, started to create a list of regular clients to serve.  
Several interviewees referred to feirinha as a very positive initiative: it was a moment of 
socialization where households from different settlements gather together every week and it 
guaranteed a market for some farmers’ crops. Some members of the cooperative who lived 
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the farthest from the “feirinha”, for example, those from village A, would arrive on the night 
before the market, sleep in the cooperative’s headquarters, and sell their products to tourists, 
restaurants and hotels on the following day. 
2007 was a difficult year because there was a surplus of passion fruit production. ASTC 
had been strongly promoting such production. As a result several households, especially in 
village A, had invested significantly in such crop and they had a very large production. ASTC 
however did not have enough buyers that could purchase the entire production. Therefore a 
large amount of the production of passion fruit got destroyed. This is considered a negative 
episode in the history of the cooperative.  
In 2008, after four years of activities, the “feirinha” was put to a stop. There are three 
reasons why this activity ended: 1) contrary recommendations of a Brazilian consultancy 
company, 2) change of municipality weekly market that coincided with the day of cooperative 
“feirinha”, 3) difficulty in selling all of the products brought by farmers.  
The Brazilian consultancy company, contacted to evaluate the efficiency of ASTC, argued 
that the “feirinha” was not an economically sustainable activity. To optimize revenue subject 
to expenditures the cooperative should focus on what is the core business of the organization 
and the commercialization of vegetables and other fruits was not. It was not useful to create 
income for the cooperative as the revenues from products sold were not directed to the 
cooperative itself but rather to the single ASTC members. 
When town market day was moved from Friday to Saturday and the cooperative decided 
to move its own to Friday, problems emerged. This resulted in a reduction of customers to the 
“feirinha”. 
It happened often that cooperative members brought more supply than necessary to 
meet the demand of tourists and hotels and restaurants. This resulted in losses in terms of 
farmers’ products at “feirinha”. 
Some ASTC members felt betrayed by the shutdown of the “feirinha”. They had invested 
in many crops that ASTC initially supported both with credit and training. After the end of the 
“feirinha”, some crops, such as bananas, citruses, pineapples, and vegetables, were no longer 
commercialized by the ASTC and they had to find other markets to sell them.  
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Second turning point: decision to specialize on fruits and invest in agro-processing 
After receiving the recommendations from the Brazilian consultancy company, from 
2008 on ASTC decided to specialize in fruit production that responded to market requests, 
which are mainly related to the tourism sector. Indeed, the municipality was an important 
tourist destination in Brazil. The cooperative was therefore forced to provide a larger variety 
of fruits than cooperative members had ever produced. This decision also implied that 
cooperative members were strongly encouraged to plant new fruits’ trees in their plots. In the 
meanwhile fruits, which are not produced by ASCT’s members, are bought by the cooperative 
elsewhere.  
The decision to specialize in fruit production, along with the different harvesting times of 
the fruits produced, made it necessary for the ASTC to invest in fruit processing in order to 
avoid losses. ASTC focused its investments on creating an agro-industry for fruit processing. 
Furthermore it endorsed credit to a limited number of ASTC members to build small buildings 
(two rooms) designed for the processing and storage of fruits (“casas das frutas”) in their 
home village. Lastly it promoted fruit diversification and production planning. “Casas das 
frutas” allowed some farmers to process the fruits immediately after the harvest in order to 
prevent losses, especially on the most perishable fruits. They also allowed farmers to sell their 
products at a higher price.  At survey time, there were only five “casas das frutas” working in 
village A. Especially in village A, where the production is the highest, the ASTC technicians 
visited plots and defined the number of trees that each member should plant.  
ASTC opened participation not only to households not residing in the agrarian reform 
settlements but also to neighboring areas including “fazendas” and “sitios”. This choice to 
include farmers also from other municipalities is related to the specialization focus of the 
cooperative. Production becomes more important than location among the criteria to include 
farmers.  
In chapter 3 I have illustrated the great difference between products that ASTC was 
promoting before 2008 (cassava, banana, citrus, coco, vegetables) and the type of products on 
which the cooperative focused afterwards (soursop, passion fruit and acerola). They differ in 
several dimensions: unitary costs for crop implantation and maintenance (pesticides and 
fertilizers application), amount of labor force needed both for production and harvesting, 
length and type of cycle of production, and level of perishability. 
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5.3.4 Ambivalent narrative to attract funds  
Since the 1980’s, there has been an attempt in development discourse to associate the 
conception of empowerment promoted by development agencies, especially NGOs, to 
voluntarism and de-politicization (Hickey S., Mohan G. 2004). 
Despite this often-declared neutrality, all development actors, including ASTC and the 
organizations supporting it, follow guiding values in their activity, such that it is impossible to 
claim for neutrality (Bornstein 2011). Such values guide both the organization’s actions and 
narrative used to attract funds (Chen, Lune, and Queen 2013).  
The values of ASCT leader strongly influence ASTC activities both in the interpretation of 
reality and therefore the definition of priorities and in the representation of the cooperative 
to attract funds. There are two issues that hamper this self-declared neutrality of ASCT. 
The choice of the nun to organize farmers in a cooperative rather than in other form of 
enterprise is certainly related to the biographical background of the nun. She comes from a 
Northeast region of Italy where cooperatives, especially in the agricultural sector, play an 
important role. In ASTC documents, the cooperative is often referred as “cooperative family”. 
This is relevant as it mimics the name given to the first consumer’s cooperatives in the region 
where the nun came from. The choice of this form of organization made it easier also to have 
access to funds in the nun’s own region.  
Also, the religious role of the nun certainly allowed significant mobilization of resources 
and fostered the participation of Italian volunteers that worked in the cooperative. Those 
other funds came from both large religious organizations and private funds from single 
families in Italy. The main Italian associations responsible for supporting cooperative 
activities also have the option to adopt a family member of the ASTC by long distance.  Private 
donors can support one or more ASTC members or the studies of ASTC members’ children. 
The amount of these funds are not well known to most people on the board of directors, and 
people more involved in the cooperative activities are not aware of how they are used. The 
main accountability of these founds is mostly related to supporters in Italy.  
It is important to point out that this heterogeneous composition of funds that allow the 
cooperative to continue to exist is drawn upon different narratives for different donors. On 
the one hand the main objectives presented in projects to be founded by Brazilian donors are 
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more related to issues such as preventing migration from rural areas and making the 
cooperative an important economic engine. On the other hand the narrative adopted for 
Italian donors refer mostly to visions of humanitarian relief and the end of poverty. 
A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that it is possible to interpret the flow of 
resources between donors and recipients as a conversation where the comprehension 
between the two actors involved in the dialogue is strictly related to the construction of the 
same common background (Scollon and Scollon 2001). The nun therefore needs to adapt her 
narrative and present the reality she is interacting with using the language that the people she 
is addressing to are able to understand and identify with. 
The main objectives, of projects supported by the private Brazilian enterprise in the 
framework of corporate social responsibility, are comprised of the general goal to drive 
citizenship that include: supporting local development, promoting social insertion of people 
and groups, and reducing poverty and inequality.  The main activities promoted in the 
enterprise program are: 1) promote income generating activities and work opportunities, 2) 
educate to achieve professional qualification and 3) guarantee the rights of children and 
teenagers. 
The objectives of the projects to be financed by religious entities are more related to the 
discourse of humanitarian relief. In the project motivations, the more emphasized aspects of 
the project are the conditions of poverty of many households residing in the settlements, 
gender violence and the impact of corruption. The positive aspects emphasized include the 
changes that agrarian reform is offering to people. The presence of a number of family 
farmers instead is not emphasized in the projects’ narrative. 
5.4 ASCT economic and political position in the municipality 
This section aims at showing that the trajectory towards specialization increases 
dependence on the market. As such, villages are more directly affected by local politics. The 
section starts by describing the influence of municipality decisions on ASTC actions, and then 
it summarizes the role that the cooperative plays in each of the villages. This section 
continues, presenting the differences in production and in the number of people hired among 
members and non-members. It shows the evolution of ASCT membership and production in 
the three villages over time. It outlines the difference in attributes and position in the 
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networks of members and non-members. Lastly it focuses on village A, as it is the most 
specialized in new crops, and the most vulnerable to the afflictions of municipal politics. 
5.4.1 ASTC and the municipality 
ASCT specialization in high value crops creates on the one hand barriers of entry in the 
cooperative and on the other increases dependence on the market.  
The importance of political representation is related to the strong dependency of the 
agrarian reform settlements on public policy both at the municipal and the federal level. 
Furthermore political partisanship concerns some settlers’ expectations from the state. They 
ask from the state the same protection that they received from sugar cane plantation 
landowner.  
Villagers’ conditions are strongly influenced by municipality decisions in the provision of 
services (school, hospital and roads). Furthermore the municipality influences the farmers’ 
commercialization directly by the way in which it maintains roads’ conditions and by its 
decision to purchase family farmers’ crops, to be used for school meals30. In addition 
politicians, part of the municipality administration, often offer to villagers’ individual benefits, 
such as to jobs, as a reward to settlers that more actively supported their electoral campaign. 
All agrarian reform settlements are organized in associations and they all have an elected 
president. It is very frequent in the municipality that villages’ presidents are offered a job in 
the public administration such as school vigilantes (“vigia da escola”) or village health officers.  
As shown in the previous section, ASTC’s activities have been largely dependent on 
foreign and national donors’ support (given in a regime of extraordinary situation), and there 
is no ordinary line of state financing that regularly supports ASTC. Funds that the cooperative 
receives from external or national administration, except for one program, always have to 
pass through a process of grant competition.  
Cooperatives working in agriculture aim at promoting one of the most challenging 
activities in the economy. Agriculture is one of the most subsidized sectors in richest 
countries. In Brazil, there are several federal budget lines specifically devoted to support 
family farming.  
                                                        
30 Programa Merenda Escolar (art. 7, Law nº 11.947/2009) 
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The analysis of the focus group’s transcript points out that producing high value crops, 
that constitute the core business of the cooperative, requires investments and training. During 
the focus group, the issue on which participants debated longer and with more emphasis was 
about fertilizers and technical assistance. Focus groups’ participants argued that ASTC is 
asking them to further diversify their production without giving them credit, and this 
prevents them from taking all of the necessary actions to invest in these new products.  
“Member 1: During the general assembly they say that you should diversify production. But 
if you do not have the conditions to preserve what you have, how can you diversify? 
Member 2: Goyaba is impossible to produce. We already tried but it is impossible. Do you 
know that to do caja it takes more than fifteen years? Who has the financial resources to do that? 
The majority of acerola comes from non-members. ASTC tells us: “why don’t you all plant a little 
of acerola, so we are all going to have acerola?” For this investments are necessary.” 
The last funds directed to the cooperative, such as Brazilian private enterprise and funds 
from religious institutions and Italian local authority, were mostly directed to activities of 
transformation and less to support activities in the field.  
Member 1: ASTC board of directors, during the last period, has been forgetting about the 
activities on the fields. At the beginning of the projects there was investment for the field. I think that 
a closer connection with the field should be present. I think that this connection should be re-
activated.  
Members of the cooperative, during the focus group, said that a possible solution to this 
problem of funds shortage would be a greater role of the ruling municipality administration in 
supporting cooperative’s activities.  
Member 2: The issue is that the cooperative does not have strengths to do more than it does. After 
that there is the municipality. If the municipality would buy more for the school meals! There are many 
students, but the municipality does not buy, therefore it creates trouble for us. 
Member 3: But it is not only about politics, we also have resources from outside (from projects).  
In Brazilian legislation, since 2009, there has been a federal legislation (Law Nº 11.947, 
June, 16 2009) that imposes on local administration the obligation to purchase products from 
local family farmers operating in the municipality to provide schools with meals.  
Art. 2 The guidelines of school food provision are: V the support to sustainable development as 
an incentive to purchase of diversified food, produced locally and preferentially by family farming and 
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by family farming entrepreneurs, prioritizing the traditional indigenous communities and remaining 
quilombos.  
Art. 14.  Of the National Fund of Education Development (FNDE) in framework of the National 
program for School Food, a minimum of 30% has to be used to acquire food products directly from 
family farming and from rural family entrepreneurs or from its organizations, with primary emphasis 
on agrarian reform settlements, indigenous traditional communities and quilombos community 
(“Portal Do FNDE - Apresentação” 2013). 
Despite this law ASTC have been selling its products to other local administrations in the 
neighboring municipalities but not to the municipality where it is located.  The reason why the 
ruling administration does not support ASTC action is related to the political positioning of 
the cooperative. Most of the cooperative’s members share the same political affiliation that 
differs from the municipality political coalition. Local politicians of the opposition party 
recognize the cooperative’s actions as valuable. During the 2012 electoral campaign, in 
electoral radio advertisements blue party candidates referred to the cooperative as a 
successful example of entrepreneurship in the region and as a good partner. Furthermore 
during the electoral campaign, several political meetings were held in the cooperative’s 
headquarters. It is important to point out that in the day of general assembly there was also a 
meeting with the blue candidate. According to nun’s narrative the ruling party is against the 
cooperative’s action because ASTC supports family farming.  
The ASTC’s proximity to one of the two parties is connected to a series of factors related 
to the history of the cooperative’s creation. The project that then led to the ASTC’s creation 
has been implemented during the ruling period of the blue party; the first land donation to 
build the cooperative infrastructures was given by the blue party administration. 
Furthermore all of the technical services and access to funds that village A received, were 
negotiated during the period of the blue party’s administration. It is important to remember 
that members of village A both represent the majority of cooperative members and account 
for a major share of ASTC total production (approximately 60%). Lastly the first director of 
ASTC was a member of the local administration at the time when the first project to support 
agrarian reform settlements was implemented. 
The municipality does not purchase cooperative products, namely fruit pulp, despite the 
federal legislation (Law Nº 11.947, June, 16 2009).  
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Local administration officials occupied a piece of land that was donated by the previous 
mayor. This land is extremely important, as it would have allowed the cooperative to build a 
structure devoted to one of the activities of crop processing, which, by Brazilian law, should 
be located outside the main transformation building.  
There is no dialogue between ASTC and the agriculture municipal office (“secretaria 
municipal de agricoltura”). During one radio interview, one of the members of the ASTC board 
of directors, responding to the journalist question, pointed out that it would be good to have a 
partnership with the municipality in order to have a collaboration related to the improvement 
of road conditions but it has not been possible to have a dialogue on this issue. The problem of 
roads is crucial because, during the wet season, it is very difficult to transport products from 
the settlements to town by truck, where they will be transformed. It happened more than 
once that products had to wait for more than one day before the truck could come to pick 
them. In such occasions, in order to prevent this, usually the solution adopted by ASTC has 
been to send the cooperative tractor to collect products. This choice however implies higher 
costs of transportation and faster decay of the tractor, as the distance from several villages to 
town is more than 20 km of road in very bad conditions.  
Considering therefore the huge influence that municipal politics have on ASTC activities, 
The main argument presented in this chapter is that it is crucial for ASTC to prevent a 
complete homogeneity of members’ political positioning.  
5.4.2 ASTC crops and labor supply 
Since 2008, ASTC has decided to focus only on some fruits while the rest of farmers’ 
crops have to find other market destinations. A more detailed analysis of crops’ features is 
presented in chapter 3, using secondary data on villages studied. Data presented in all tables 
in this section is the result of the household survey that I have conducted in 2012.  
The different crops have been categorized in terms of their possibility to be sold to the 
ASTC. Households have been therefore classified in four groups according to typology of crops 
they produce to be commercialized. First, households producing both crops that could be sold 
to the ASTC as well as those that could not. Second, households producing crops that cannot 
be sold to ASTC. Third, households that only produce crops for subsistence and not for 
commercialization. Fourth, households that produce and sell crops which the most important 
for the coop commercialization.  
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Table 5.2 illustrates that village A has the larger percentage of households that produce 
products that can be both sold to the coop and products that have to find other market 
destinations. Village A is also the only village in the municipality studied where a significant 
part of the population produces only crops that can be sold to ASTC. Instead, in the other two 
villages, households that produce crops that the coop does not buy constitute most of the 
population. The percentage of households that do not produce crops for commercialization 
ranges from 8% in village C to 19% village A. In table 5.2 does not show whether households 
actually sold such products to coop but only typologies of crops produced for the 
commercialization. 
Table 5.2 Households by the type of crops commercialized by villages 
  Both ASTC and non-ASTC Only non-ASTC Only for consumption Only ASTC  
Village A 
41 12 19 30 
40% 12% 19% 29% 
Village B 
12 22 4 0 
32% 58% 11% 0% 
Village B 
11 23 3 0 
32% 62% 8% 0% 
 
As outlined in chapter 3, the most important crops that ASTC commercializes are labor-
intensive crops. Soursop and passion fruit, which are the core production of ASTC members, 
have high perishability and specific harvesting seasons while banana and pineapple have a 
continuous production cycle. This implies that while the former crops have peaks of labor 
force demand, the latter crops have more stable labor force demand over the entire year.  
Table 5.3 compares households that hire and do not hire, in the same four groups of table 
5.2. The variable hire describes the fact that the households employ, for their family farming 
activities, individuals that belong to other households in the same village where they reside. 
Table 5.3 shows that there are more households that hire labor force among households 
that produce either only coop marketable crops or other crops. Village C represents the only 
exception where most households that hire labor force are households that produce only 
products that ASTC does not commercialize. This result can be explained by the presence of a 
large number of households that produce cassava and the presence of a mill in the village. The 
combination of the two factors can imply that a relevant number of people rather than 
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organizing the production of cassava to have frequent small harvests prefer to produce large 
quantity of cassava to be then processed in the mill. The price of cassava flour is higher than 
simple cassava. The necessity to plant and harvest large quantities of cassava at once requires 
therefore an amount of labor force that is comparable to labor force needed by fruit trees. 
Table 5.3 Use of external labor force use by category of production 
    
Both ASTC and 
non- ASTC 
Only non-ASTC 
Only for 
consumption 
Only ASTC  
Village A 
Do not hire 13 17 8 16 
Hire 17 2 4 25 
Village B 
Do not hire 5 17 3 0 
Hire 7 5 1 0 
Village B 
Do not hire 9 15 3 0 
Hire 2 8 0 0 
 
Table 5.4 describes where households declared to sell their products. For what 
concerned ASTC members, the ASTC management system provides the exact value sold to 
ASTCs. For non-members, however, this is not available, as the coop tracks the total sold by 
non-members but not their identity. Table 5.4, differently from the previous tables on the 
potential places where households can sell their products, compares households that hire and 
do not hire, according to market destination of their products combined with households’ 
membership in the ASTC. The four categories are: 1) households that are ASTC members and 
sell to ASTC, 2) households that are ASTC members but do not sell to ASTC and 3) households 
that are not ASTC members and do not sell to ASTC, 4) households that are not ASTC 
members and sell to ASTC.  
The table 5.4 highlights that, in village A, 24 out of 26 members sell to ASTC; in village B, 
only 2 out 9 members; and in village C, only two members both sell to ASTC and have 
cooperative membership. In general, the table shows that among households that produce 
crops that are sold to the cooperative, there is a larger proportion that hire. In contrast, the 
opposite is true for households that do not sell to ASTC. Village C represents the only 
exception to the trends described where the only two members do not hire. This result is 
explained by the small production of these members that still have quite young soursop trees 
that yet did not achieve full potential productivity. 
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Table  5.4 Labor force use by market destination 
 
    ASTC & Sell ASTC & no sell No ASTC & no sell No ASTC & sell 
Village A 
Do not hire 8 0 45 1 
Hire 16 1 28 3 
Village B 
Do not hire 0 3 21 1 
Hire 2 4 7 0 
Village C 
Do not hire 2 0 25 0 
Hire 0 0 10 0 
5.4.3 ASTC trends in membership and production 
 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show the evolution over time of ASCT membership and production in 
the three villages.  It presents data on production sold to the cooperative only from 2007, as 
there is no data available in ASCT reports and management systems before that year. 
Figure 5.1 shows that in village B the number of members in the village does not 
significantly change over time. In village A instead there is a continuous increase in the 
number members. This trend does not show there was a turnover of members that left the 
cooperative and had been substituted. Between 2008 and 2009 four households (Id 15, Id 18, 
id 33 and 51) withdrew from the cooperative and have been substituted by four new other 
households that already had a higher level of productivity (id 40, id 63 and id 53).  
Figure 5.2 shows the production sold to the cooperative per year. A crucial moment is 
the end of ASTC weekly market in 2008, which corresponds also to a bad year in terms of 
cooperative production. By analyzing the history of the villages and the production sold to the 
cooperative it is possible to observe that moments in which members exit from the 
cooperative correspond to moments of change. In village A ASTC actions are able to influence 
more members than B because several of them sell to ASTC the equivalent value of over one 
gross minimum salary per month, as also shown by tables presented in the next pages. 
Furthermore ASTC members in village A are perceived by the rest of the village differently 
than they are in village B. It is observed while in village A that households that stop to sell to 
the coop also withdraw from the coop. 
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In village B in terms of membership there were no important changes but instead the 
number of households that sell products to ASTC decreased. Figure 5.2 shows that in 2007 all 
of the members sold a quantity of products to the cooperative but after 2009 the products 
sold to the cooperative decreased significantly. 
Figure 5.1 ASTC number of members trend by village 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Production trend in R$ by village 
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5.4.4 ASTC attributes and position in the network 
 
Referring back to one of the main findings of previous work on Community Based 
Organizations, such as producers’ cooperatives, one of the crucial risks of these organizations 
is to be composed only by the most wealthy and most central individuals and to be segregated 
from the rest of the social structure where they are located. As shown in the previous sections, 
the possibility of ASCT to perform their action is related to local politics. It is crucial for the 
coop to have access to state or municipal funds that can support their activity of 
commercialization. 
The next paragraphs illustrate households’ features by ASCT membership comparing 
network position, party affiliation and income from family farming. ASCT membership is 
measured both in terms of simple affiliation and production sold to the cooperative. There is a 
prevalence of cooperative members supporting the blue faction, but there is no complete 
homogeneity. Table 5.5 illustrates the distribution of members and non-members by their 
political positioning.  
 
Table 5.5 ASTC members’ participation to political parades  
 
  Households No. of non-participant  No. of orange participant  No. of blue participant 
Village A 
Non-ASTC  44% 16% 15% 
ASTC 9% 4% 13% 
Village B 
Non-ASTC  53% 21% 5% 
ASTC  8% 0% 13% 
 
The next pages analyze separately the two villages A and B, to show how despite similar 
percentage of ASTC members (26% and 21%) they differ in terms of family farming income 
but they have similar political party prevalence. 
Village A 
The first analysis refers to the relation between ASTC members and family farming 
income. Table 5.6 describes the distribution of ASTC members and not members by classes of 
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family farming income per month and proportion of ASTC members by class. Moreover it 
includes the average production sold to ASTC per month by members to make a comparison 
between the total income from family farming and the contribution of coop. However the two 
variables are not strictly comparable as the former is the net income while the latter still 
includes production costs. Looking at the proportion of ASTC members by class, it emerges 
that the number is very small in the two lowest classes, while from the third class and above 
the number grows together with the level of income. Table 5.6 also highlights how the average 
sold to ASTC is comparable with the class interval. 
Table 5.6 Family farming income distribution in village A by ASTC membership 
 
Income from family 
farming (R$) 
No. of non-ASTC 
households 
No. of ASTC 
households 
Proportion of ASTC 
members 
Average sold 
to ASTC (R$) 
0-100 22 1 4% 104 
101-300 15 0 0% 0 
301-660 29 14 33% 753 
661 -1242 8 6 43% 861 
Over 1242 2 5 71% 1507 
Total 76 26 25%   
 
Table 5.7 describes ASTC members’ distribution in parties by classes of value sold to 
ASTC. Furthermore it highlights the percentage of households that participate in blue party 
over the total. The table shows that the percentage of blue participants grows together with 
the level of value sold to ASTC. The highest class, where one is blue, one is orange and the 
third does not participate in any party, represents the only exception. However the three non-
participants are connected by kinship ties to the largest clan in the village that is prevalently 
blue, as shown in figure 5.3. 
Table 5.7 ASTC households’ distribution by amount sold to the cooperative in 2011 by party 
Monthly sold to 
coop (R$) 
No. of non-
participant  
No. of orange 
party  
No. of blue 
party 
Total 
households 
Blue party 
0-100 3 0 1 4 25% 
101-300 2 1 2 5 60% 
301-660 1 2 2 5 80% 
661 -1242 0 0 7 7 100% 
Over 1242 3 1 1 5 40% 
Total 9 4 13 26 65% 
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Figure 5.3 represents the joint graph of all the networks collected where only ASTC 
members are shown. Lines in red represent kinship ties, lines in purple frequent contact ties 
and lines in green agricultural employment ties. Dimension of nodes represents the value sold 
to ASTC. In the network it is possible to identify three groups that compose the cooperative. 
First relatives of ID 72 that were called to join his family in village A, which represents 42% all 
ASTC members. Second a group of new settlers with mostly blue affiliation. Third, there is a 
group of new settlers with mostly orange affiliation. It is possible to see that blue and orange 
members are divided in two groups and that there is only one tie that connects the two. Id 54, 
the only orange member inside the blue group, is the president of village A. ASTC are all 
connected except for id 59. 
 
Figure 5.3 Village A ASTC members join graph of the all networks collected  
 
 
 
Despite the prevalence of blue members in the cooperative, the social networks maps 
below illustrate how networks connect households, with different political affiliations. This 
element is crucial because ties between different groups, defined by political participation, 
offer the possibility to hamper conflicts among groups. 
Figure 5.4 presents the frequent contact network. Nodes dimension represents income 
from family farming. Nodes’ color represent participation to political parades: blue for blue 
party, orange for orange party and grey if no party has nominated. It shows that households 
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that participate in the same parades are close to each other in the network despite ASTC 
membership. However there is no complete segregation between blues and oranges as they 
are connected. It is important to observe that households that participate in political parades 
have the highest number of links and therefore they are central in the network. 
 
Figure 5.4  Village frequent contact network 
 
 
Table 5.8 represents the contact network degree distribution by ASTC. It shows that 
most of households with the highest degree are ASTC members. Furthermore there is higher 
percentage of ASTC members as the degree increases. 
Table 5.8 Village A frequent contact network degree distribution by ASTC  
Households’ 
degree 
No. of non-ASTC households No. of ASTC households Proportion of ASTC members 
0 2 0 0% 
1-2 27 5 16% 
3 23 6 21% 
4-5 19 7 27% 
6-13 5 8 62% 
Total 76 26 25% 
 
Figure 5.5 portrays family farming employment network. The presence of a tie between 
two nodes signifies that one individual works in the family farming activity for the other. The 
shape, color and dimension of the nodes are the same as those used in figure 4. In the network 
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there are two most central nodes: id 51 and id 71. They have the highest degree, as they are 
the two households that have more people that work for them. They are the two owners of the 
only two local shops in the village and the ones that own a truck. Id 51 is a former ASTC 
member while 71 is still affiliated. Both households were key figures in the party activities in 
2012 as they were the ones that brought households to the respective parades with their 
truck. However, despite their differences in political participation, they are still connected to 
each other. 
Figure  5.5 Village A family farming employment network 
 
 
 
Village B 
This section presents the same tables and figures as in village A. Table 5.9 shows that 
ASTC only partially includes households that have relevant income from family farming. Most 
ASTC members have family farming income that ranges approximately from half to one salary. 
Only one ASCT member has over one salary. Furthermore only two members sell to ASTC and 
it is a very small value.  
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Table 5.9 Village B family farming income distribution by ASTC membership 
 
Income from 
family farming 
(R$) 
No. of non-ASTC 
households 
No. of ASTC 
households 
Proportion of 
ASTC members 
Average sold to 
ASTC (R$) 
0-100 9 1 10% 0 
101-300 12 0 0% 0 
301-660 4 5 56% 214 
661 -1242 3 2 40% 0 
Over 1242 2 0 0% 0 
Total 30 8 21%   
 
Table 5.10 describes the ASTC members’ distribution in political parades participation 
by range of amount sold to ASTC. Furthermore it highlights the percentage of households that 
participate in the blue political parade over the total.  
Table 5.10 shows that there are no households participating in the orange parade among 
ASTC members. Most members sell less than 100 R$ per month to the ASTC, and they are 
equally divided between blue and non-participants. The remaining two households sell the 
equivalent of less than two salaries and they participate in the blue parade. Figure 6 describes 
how the two that sell the most are central in the network and they are connected to each 
other. 
Table  5.10 Village B ASTC households distribution by amount sold to the cooperative in 2011 by 
political parade 
 
Monthly sold 
to coop (R$) 
No. of non-
participant  
No. of orange 
participant  
No. of blue 
participant 
Total 
households 
Blue 
participants 
0-100 3 0 3 6 50% 
101-300 0 0 1 1 100% 
301-660 0 0 0 0 0% 
661 -1242 0 0 1 1 100% 
Over 1242 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 3 0 5 8 63% 
 
Figure 5.6 represents the joint graph of all the networks collected where only ASTC 
members are shown. The meaning of ties and nodes featured is the same used in figure 3. 
Multiple category ties connect all nodes, except for ID 108 and 112, and kinship plays a minor 
role as it connects only two households. 
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Figure 5.6 Village B ASTC members joint graph of the all networks collected 
 
 
 
However, there is no orange among ASTC members. Figure 6, which portrays frequent 
contact network, illustrates that there is no polarization between blue and orange in village B. 
There is a very dense clique that includes households belonging to both political groups. In 
this clique there are households that arrived together, live nearby and are connected by 
kinship ties, but they are not homophilous on political parade participation. 
Figure 5.7 Village B frequent contact network  
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Table 5.11 represents the contact network degree distribution by ASTC. It shows that 
most of the households with the highest degree are ASTC members.  
Table  5.11 Village B frequent contact network degree distribution by ASTC  
Households’ degree 
No. of non-ASTC 
households 
No. of ASTC households 
Proportion of ASTC 
members 
0 2 0 0% 
1-2 9 2 18% 
3 7 0 0% 
4-5 5 0 0% 
6-10 7 6 46% 
Total 30 8 21% 
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the agricultural employment network. As the number of households 
that live on family farming is quite small, the network is not dense. Furthermore it shows that 
the households that hire more are involved in political parades. However the network is quite 
polarized by parade participation. The two groups are connected but with indirect ties. The 
most central households have a brokering role between the two groups. 
Figure 5.8 Village B family farming employment network  
 
 
 
5.4.5 ASTC focus on village A 
Village A is the focus of the analysis as it is the most specialized in new crops, it is more 
vulnerable to be captured by municipal politics. There is no complete overlap between blue 
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faction and cooperative because there are households that do not produce much for the 
cooperative or do not produce but still are members of ASTC. The breakdown of households 
by amount sold to cooperative shows that the majority of households that sell to ASTC more 
than the equivalent of one minimum salary per month prevalently participate in the blue 
party parade (Table 5.7). 
The main argument is that there is a risk that specialization will also cause political 
homogeneity. If the trajectory of cooperative specialization continues, the least productive 
members are likely to be excluded from the cooperative. The risk is that, in the medium run, 
only the most productive and only blue party affiliates will be members of the cooperative. 
The next paragraph illustrate the trajectory of exclusion and political homogenization of the 
cooperative in the history of village A.  
Village A household “in ASTC they only want [people] who produce a lot. ASTC makes a distinction 
between who produces a lot and who produces not so much”.  
Village A household “ASTC brings investment from Italy. In my opinion people that benefitted from ASTC 
and connected projects are only those that had something before. Many already had some savings before the first 
projects started. ASTC only want people that work a lot. Those that do not produce so much cannot stay.” 
The choice of village A has two main reasons. First village A is where ASTC action has 
been more relevant in supporting economic activities, as value of production (60% of total 
ASTC production in 2011) and the proportion of members that sell products to ASTC among 
all members attest (54%). Second, village A is where the period of fieldwork was longer.  
In village A, where a large percentage of people make their livelihood mostly out of 
family farming, two are main forces that are able to mobilize consent: the will to find political 
representation and the necessity to transport and sell agricultural crops. 
ASTC played a role in both spheres. In the early period of the village, it offered some help 
in mediating the relationship between the village and the municipal administration. In this 
village where there was no social movement guiding the process of village creation. The main 
ASTC role however has always been guaranteeing a market and transport for farmers’ 
products. The certainty of a sure market is especially crucial for fruits, high value cash crops 
that are the core business of ASTC, but which are easily perishable and therefore need to be 
quickly transported. 
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The necessity to transport and sell agricultural crops is extremely important in village A, 
more so than in the other villages for three main reasons: first the village is furthest from 
town weekly markets, second, the village has more households that produce fruit crops, and 
third, there are more households to produce a large number of crops. A proxy of this 
importance is the value of income from family farming. 
The emergence of political factions in agrarian reform settlements are only partially 
explained by local dynamics, portrayed by social networks, described in the previous sections 
but more by the intertwine between the above referred factors: political representation and 
transport and commercialization of agricultural crops. The importance of political 
representation is related to the strong dependency of the agrarian reform settlements to 
public policy and to the growing expectations from the state. In village A the local mayor 
(“prefeito”) had an important role in the village creation. It was the main authority with which 
settlers have negotiated access to funds. Most of the population was in favor of the ruling 
mayor, who was a representative of the blue party. During two electoral campaigns, for 
political office in the municipality council, village settlers were mobilized to support id 72 
political campaigns. However, none of the two electoral campaigns was successful. In 2002 
when the results of the elections replaced the political party in charge, some households 
stayed with the old party but many decided to change political representation. The lack of 
alignment with the ruling party was perceived as a possible lack of representation of village at 
the municipal level, and also a possible threat to personal benefits such as “bolsa familia”, the 
conditional cash transfer fund.  
The change of political representation at the municipal level was closely followed by 
ASTC specialization in specific products. In 2008 there was the withdrawal of some relevant 
figures from the cooperative. The main reasons asserted were losses in cooperative 
production along with some personal incompatibilities with the ASTC leading figure. One 
person in particular started to, using the words of the nun, “become an alternative to the 
cooperative”. The cooperative, with the end the “feirinha”, left a space for who would be able 
to support the commercialization of such products. Id 51, the owner of a truck in the 
cooperative, was able to find alternatives for the work he was doing for the cooperative. Since 
2008, he has been offering to transport either only crops or crops and people to sell their 
products at the nearest town market, in exchange for a small amount of money.  
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In 2012 election id 51 gained one political office in the municipality with the opposite 
faction from ASTC majority.  
 It is therefore possible to argue that if a representative of the other faction provides 
transport to commercialize crops that the cooperative does not buy, these households will 
benefit from his services and eventually abandon the cooperative. If these smallest producers 
will leave ASTC, it is likely that ASTC will increase its homogeneity in blue faction’s members. 
In the following two pictures I present the joint graphs of the all networks collected 
where only ASTC members are shown. Figure 5.9 presents all ASTC members present in 2009 
while figure 5.10 only presents members in 2011. The meaning and coding of the links and 
colors of the nodes are the same as those used in figure 3. Square nodes are members in 2011, 
triangles with lower arrow represent members that withdrew from ASTC in 2009, while 
triangles with higher arrows are members that entered after 2011. Comparing the two socio-
graphs, it is evident that the withdrawal of four members caused the loss of a connected part 
of the graph. 
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Figure 5.9 Joint graph of the all ties among village A ASTC members in 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Village A ASTC members joint graph of the all ties without members that exited in 2009 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the trajectory of ASCT specialization, driven by donors, shows that crucial 
decisions taken by ASTC only marginally reflects the needs and requests of ASTC members. 
The debate on the crucial role of donors in shaping ASTC decision and the future of the 
cooperative is central to some of the most productive members. They would like ASTC to gain 
financial autonomy to increase the bargaining power of ASTC members. “If ASTC was able to walk 
with its own legs, it would be able to contribute to the quality of life or our families”.  Quote from focus group.  
However, not all members of ASTC’s board of directors completely agree with this 
position and the ambivalent discourse of the cooperative persists. While dependence from 
external funds provides some members with personal benefits, it strongly hampers the ability 
of members to take decisions in ASTC. 
Referring back to coalition theory, it is possible to argue that, small, tag-along members 
are important as they force the cooperative leader to be consistent when she justifies her 
narrative to some donors saying that ASTC supports the more disadvantaged farmers. On the 
contrary the narrative that is starting to emerge among villagers, especially in village A, is that 
ASTC only supports the biggest producers.  
While ASTC’s support to the introduction of new crops has played a role in the 
emergence of village family farming employment network, its trajectory towards 
specialization has some drawbacks.  
ASCT specialization in very costly crops creates on the one hand barriers to entry in the 
coop, and on the other hand increases dependence on the market. Furthermore ASTC has 
always praised farmers that were able to produce large quantities of crops. During ASTC 
annual meeting, a list of the largest producers is often presented to show who was the first 
producer of ASTC. However, producing higher quantity of the same crop makes it more 
difficult for the cooperative to find a destination for its members’ production. Despite ASTC’s 
ambition and planned strategy, its members are not able to diversify their production beyond 
several high value crops. Members, because of financial and land constraints, tend to produce 
high quantity of the same crop. Being able to find enough buyers for ASTC farmers’ products is 
a crucial issue. The market represented by municipality schools is important for ASTC.  
The non-neutrality of ASTC members, due to its history, creates barriers to its own 
access to municipal funds. As a result of municipal political politics and ASTC history, villagers 
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participate in opposite political parades. Recent events in village A show that political 
affiliation is starting to be a reason for division. ASTC members are prevalently blue party 
participants, and many of the members that withdrew from the coop are now orange 
participants. There is a risk that ASCT could become politically homogenous. This would 
imply on the one hand even more difficult relations with the municipality and the on the other 
hand it can create tension inside the villages. Barth study on pastung tribes in Afghanistan 
(Barth 1980) showed that the presence of men’s club allowed for meeting of people of 
different tribes prevented landlord to segregate them. If ASTC is no longer an organization 
composed by politically heterogeneous households, it would no longer represent an element 
that can respond adaptively to external threats but it would become instead vulnerable for 
local politics to control.    
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6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis explored how the response to external policies, varies across three Brazilian 
agrarian reform settlements (Projetos de assentamentos da reforma agraria) of the same 
municipality. Assentamentos are new villages that emerge from expropriated unproductive 
farms of sugar cane plantations. They can be considered quasi-natural experiments in terms 
of village composition and network formation as they include both old and new settlers.  
Starting from the desegregation of a highly hierarchical society of sugar cane plantation 
(engenho/fazenda) there is the opportunity to recreate a more plural system where family 
farming employment could become a way to bridge households that otherwise will not be 
connected.  
The main argument is that family farming plays a crucial role in allowing for the 
possibility to create new rural villages that differ from previous sugar cane plantation 
production units. The possibility of family farming to become a relevant livelihood strategy is 
associated with the features of villages’ social networks. The co-presence in the same village 
of old and new settlers does imply neither interaction nor peaceful co-existence, especially 
because the two groups have very different features. Moreover, villages’ creation in the 
framework of the agrarian reform does not mean that their main economic activity is family 
farming. 
This research is related to three main strands of literature. First, the debate on the role of 
Brazilian agrarian reform: promotion of structural change or social policy (A. Pereira 2003)? 
Second the discussion on the role of Community Driven Development and Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs): do they promote social change or do they reproduce social and 
economic domination patterns (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012; Agarwal 2001; Labonne and 
Chase 2011; Dorsner 2004; De Wit and Berner 2009)? Third, the scholarship on the role of 
social relations in influencing institutions and organizations (M. Granovetter 1985; Padgett 
and Powell 2012). 
Critical scholars of agrarian reform and CBOs argue that these two policies do not trigger 
any change. They argue that they limit the agrarian reform action to simple resettlement of 
poor people from urban to rural areas. Furthermore they tend to involve only very few 
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people, normally the most central in the network and therefore they tend to reproduce the 
pre-existing social structures. 
The main argument of the thesis is framed in the theory of emergence of organizations 
from the intertwine of social networks in which organizations are embedded (Padgett and 
Powell 2012). The capacity of social structure to respond to change depends on the ways in 
which multiple social networks, that constitute social network structure, overlap (Parkinson 
2013b; Petersen 2001).  
 
Figure 6.1 Scenarios of networks’ overlap 
 
 
The different circles represent the overlap between the different networks studied namely 
kinship, frequent contact and agricultural employment. 
The majority of studies on CBOs and Community Driven Development analyze the 
process of innovation diffusion with linear-in-means models or innovation diffusion models 
(Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Banerjee et al. 2012) or identify the homophilous traits that favor 
households participation in CBOs by using dyadic regression (Arcand and Fafchamps 2012; A. 
Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps 2010a).  
This study instead focuses on how agrarian reform and a producers’ cooperative 
interacts with the relational systems of three villages. This choice has both a theoretical and 
empirical motivation. The theoretical motivation is that change emerges from the dialogue 
between multiple social networks. It is therefore possible to trigger change, and by supporting 
networks that do not totally overlap with the existing ties, supporting ties between people or 
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groups that otherwise would not have been in contact (Figure 1, scenario 2). The empirical 
motivation is related to the fact that the number of households involved by CBOs is usually 
very small. However mapping and analyzing multiple networks allows understanding what 
the features of the relational system and therefore how much the society target of CBOs 
intervention can respond to its action. If CBOs members are not an island (Figure 1, scenario 
1) but instead they are connected by network with the rest of the people (Figure 1, scenario 
2), CBOs influence not only its members but also the rest of the people living in that context. 
This research analyzes three villages created by agrarian reform (Projetos de 
assentamentos da reforma agraria) in the Northeast of Brazil where a cooperative, with the 
invented name of Alagoas Sem Terra Cooperative (ASTC), aims at promoting family farming 
by supporting the introduction of new crops and the commercialization of some products. 
These three villages have been selected out of the 18 assentamentos in the municipality 
object of analysis based on two main criteria. The first rule aimed at selecting villages whose 
creation has been headed by different social movements. Because the process of creation was 
mainly led by Movimento Sem Terra,  the criteria was comparability in terms of cooperative 
intervention. It was selected therefore Village B because it has highest percentage of ASTC 
households’ members in the village after village A, that is  the only  village that was not 
created by a social movement but by a private association (village A). 
For each of the settlements data comprised both households’ attributes and social, 
economic and kinship ties among them. In total the interviews were 102 households in village 
A, 38 in village B and 37 in village C. The number of households interviewed represent all 
households permanently living in village A and B and 95% of those living in village C. 
The agrarian reform settlements can be considered a quasi-natural experiment of village 
creation as new and old settlers with different professional background and geographical 
origin become neighbors. The innovative element of Brazilian agrarian reform is not only 
access to land but also the mobilization of a large number of people from different parts of the 
country and the creation of rural settlements with heterogeneous composition in terms of 
professions. Assentamentos represent an opportunity to create a new rural space 
(Bergamasco 1997). They represent a novelty in Brazilian rural areas as they create a rural 
space where residency and property coincides and family farming favors the creation of rural 
spaces independent from the town (Wanderley 2000). 
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The agrarian reform and ASTC operate in a context that have been characterized for 
centuries by sugar monoculture and where a large majority of unskilled labor force lived in 
large estates that had one landowner, with whom they entertained vertical unequal 
relationships. Families that took part in the agrarian reform comes mostly from this 
background and only a small part of them already had experience with family farming before 
coming to the village. There is therefore the risk the agrarian reform settlements will 
reproduce the pre-existing forms of domination’s structure present in sugar cane plantations.  
The transposition across domains of the same role concept has been defined as 
“refunctionality” (Padgett and McLean 2006a). People, besides residing in a new physical 
space (agrarian reform settlements), would reproduce the same relational patterns (sugar 
cane plantation) experienced during their biography. 
The decision to focus on intra-village ties responds to the necessity to understand 
whether these villages became social systems wherein social and economic reproduction 
functions take place mostly inside the village. By analyzing three agrarian reform settlements 
that were created by three different social movements it is possible to show that different 
households’ recruitment strategies and different early organizations of villages (different 
villages’ histories) led to different village composition and social processes behind network 
formation. 
The villages can be defined as organizations. The unit of analysis is the household and 
they are the nodes in the network. A network describes the social relationships (such as 
friendship) among nodes. Multiple networks that connect households in each village define 
villages’ structure. 
It was collected information on three networks: frequent contact network, kinship and 
agricultural employment. Frequent contact network, which describes frequent meetings of 
households in the village, is considered an approximation of how people interact in each of 
the three villages. Furthermore it can be considered as a behavioral network that is the result 
of constitutive social networks such as kinship and agricultural employment. 
For each village, I estimated Exponential Random Graphs Models (Robins et al. 2007) that 
analyzes the effects of particular network configurations on the presence of ties in the 
frequent contact network among households. Such analysis aims at testing whether 
differences in villages’ histories and social composition are reflected in different social 
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processes and local structures that trigger frequent contact with network formation. 
Specifically it aims what are the common attributes or common edges that increase the 
probability of a link in the frequent contact network.  
The three villages are statistically different in terms of number and homophilous traits 
behind frequent contact network formation. Namely the homophilous traits that trigger tie 
formation are more numerous and less redundant in village A than in the other villages.  
In the three villages the agricultural employment has a brokering role. On the one hand 
households, that have family farming as main livelihood strategy, are more likely to form a tie 
in a frequent contact network and on the other hand agricultural employment creates non-
overlapping ties between households. Households that produce more labor intensive crops 
need to hire more labor and they tend to hire households with whom they have no other ties 
or share few or no common attributes. This favors a higher number and more complex system 
of intra village ties that is different from the social structure of these villages before the 
agrarian reform. In sugar cane plantations most of social reproduction took place mostly 
outside the village. Instead after the agrarian reform, in the villages analyzed, especially in 
village A, it is possible to observe a complex system of intra-village ties inside the village. 
The analysis of the three villages shows that village A differs from the others both on 
features of the relational social system and on family farming production profile.  
On the social dimension several homophilous traits are able to trigger frequent contact 
ties between families. Moreover the number of marriages between people of different 
geographical origin and/or between new and old settlers is higher in village A than in the 
other villages. Village A is the one where there is higher agricultural production and 
prevalence of new crops, that require the higher employment of labor force as testified by an 
agricultural survey conducted in 2007 (COATES 2007).  
On family farming production, chapter 3 explains the production cycle of the most 
widespread crops across settlements and shows that besides the absence of differences in soil 
properties, in village A new crops are most widespread. Furthermore, cooperative 
management system, project reports and leaders’ narratives show that members of the 
cooperative residing in village A have been always the major contributor to the cooperative 
production. 
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Lacking longitudinal data it is not possible to clearly disentangle the direction of 
causality between the relational system configuration and major agricultural production. 
However village A is the one that most resembles the scenario 2 of Petersen theory (Petersen 
2001) as the frequent contact network is predicted by the combination of both family farming 
employment and kinship network that are not completely overlapping.  
Also in the other villages agricultural employment plays a brokering role but the number 
of ties is smaller and the effect on the overall system is smaller. In village B there is 
overlapping between kinship and family farming employment network. 
In village A it is possible to observe how the cooperative influences not only its members 
but also the rest of the village because several households produce the crops that cooperative 
supported and that represent a novelty for the context.  
After having shown how social relational system of village A resemble more to scenario 
2, the thesis ends by highlighting how this brokering role of family farming is hampered by a 
process of political homogenization of producers’ cooperative. 
ASTC interacts with family farming employment network by supporting the introduction 
of new labor-intensive crops and it plays a role in providing the market for some products. 
However, ASCT specialization in very costly crops, influenced by the strong role of donors on 
cooperative’s decision, on the one hand created barriers to entrance in the coop and on the 
other increased dependence towards market. Furthermore if only biggest producers are ASTC 
members and all of smaller family farmers are left out, there is a risk that these ASTC 
members share no or very little space of social interaction with the other villagers (scenario 
1). The situation that would be produced could strongly mimic what was observed during 
sugar cane plantation period where there were very powerful landlords and a very large 
number of salaried workers. If instead ASTC is able to not exclude smaller producers and to be 
heterogeneously composed by both small and large producers it can actually supports the 
creation of more complex relational system characterized by the presence of several small 
and medium family farmers. 
The choice to specialize made the cooperative more dependent from market as it has to 
sell large amount of a limited selection of products. Being able to find enough buyers for ASTC 
farmers’ products is a crucial issue. The market represented by municipality schools is 
important for ASTC. The political positioning of ASTC members, due to its history, creates 
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barriers to its own access to municipal funds. Villagers have started to be affiliated to two 
political opposite parties. Recent events in village A show that political affiliation is starting to 
be a reason for division. ASTC members in fact prevalently support the party represented by 
the color blue and many of the members that withdrew from the cooperative support the 
orange party. Therefore there is a risk that ASCT could become politically homogenous. This 
would imply on the one hand even more difficult relations with the municipality and on the 
other tensions inside the villages that would hamper the brokering role of agricultural 
employment. 
The contribution of this work to extant research is to study role of external policies to 
promote change not in a methodological individualism perspective (Arrow 1994) but rather 
in terms of emergence of new organizational form (Padgett and Powell 2012). We can in fact 
refer to local development not only in terms of expansion of individual capabilities 
(Nussbaum 2011) but also in terms of emergence of new organizational forms (Padgett and 
McLean 2006b). The methodology adopted is a mixed methods approach. The qualitative 
tools allowed to better understand the process of villages’ creation and to inform the meaning 
of social ties in the society analyzed while quantitative tools allowed testing for the 
differences in villages’ social networks’ formation. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Interview guide 
Parte I: Características socioeconômicas da 
família  
Part I: Socio-economic features of the household 
1.Origem das famílias e profissões anteriores 
 
1. Origin of households and previous professions 
Antes de tudo gostaria de saber os vossos nomes (e 
alcunhas) e conhecer um pouco historia da sua 
família.  
 
First of all I would like to know your names (and your 
nicknames) and to know a little about the history of 
your family. 
 
 Vocês (o senhor e a esposa) são naturais de onde?  
 
 Where were you born? 
 Já viveram em outros municípios? Qual foi ultimo 
local onde vocês viveram?  
  
Have you already been living in other municipalities? 
What was the last place where you lived before 
coming to this village? 
 
Alguém da sua família ainda vive o trabalha por lá?  
 
Does somebody of your family still live or work there? 
 
Com qual frequência vocês visitam esses lugares? 
(uma vez por ano, duas vezes por ano, uma vez por 
mês) 31 
How often do you visit such places (once per year, 
twice per year, once per month)? 
 
Quais foram as suas atividades anteriores (prestação 
de serviços, cana de açúcar, agricultura do lote, 
pequeno comercio) 32? 
What were your previous activities (services, sugar 
cane, family farming, small trading activities) 
   
2. Historia de como chegaram a viver no 
assentamento  
2. History of how they got to live in the settlement? 
a) Há quanto tempo vocês vivem nesse local?  
 
a) How long have you been living in the settlement? 
b) Como chegaram a viver aqui? 
 
b) How did you get to live here? 
• Morador  
 
• Old settler 
• Seguindo um movimento social  
 
• Following a social movement 
• Acompanhando um parente que já se tinha 
instalado aqui?   
• Following a relative/sibling 
• Aquisição do lote depois da reforma agrária?  
 
• Plot acquire after agrarian reform? 
   c) Quem vos informou da possibilidade de poder ter 
terra nesse assentamento?  
 
 
c) Who told you about the possibility to get access to 
the land in this settlement? 
d) Se forem dos primeiros moradores pode me 
contar um pouco de como foi o período do 
acampamento até reconhecimento da terra por parte 
do INCRA33.. 
d) If you are in the group of first settlers could you tell 
me a little about the process that led from the period 
of encampment to land access recognition from 
INCRA.  
                                                        
31 I did not provide these possibilities to the respondent but I used them to code the answers. 
32 Idem note 14. 
33 This question was asked only to the first people of each village interviewed and not to everyone. The 
objective was to reconstruct the story of the village. 
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3. Composição da família e atividade atual 
 
3. Household composition and current activity 
 
Quantas pessoas moram consigo na sua casa?   
 
How many people live with you in your house? 
 
Qual é a relação de parentesco que tem com eles?   
 
What is the kinship tie to them? 
Vocês estudaram até que serie34? Did you study until which grade? 
 
Quais são as vossas atividades (não trabalha, 
trabalha em casa, estuda, procura por trabalho, se 
trabalha - prestação de serviços, cana de açúcar, 
agriculturas do lote, pequeno comercio) 
What are your activities (do not work, work at home, 
look for job, if somebody works what are your current 
activities (services, sugar cane, family farming, small 
trading activities) 
No ultimo ano trabalhou fora do assentamento? 
Quantos meses? Qual foi a atividade?  
During last year did somebody in your household 
work out the village? How many months did he or she 
stay away? Which was his activity?  
 
Algumas das pessoas, que vivem na sua casa, tem 
aposentadoria o tem beneficio?  
 
Does somebody in your household have pension or 
social benefit? 
   
5. Bens da família 
 
5.Family goods 
Tem algum equipamento eletrônico? Qual (TV, 
celular, radio, computador)?    
Do you have any electronic equipment? Which? (TV, 
cell phone, radio, computer)?  
 
Qual é a sua fonte água (cacimba, água encanelada, 
rio)? 
 
 
What is your source of water (well, channeled water, 
local stream)? 
 
Vocês para cozinhar usa fogão a lenha o gás de 
cozinha ou os dois? 
 
What do you use to cook: wood or gas or both?  
   
6. Características da produção agrícola 
 
6.Features of family farming production 
Qual e’ a distancia da casa ao lote (em minutos) 35 What is the distance from plot (in minutes) 
Quanto do seu lote esta cultivado (se sabe o numero 
de contas ou hectares, se não quanta parte esta 
cultivada)? 
 
How much of your plot is cultivated (if you know how 
many contas or hectares, if not which part is 
cultivates)? 
Qual é a sua produção agrícola (cana de açúcar, 
lavoura branca, fruticultura, vegetais)  
What is your production (sugar cane, temporary 
crops, fruits, vegetables) 
 
Vocês possuem algum animal? E´ para consumo o 
venda? (pequenos animais, piscicultura, bovinos) 
 
 
Do you have any animal? Is it for consumption or to be 
sold (small animals, fishery, cattle) 
  
A quem entrega a produção? (atravessadores, CEASA, 
vizinhos, cooperativa, feira semanal) 
 
 
To whom do you sell your production? (Middlemen, 
large local warehouse (CEASA), neighbors, coop, 
weekly local market) 
 
Alguém da sua família tem mais de um lote?  
 
Has anybody of your family more than one lot? 
   
                                                        
34 To be intended you and your wife or the opposite 
 
35 Asked just in village B as distance to the plot is higher just in this case. 
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Parte 2: Relações sociais 
 
Part 2: Social relations 
   
1. Relações de parentesco: 
 
1. Kinship ties: 
Tem parentes que vivem no assentamento? 
 
Do you have relatives living in this settlement? 
   
2. Participação em grupos 
 
2. Participation in groups 
 
Vocês na vossa vida já participaram de algum grupo 
(igreja, associação, sindicato, cooperativa)?  
 
 
Did you ever participate in the activities of some 
groups (church, cooperative, union, association)  
Como é que vocês souberam desses grupos?  Foram 
convidados por alguém o como é que souberam?  
How did you get to know about these groups? Did 
someone invite you or how did you get to know?  
 
Vocês participam de alguma igreja? Qual? Quantas 
vezes por semana se encontram? 
 
 
Do you participate in the activities of some church? 
Which? How many times per week do you attend to? 
   
3. Relações laborais 
 
3. Labor relations 
No ultimo ano no seu lote precisaram contratar 
alguém ou vocês foram contratados por outra 
família? Se sim quem?  
 
During last year have you called someone to work on 
your plot? If yes can you name the main workers that 
you contracted? (Hires)  
 
No ultimo ano alguém da sua casa trabalhou para 
outro assentado, o por outra pessoa de fora?  
 
 
During the last year have you worked on the plot of 
some villages’ holders? If yes can you name the main 
people that called you? (Work for).  
   
4. Canais de informação/amizades 
 
4.Access to information and friendship 
 
 
Tem alguma pessoa que vocês se reúnem 
frequentemente para conversar? Quem são, poderia 
saber os nomes?  
 
 
Are there some people that you frequently meet to 
talk? Who are they? Can I know their names?  
Como è que você se informa sobre as novidades da 
cidade? tem alguém que vocês gostam de conversar 
para ter essas informações?  
 
How do you get to know about the news from town? Is 
there somebody that you like to talk with to get this 
information? 
 
Se estiverem precisando de alguma ajuda para 
enfrentar uma dificuldade na roça a quem pedem?  
 
 
If you need help to solve some issue related to your 
plot, whom do you ask to?  
 
Quem vocês acham que é mais popular no 
assentamento?   
 
 
Who do you think is the most popular in the 
settlement? 
 
Se estiverem precisando de alguma ajuda para 
enfrentar uma dificuldade no assentamento a quem 
pedem? 
 
If you needed some help to solve some issue in the 
settlement who would you call? 
   
6. Mobilidade 
 
6. Mobility patterns 
 
Alguém da sua família se desloca para a cidade, ou 
outros assentamentos ou outros locais (para fazer 
compras, para ir ao medico, para vender os produtos 
cultivados) 
 
Do somebody of your family go to town or other 
settlements or other place to buy groceries, visit a 
doctor or sell products? 
255 
 
Qual é o meio de transporte (mota/bicicleta de 
propriedade, carro/ camião de propriedade, 
transporte semi-coletivo):  
 
What is your transportation mean (own motorbike, 
own bicycle, own car, own truck, semi-collective 
transport) 
 
Além da citade vocês vão para outros locais? Em 
media quantas vezes por ano? 
 
 
Beside the nearest town do you go to other places? 
Which and how many times per month?  
   
7. Renda e gastos 
 
7. Income and expenses 
Quanto é a renda por mês juntando tudo (a renda da 
agricultura, de outros trabalhos e bolsa família e/o 
aposentadoria)?  
 
How much is income per month putting together 
family farming, other jobs and bolsa familia and/or 
pension?  
Quanto a agricultura contribui para a renda (valor 
exacto ou percentagem)?  
 
How much family farming contributes to the overall 
income (either you tell the exact amount or indicate 
the approximate percentage) 
Vocês gastam quanto por mês (eletricidade, 
alimentação, remédio, transporte, compra de adubes 
o outros equipamentos para a agricultura)?  
 
How much do you spend per month (electricity, food, 
medicine, transport, supplies for agricultural 
production)?  
  
8. Houve mudanças na sua vida, produção agrícola, 
convívio desde que a sua família se transferiu para 
este assentamento? 
 
8. Are there changes in your life after you moved to 
the settlement (social environment, agricultural 
production, safety or others) 
• ·Muito 
 
• A lot 
• razoável 
 
• Moderately 
• ·Pouco  
 
• a little 
• ·Nada 
 
• nothing 
  
O que melhorou?  
What improved? 
 
O que piorou?  
What got worse? 
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8.2 Focus group questions 
 
1 Vocês sabem o que a cooperativa faz? Pode explicar 
 
Do you know what the cooperative do? Can you 
explain. 
2 
Na sua ótica a cooperativa esta a responder aos 
seus problemas? 
In your opinion do the cooperative answer to your 
problems? 
3 
Na sua ótica a cooperativa esta a responder as suas 
necessidades de assistência técnica? 
In your opinion do the cooperative answer to your 
technical assistance issues? 
4 
O que vocês pensam que não funciona na 
cooperativa.  O que esta a funcionar? O que vocês 
queriam mudar? 
What do you think that does not work in the coop? 
What is working? What would like to change? 
5 
 
Na vossa ótica e’ difícil participar na vida da 
cooperative: propor as vossas ideais e fazer 
atividades em comum? 
In your opinion is it difficult to participate to coop 
activities: propose you own ideas and do activities 
with other members? 
6 
 
Já tiveram a sensação que alguém decidiu por você 
na cooperativa? 
 
Have you ever had the impression that somebody 
decided for you? 
7 
O que vocês pensam da divida do agricultor em 
relação ao INCRA? 
What do you think about settlers’ debt towards 
INCRA? 
8 
Vocês continuariam a trabalhar na cooperativa se 
ela parasse de trabalhar com projetos? 
Will you still continue with coop if it would stop 
working with projects? 
9 
O que vocês acham daqueles cooperados que não 
participam das atividades da cooperativa? 
What do you think about those people that did not 
take part in the activities of cooperative? 
10 
No futuro vocês pensam que a cooperativa terá um 
papel na vossa vida? 
Do you think that the cooperative will still play a 
role in your life? 
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8.3 Variables collected 
 
Variable name Variable description Type of variable 
Age Age (mean of male and female age) ordinal 
hh Number components in the household ordinal 
village 
Number of years in the village (mean man and female household head 
years in the village) 
ordinal 
school Number of years of school (mean man and female years of school)  ordinal 
income Monthly average total income ordinal 
aincome Monthly average family farming income ordinal 
mobility Number of times outside the village per year ordinal 
land Plot dimension in hectares ordinal 
cows Number of cows possessed ordinal 
hires Number of households that they hire to work on their plot  ordinal 
workfor Number of households for whom they work for ordinal 
kind Number of households to which they have kinship relationship ordinal 
aff 
Sum of all events in which families take part that are represented by 
the sheet events 
ordinal 
popular 
Number that household that referred the household in object as among 
the most popular  
ordinal 
moto Possess of motorcycle nominal 
car Possess of car nominal 
truck Possess of truck nominal 
bike Possess of bicycle nominal 
female Female leaded household nominal 
intm Interviewed male nominal 
inf Interviewed female nominal 
intb Interviewed both nominal 
ac Possess of animals for consumption nominal 
as Possess of small animals to sell  nominal 
at Possess of horse nominal 
as1 Possess of cows to sell nominal 
orange Participation in political parade orange nominal 
blue Participation in political parade blue nominal 
geremias Household that arrived in the village in the group of Geremias nominal 
severino Household that arrived in the village in the group of Severino nominal 
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aut96 Autonomous worker before agrarian reform nominal 
em96 Employee before agrarian reform nominal 
mix96 Mixed employment status before agrarian reform nominal 
ret96 Retired before agrarian reform nominal 
une96 Not employed before agrarian reform nominal 
aut12 Autonomous worker after agrarian reform nominal 
em12 Employee after agrarian reform nominal 
mix12 Mixed employment status after agrarian reform nominal 
une12 Retired after agrarian reform nominal 
ret12 Not employed after agrarian reform nominal 
3sect96 Working in the third sector before agrarian reform nominal 
agri96 Family farming before agrarian reform nominal 
cane96 Sugar cane before agrarian reform nominal 
offcane96 Sugar cane industry officer before agrarian reform nominal 
oth96 Other before agrarian reform nominal 
mixx96 Mixed employment sector before agrarian reform nominal 
mun+oth96 Municipality + other livelihood strategies nominal 
3sec12 working in the third sector y after agrarian reform nominal 
agri12 family farming after agrarian reform nominal 
cane12 sugar cane after agrarian reform nominal 
oth12 other after agrarian reform nominal 
mun+oth12 municipality + other livelihood strategies nominal 
mixx12 mixed employment sector after agrarian reform nominal 
offcane12 sugar cane industry officer after agrarian reform nominal 
land96 access to land either personal or family land nominal 
land12 access to land either personal or family land  after agrarian reform nominal 
3rd comers 3rd wave nominal 
2nd comers 2nd wave nominal 
originary 
dependents 
son of already in village before encampment nominal 
1st com 
dependants 
kids of first comers that arrived in the village with parents nominal 
1st comers 1st wave of people nominal 
originary people that were living in the village before agrarian reform nominal 
pen coming from the town of penedo nominal 
sanseb coming from the town of san sebastiao nominal 
bj already living in bom jesus before sem terra nominal 
jun coming from the town of junqueiro nominal 
pind coming from the cooperative pindorama nominal 
munov coming from nearby engenho mundo novo nominal 
piab coming from nearby engenho piabas nominal 
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riac coming from nearby engenho riachao nominal 
other coming from other areas nominal 
coop07 production sold coop in reais in 2007 ordinal 
coop08 production sold coop in reais in 2008 ordinal 
coop09 production sold coop in reais in 2009 ordinal 
coop10 production sold coop in reais in 2010 ordinal 
coop11 production sold coop in reais in 2011 ordinal 
coop12 production sold coop in reais in 2012 ordinal 
MLST member of MLST local association indicator 
futbol member of local futbol team indicator 
landasso member of local land association indicator 
cath following catholic church indicator 
evang1 following local evangelical church #1 indicator 
evang2 following local evangelical church #2 indicator 
Manacleto commercializing products with anacleto* indicator 
Mbarros commercializing products in the market in barros* indicator 
Mcoop commercializing products in the coop indicator 
Mmunicipality commercializing products in the market in municipality indicator 
* fictional name 
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8.4 Variables specified in the Exponential Random Graph Models 
 
  Variable description 
Type of 
variable 
Number of 
levels in 
village A 
Number of 
levels in 
village B 
Number of 
levels in 
village C 
Uniform homophily 
effect      
nodematch.agri12 
Declared to be engaged in agriculture as 
main livelihood activity at time of 
survey (2012) 
indicator 
variable 
   
nodematch.cath Following catholic church 
indicator 
variable 
   
nodematch.contact 
Information about the possibility to get 
access to land in the village by the same 
contact 
categorical 
variable 
19 11 15 
nodematch.cop11 Production sold coop (R$) in 2011 
continuous 
variable 
   
nodematch.coopavr 
Average production sold coop in reais 
from 2007 to 2012 
continuous 
variable 
   
nodematch.empl0 
Previous employment sector before 
agrarian reform 
categorical 
variable 
7 7 7 
nodematch.empl1 
Employment sector at time of survey 
(2012) 
categorical 
variable 
7 7 7 
nodematch.evang1 following local evangelical church #1 
indicator 
variable 
   
nodematch.evang2 following local evangelical church #2 
indicator 
variable 
 Not present Not present 
nodematch.futbol member of local futbol team 
indicator 
variable    
nodematch.hires 
number of household that they hire to 
work on their plot 
discrete 
variable 
   
nodematch.local 
.association 
belonging to the same local association 
indicator 
variable 
   
nodematch.market.pl
ace 
selling product on the same market 
place 
indicator 
variable 
   
nodematch.village.off
ice 
total number of years that the 
household had some office in the village 
continuous 
variable 
   
nodematch.origin 
matching on the same origin from the 
same geographical origin before coming 
to the village 
categorical 
variable 
10 6 9 
nodematch.party 
matching on the same political 
participation 
categorical 
variable 
4 4 NA 
nodematch.popular 
number that household that referred 
the household in object as among the 
most popular 
continuous 
variable 
   
nodematch.migration
.wave 
matching on the same level of the 
categorical variable that describe  
migration waves 
categorical 
variable 
7 5 7 
nodematch.workfor 
number of households for whom they 
work for 
continuous 
variable 
   
Edge covariance 
effects 
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edgecov.nhA edgecovariance in hire network 
continuous 
variable 
   
edgecov.nkA edgecovariance in kinship network 
continuous 
variable 
   
edgecov.nwA edgecovariance in workfor network 
continuous 
variable 
   
Structural effects      
gwdegree Geometrically weighted degree     
 gwesp 
Geometrically weighted edge wise 
shared partners 
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8.5  Sensitivity analysis 
 
Village A correlations  
 
 
 
  
migration wave
employment sector 
before agrarian 
reform
 employment sector 
at survey time
geographical origin
contact to get in the 
village
popularity score
number of workers 
hired
number of 
households work 
with
political parade 
participation
value sold to coop 
in 2011
average production 
sold to coop 2007-
2012
footbal team 
member
membership in 
village association
catholic church 
evangelical church 
1
evangelical church 
2
production sold in 
the same local 
market
village president 
engaged in family 
farming
migration wave 1.000
employment sector 
before agrarian reform
0.067 1.000
 employment sector at 
survey time
-0.066 0.134 1.000
geographical origin 0.332 0.040 0.160 1.000
contact to get in the 
village
-0.259 -0.021 0.146 -0.156 1.000
popularity score -0.086 -0.086 0.138 -0.078 -0.042 1.000
number of workers 
hired
0.171 -0.139 0.040 -0.087 -0.132 0.240 1.000
number of households 
work with
0.048 0.111 0.050 0.109 0.131 -0.140 -0.304 1.000
political parade 
participation
0.211 0.178 0.087 0.213 -0.197 0.233 0.165 0.018 1.000
value sold to coop in 
2011
0.114 -0.119 -0.182 0.149 -0.169 0.320 0.303 -0.236 0.170 1.000
average production 
sold to coop 2007-
2012
0.033 -0.097 -0.199 0.076 -0.141 0.392 0.272 -0.219 0.262 0.907 1.000
footbal team member 0.004 -0.036 0.245 0.123 0.121 0.203 0.104 0.125 0.206 0.048 0.055 1.000
membership in village 
association
-0.296 0.025 0.013 -0.087 0.082 -0.016 0.095 -0.109 -0.026 0.261 0.238 -0.029 1.000
catholic church 0.122 -0.129 -0.151 0.042 -0.049 0.038 0.320 -0.107 0.251 0.093 0.067 0.049 -0.069 1.000
evangelical church 1 0.011 0.103 -0.031 -0.011 -0.027 -0.074 -0.233 0.260 -0.212 -0.067 -0.073 -0.090 0.078 -0.218 1.000
evangelical church 2 -0.047 -0.060 0.107 0.067 0.060 -0.065 -0.161 0.111 -0.146 -0.102 -0.100 -0.117 -0.004 -0.173 -0.074 1.000
production sold in the 
same local market
-0.230 -0.080 -0.068 -0.126 0.088 -0.072 0.058 -0.037 -0.103 -0.134 -0.126 -0.010 0.087 -0.102 -0.018 -0.069 1.000
village president -0.157 -0.169 0.057 -0.086 -0.004 0.327 0.217 -0.065 0.041 0.227 0.261 0.007 0.120 -0.028 -0.052 -0.042 -0.057 1.000
engaged in family 
farming
0.068 -0.200 -0.869 -0.044 -0.143 -0.079 0.052 0.004 -0.005 0.248 0.256 -0.198 0.175 0.159 0.076 -0.058 0.138 -0.055 1.000
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Village A – sensitity analysis 
 
  
estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E.
edges -4.969 0.528 *** -4.818 0.520 *** -4.884 0.523 *** -4.913 0.526 ***
Actor	relation	effects	
(exogenous)	-	Homophily
engaged in family farming 0.296 0.239 0.305 0.173 .
catholic church 0.237 0.200 0.282 0.198 0.242 0.200 0.275 0.197
evangelical church 1 0.278 0.215 0.252 0.215 0.281 0.215 0.249 0.215
evangelical church 2 0.618 0.297 * 0.606 0.296 * 0.624 0.297 * 0.602 0.296 *
average production sold to coop 
2007-2012
-0.116 0.188 -0.142 0.188
political parade participation 0.105 0.177 0.091 0.176 0.093 0.176 0.102 0.176
migration wave 0.217 0.199 0.212 0.199 0.215 0.199 0.214 0.198
geographical origin 0.511 0.197 ** 0.502 0.197 * 0.500 0.197 * 0.512 0.197 **
contact to get in the village 0.014 0.205 0.033 0.204 0.008 0.205 0.037 0.204
popularity score -0.648 0.183 *** -0.624 0.183 *** -0.636 0.182 *** -0.633 0.184 ***
membership in village association 0.018 0.175 0.022 0.175 0.017 0.175 0.024 0.175
number of workers hired 0.283 0.180 0.295 0.180 0.284 0.180 0.293 0.180
number of households work with 0.009 0.178 0.006 0.178 0.020 0.178 -0.005 0.178
employment sector before 
agrarian reform
0.408 0.184 * 0.425 0.184 * 0.421 0.184 * 0.410 0.184 *
 employment sector at survey time 0.010 0.246 0.209 0.178 0.227 0.178
footbal team member 0.049 0.175 0.035 0.176 0.045 0.175 0.038 0.175
value sold to coop in 2011 0.032 0.190 0.065 0.188 0.026 0.203
production sold in the same local 
market
0.015 0.203 0.024 0.203 0.014 0.203
village president -0.175 0.323 -0.164 0.320 -0.207 0.322 -0.136 0.320
Covariate	network	(exogenous)	-	
Covariate	edges
hire network 1.476 0.386 *** 1.502 0.387 *** 1.487 0.386 *** 1.493 0.387 ***
work for network 1.739 0.395 *** 1.668 0.395 *** 1.725 0.396 *** 1.683 0.394 ***
 kinship network 2.817 0.191 *** 2.813 0.191 *** 2.817 0.191 *** 2.814 0.191 ***
Model	1 Model	2 Model	3 Model	4
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Village B – correlations 
 
  
migration 
wave
employment 
sector before 
agrarian reform
employment sector 
at survey time
geographical origin
contact to get in 
the village
popularity 
score
number of 
workers hired
number of 
households 
work with
political parade 
participation
footbal team 
member
membership in 
village 
association
production sold 
in the same local 
market
catholic church 
evangelical 
church
average production 
sold to coop 2007-
2012
value sold to 
coop in 2011
village 
president 
engaged in 
family 
farming
migration wave 1.000
employment sector before 
agrarian reform
-0.051 1.000
employment sector at survey 
time
-0.260 -0.158 1.000
geographical origin -0.112 0.190 -0.112 1.000
contact to get in the village -0.334 -0.227 0.111 0.313 1.000
popularity score 0.013 0.053 0.092 0.155 -0.171 1.000
number of workers hired 0.000 -0.009 0.174 -0.020 -0.022 0.125 1.000
number of households work with -0.022 0.076 -0.136 -0.082 0.243 0.044 -0.187 1.000
political parade participation -0.037 0.026 0.004 -0.002 -0.156 0.280 0.171 0.058 1.000
footbal team member -0.024 0.348 -0.093 -0.083 0.091 0.358 0.144 0.243 0.221 1.000
membership in village 
association
-0.149 -0.199 0.397 -0.041 -0.192 0.460 -0.063 -0.006 0.335 0.086 1.000
production sold in the same local 
market
-0.091 -0.196 -0.014 -0.055 0.009 0.206 0.168 0.205 -0.078 0.156 0.131 1.000
catholic church -0.150 -0.139 -0.077 -0.192 -0.105 0.105 -0.096 -0.120 0.171 0.117 0.091 -0.133 1.000
evangelical church 0.339 -0.148 -0.165 0.042 0.186 -0.111 0.015 0.333 -0.096 -0.116 -0.142 0.014 -0.260 1.000
average production sold to coop 
2007-2012
-0.137 -0.178 0.160 -0.007 0.070 0.352 0.307 0.197 0.531 0.367 0.344 0.256 0.026 0.026 1.000
value sold to coop in 2011 -0.079 -0.072 0.200 0.189 -0.192 0.808 0.221 -0.093 0.395 0.320 0.554 0.196 0.110 -0.125 0.658 1.000
village president 0.045 -0.016 0.202 -0.128 -0.296 0.514 0.000 -0.147 0.294 -0.049 0.525 -0.036 0.027 -0.237 0.100 0.424 1.000
engaged in family farming 0.196 0.032 -0.776 0.024 -0.032 -0.080 -0.034 0.250 -0.192 -0.042 -0.335 0.064 -0.017 0.256 -0.101 -0.196 -0.136 1.000
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Village B sensitivity analysis 
 
 
 
 
estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E.
edges -2.2435 0.4321 *** -1.948 0.460 *** -1.828 0.415 *** -1.742 0.437 *** -2.142 0.444 *** -2.0443 0.4355 *** -1.623 0.428 ***
Actor relation effects (exogenous) - 
Homophily
engaged in family farming 0.5938 0.2538 * 0.589 0.253 * 0.593 0.254 * 0.5977 0.2529 *
catholic church -0.3295 0.2696 -0.159 0.281 -0.301 0.274 -0.264 0.284 -0.281 0.275 -0.1962 0.2689 -0.169 0.280
evangelical church 1 -0.2366 0.3325 -0.352 0.328 -0.165 0.331 -0.161 0.332 -0.232 0.333 -0.3433 0.3275 -0.291 0.326
evangelical church 2
average production sold to coop 2007-
2012
-0.275 0.292 -0.269 0.295 -0.4137 0.2836
political parade participation -0.1074 0.2803 -0.198 0.276 -0.078 0.283 -0.109 0.280 -0.067 0.284 -0.1427 0.2803 -0.211 0.275
migration wave 0.8155 0.2667 ** 0.799 0.265 ** 0.757 0.269 ** 0.798 0.265 ** 0.768 0.271 ** 0.7412 0.2688 ** 0.790 0.263 **
geographical origin 0.1691 0.3357 0.212 0.336 0.131 0.330 0.142 0.332 0.163 0.334 0.1981 0.3334 0.176 0.333
contact to get in the village -0.7222 0.4539 -0.804 0.451 . -0.672 0.444 -0.695 0.445 -0.696 0.451 -0.7634 0.4503 . -0.787 0.445 .
popularity score -0.7113 0.3038 * -0.655 0.311 * -0.683 0.308 * -0.646 0.312 * -0.787 0.445 .
membership in village association -0.1485 0.2801 -0.176 0.283 -0.118 0.286 -0.094 0.287 -0.1505 0.2835 -0.192 0.283
number of workers hired 0.5137 0.2678 . 0.452 0.270 0.551 0.272 * 0.568 0.277 * 0.562 0.273 * 0.4673 0.2686 . 0.441 0.269
number of households work with 0.3242 0.5698 0.366 0.565 0.336 0.572 0.360 0.571 0.340 0.572 0.3543 0.5664 0.372 0.567
employment sector before agrarian 
reform
0.454 0.2895 0.366 0.287 0.439 0.288 0.418 0.289 0.454 0.289 0.4022 0.2865 0.350 0.286
 employment sector at survey time 0.162 0.271 0.182 0.272 0.186 0.270
footbal team member 0.1531 0.2609 0.118 0.262 0.149 0.260 0.181 0.262 0.155 0.262 0.0796 0.2592 0.115 0.261
value sold to coop in 2011 -0.497 0.406 -0.415 0.409 -0.536 0.405
production sold in the same local 
market
-0.1809 0.2497 -0.191 0.249 -0.196 0.249 -0.197 0.249 -0.186 0.250 -0.1865 0.2494 -0.201 0.248
village president -0.467 0.2996 -0.545 0.302 . -0.521 0.305 . -0.412 0.303 -0.524 0.307 . -0.6769 0.3012 * -0.536 0.299
Covariate network (exogenous) - 
Covariate edges
hire network -0.1827 0.8049 -0.158 0.810 -0.214 0.805 -0.200 0.806 -0.189 0.802 -0.1803 0.8056 -0.203 0.813
work for network 0.9347 0.666 1.070 0.662 0.787 0.661 0.912 0.653 0.887 0.672 0.9056 0.6734 0.980 0.652
 kinship network 0.8519 0.5516 0.897 0.545 0.878 0.554 0.851 0.551 0.877 0.554 0.9351 0.5494 . 0.915 0.544 .
Model 6 Model 7Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Village C – correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration wave
employment 
sector before 
agrarian 
reform
 employment 
sector at 
survey time
geographical 
origin
contact to get 
in the village
popularity 
score
number of 
workers hired
number of 
households 
work with
footbal team 
member
membership in 
village 
association
production 
sold in the 
same local 
market
catholic church 
evangelical 
church 1
average 
production 
sold to coop 
2007-2012
village 
president 
engaged in 
family farming
value sold to 
coop in 2011
migration wave 1.00
employment sector before 
agrarian reform
0.07 1.00
 employment sector at 
survey time
-0.08 0.01 1.00
geographical origin 0.52 0.04 0.06 1.00
contact to get in the village 0.24 -0.02 0.10 0.21 1.00
popularity score -0.20 0.09 -0.05 -0.16 0.02 1.00
number of workers hired 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.09 -0.22 1.00
number of households 
work with
-0.12 -0.22 -0.02 0.16 0.08 -0.12 -0.20 1.00
footbal team member -0.07 0.16 0.32 0.31 -0.16 0.25 -0.13 0.07 1.00
membership in village 
association
-0.52 -0.02 -0.02 -0.38 0.22 0.13 -0.31 0.03 -0.13 1.00
production sold in the same 
local market
-0.30 0.03 -0.02 -0.22 -0.20 0.08 -0.15 0.07 -0.03 0.23 1.00
catholic church -0.08 -0.34 -0.17 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.03 -0.23 0.12 -0.12 1.00
evangelical church 1 -0.23 0.31 -0.06 -0.21 -0.04 0.30 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.13 0.34 -0.13 1.00
average production sold to 
coop 2007-2012
-0.06 -0.17 -0.20 -0.08 -0.19 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10 -0.24 0.07 0.32 -0.07 0.10 1.00
village president 0.02 0.38 0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.08 0.33 -0.13 0.14 0.26 -0.04 0.16 0.05 1.00
engaged in family farming -0.03 -0.09 -0.79 -0.06 -0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.40 0.20 0.04 0.27 -0.09 0.26 -0.04 1.00
value sold to coop in 2011 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 -0.10 -0.19 0.01 -0.13 -0.11 -0.25 0.08 0.34 -0.08 0.18 0.99 0.11 0.23 1.00
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Village C – sensitivity analysis 
estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E. estimates S.E.
edges -1.339 0.751 . -1.904 0.712 ** -1.339 0.751 . -1.904 0.712 **
Actor	relation	effects	(exogenous)	
-	Homophily
engaged in family farming -0.862 0.302 ** -0.862 0.302 **
catholic church 0.388 0.317 0.388 0.317 0.376 0.313
evangelical church 1 0.511 0.394 0.594 0.399 0.511 0.394 0.594 0.399
evangelical church 2
average production sold to coop 
2007-2012
-0.923 0.469 * -0.976 0.468 *
political parade participation
migration wave -0.414 0.417 -0.400 0.417 -0.414 0.417 -0.400 0.417
geographical origin -0.035 0.458 -0.055 0.457 -0.035 0.458 -0.055 0.457
contact to get in the village 0.425 0.396 0.299 0.399 0.425 0.396 0.299 0.399
popularity score -0.858 0.337 * -0.835 0.340 * -0.858 0.337 * -0.835 0.340 *
membership in village association 0.205 0.408 0.416 0.401 0.205 0.408 0.416 0.401
number of workers hired -0.329 0.314 -0.364 0.309 -0.329 0.314 -0.364 0.309
number of households work with -0.716 0.306 * -0.705 0.304 * -0.716 0.306 * -0.705 0.304 *
employment sector before agrarian 
reform
0.238 0.330 0.335 0.333 0.238 0.330
 employment sector at survey time -0.456 0.358 -0.456 0.358
footbal team member 0.671 0.298 * 0.607 0.295 * 0.671 0.298 * 0.607 0.295 *
value sold to coop in 2011 -0.923 0.469 * -0.976 0.468 *
production sold in the same local 
market
0.308 0.313 0.297 0.311 0.308 0.313 0.297 0.311
village president -0.160 0.357 -0.004 0.355 -0.160 0.357 -0.004 0.355
Covariate	network	(exogenous)	-	
Covariate	edges
hire network 1.007 0.783 0.955 0.800 1.007 0.783 0.955 0.800
work for network 3.127 0.688 *** 3.077 0.671 *** 3.127 0.688 *** 3.077 0.671 ***
 kinship network 1.704 0.490 *** 1.690 0.478 *** 1.704 0.490 *** 1.690 0.478 ***
Model	4Model	2 Model	3Model	1
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8.6 Monte Carlo Markov Chain stepwise model diagnostics 
 
8.6.1 Village A stepwise model 4 MCMC diagnostics  
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8.6.2 Village B stepwise model 4MCMC diagnostics  
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8.6.3 Village C stepwise model 4 MCMC diagnostics 
 
 
 
 
 
